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Abstract 
Order and Leadership 
Author: Craig Noyes 
Advisor: Timothy Crawford 
This thesis focuses on United States civil-military relations during the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. It examines interactions between principal-level civilian and 
top-tier military leadership during three strategic decision-making moments. Each case 
involves examples of subjective civilian control. The author’s goal is to investigate and 
then categorize the processes that were used, assessing how variables influenced the 
nature of subjective control. Qualitative process tracing is the primary methodology. The 
author focuses on available sources from myriad avenues including but not limited to 
journalism, memoirs, primary documents, and social science literature. Case study 
analysis identifies numerous variables. Presidential leadership and process organization 
were found to be the most influential, spanning from engaged to “delegatory” and orderly 
to ad-hoc, respectively. Correlations are identified between the variables. Then, theories 
from established literature are reviewed and applied when possible. Research finds that 
subjective civil-military relations became increasingly moderate and theoretically “pure” 
over each case, chronologically. The author uses his analysis to create new typologies of 
subjective civil-military control, focusing on the relationships between presidential 
leadership and process organization. The resulting typologies are intended to assist 
political scientists’ identification and categorization of varying civil-military 
relationships on the subjective end of Huntington’s spectrum. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
In this thesis, the author focuses on United States civil-military relations during 
the first decade of the twenty-first century. He examines the interaction between 
principal-level civilian leadership and the top-tier military leadership during three 
strategic decision-making moments in the Global War on Terror/Overseas Contingency 
Operation (GWT/OCO). Every case involves examples of subjective civilian control. In 
all instances the president maintains primary decision-making status and ultimate 
authority. However, the power dynamics shifted from case to case. As such, the author’s 
ultimate goal is to categorize the processes that were used and assess how any relevant 
variables influenced the nature of subjective control. 
The author pays particular focus on the National Security Council’s (NSC) 
relevance and influence upon the relationship/decision-making process. By examining 
this component of national security policy making, the author analyzes the operational 
processes within the civil-military relationship. How the NSC is involved in each case is 
vital to the style of national security decision-making. The latter point is established by 
history as well as political science literature preceding this work. 
This thesis deals with fundamental concepts pertaining to subjective civil-military 
relations as well as the dynamics related thereto. Key questions include the following: 
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How can we categorize the different forms of subjective civilian control? In what way do 
those forms relate to each other? What is the decision-making process and how do the 
relevant agents/variables influence that process? Furthermore, how does that process 
influence the type of subjective control that is experienced? If we assume that successful 
civil-military decision making involves all players participating in national security 
process, what attributes lead to the most judicious, inclusive, deliberative, non-coercive 
method?  
These questions regarding subjective civil-military relations are important not 
only because the relationship is in constant flux. They are also important because of the 
number of innovation, tactical changes, and strategic pivots that has occurred since late 
2001. The civil-military relationship, the bureaucracies therein (diplomatic, military, and 
intelligence), and the end games of our policies have gone through significant changes 
this century. They have been under great stress as our forces and resources have been 
used with heightened frequency. As such, analyzing their actions and understanding their 
relationships may help us better appreciate the needs of our current national security 
environment. 
Beyond the immediate relevance of this work is the fact that the civil-military 
relationship is a concept that has existed for centuries. Political scientists have theorized 
about it for decades. As such, it is valuable to examine the concept as it pertains to new 
events. This thesis uses a number of theoretical works that focus on the nature of civil-
military relations and bureaucratic process theory. By using these literatures the author 
hopes to identify the loci of decision-making, the efficacy of different process 
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organizations, and the manner by which presidential leadership influences the degree of 
subjective civilian control.  
The Framework 
This thesis focuses on the interpersonal, bureaucratic relationships that were built, 
disassembled, used, and/or neglected at certain benchmarks during the previous decade. 
In its most fundamental form, however, this thesis and the theoretical work herein focus 
on the phenomenon of subjective civilian control. It is clear that there are myriad forms 
of the subjective civil-military relationship; this is due to the numerous variables that 
influence the relationship. In using process tracing, one can argue that there are 
identifiable trends present amongst the variables. When the process is of a particular sort 
– as indicated by and predicated upon particular variables and actions – then a category 
of subjective civilian control is identified. 
The author adopts these suppositions. As such, within this thesis, the dependent 
variable (DV) is the type of subjective civilian control that is present within a particular 
case’s civil-military relationship. The DV corresponds with Huntington’s typologies of 
subjective versus objective civil-military relations. Thus, the theory developed in this 
thesis complements the literature that precedes it. This author intends to fill a gap in 
existing conceptual frameworks regarding types of subjective control. 
The dependent variable is influenced by a large number of independent variables 
(IV). These are discussed throughout the thesis. Of all the independent variables in 
herein, two are most prevalent, influential, and predictable among all the others. 
Presidential leadership and decision-making process organization are clearly present in 
every case. They also have direct correlations with dependent variable outcomes. Other 
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independent variables include the institution in which the debate is centered, the nature of 
the debate, the transparency of the debate, and the civilian agents’ level of authenticity 
within the civil-military dynamic. All of these IVs are described in the literature review 
chapter. 
The National Security Council and national security advisor are highly influential 
agents in modern US national security decision-making. They have been particularly 
relevant since Nixon’s Administration and became structurally reinforced following the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of the late 1980s. Because of the NSC’s mission and its relevance 
regarding many independent variables (including the center of debate, nature of debate, 
and transparency of debate IVs), this author pays particular focus on how its character 
and actions influence the DV. This effort reinforces and builds upon existing literature. 
Numerous authors have studied the NSC’s role in decision-making. They have developed 
typologies that assist this author’s undertaking, here. Crabb and Mulcahy’s work is of 
particular relevance. This thesis complements and builds upon their theories as it does 
with Huntington’s. 
Intervening variables (IntV) include the organizational structures of bureaucracies 
used in the relationship, the style of communications between the sides (ie. method, 
frequency, etc.), tempo of the decision-making process, and others. Conditional variables 
(CV) include policy makers’ willingness to make policy decisions, the political 
capital/opportunity to enact policies, and the military’s capability to enact the decided 
upon tactics/strategies, among others.  
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The Cases 
Three case studies are examined here. They span two presidential administrations, 
two wars, the preparation for one invasion, and two tactical/strategic shifts of ongoing 
combat operations. The case studies include war-planning for the Iraq invasion in the 
spring of 2003; the strategic review/implementation of counterinsurgency strategy 
(COIN) – what became known as the “Surge” – in Iraq, 2006; and the strategic 
review/war plan in Afghanistan, 2009. The timeline spans approximately eight years, 
from September 2001 through December 2009.  
The author uses the case studies as controlled comparisons; he relies heavily upon 
process tracing. Since all three cases occur within the same civil-military structure, deal 
with consistent theaters of operation, and have great overlap in the players, the author 
hopes to minimize extraneous variables. This allows the author to monitor a large number 
of concepts that would prevent a controlled comparison of the relationship. Thus, using 
process tracing to research and analyze the case studies, this author is able to search for 
continuity, changes, and/or an arc of transition between the cases. In light of the thesis’ 
goal and the case studies selected, this thesis is a historically descriptive work.  
The Arguments 
The author initially expected to see a direct correlation between one side’s 
influence upon civil-military relations and a similarity of that side’s position to the final 
decision. For example, if process tracing reveals that civilian actions most significantly 
influenced the relationship, then the outcome/policy decision would be most similar to 
the civilian position. If these situations occurred and the eventual policy decision was 
more like their position than the military’s, then the relationship would be characterized 
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as subjective. This logic would work vice versa in regards to military influence in the 
relationship.  
This elementary theory was son dismissed. All three cases studies are clear 
examples of subjective civilian control. However, the method by which the president and 
civilian agents maintained subjective control varied greatly from case to case. The author 
uncovered a great many variables that contributed to the civil-military relationship. Still 
other variables contributed to the decision-making process. Eventually, the author 
identified the variables that were most influential upon civil-military relations and then 
compared them to each other, through time. This process helped the author uncover 
corresponding relationships and apparent causality related to two independent variables, 
in particular. 
This author argues that presidential leadership and decision-making process 
organization are the two most influential independent variables upon subjective civilian 
control. The manner in which these two variables are executed determines the type and 
characteristics of a subjective civil-military relationship. In this thesis the author develops 
a typology that pairs these two variables and then corresponds them to other significant 
independent variables. Finally, this author compares the new typology with existing 
theory. This helps contextualize the new work and then enrich Huntington’s 
subjective/objective theory by illuminating different types of subjective control. 
This author finds that over the course of the three case studies subjective control 
shifted to an increasingly traditional, moderate, theoretically pure form. The first case 
study revealed a highly subjective civil-military dynamic with skewed authoritative 
advantages, overt attempts at co-optation, secrecy, and compartmentalized policy 
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debates. By the third case study, the subjective civilian control was maintained by 
authentic civilian role players who demanded open, inclusive, highly procedural debates 
through the NSC. This shift took place over two administrations and involved a high 
number of principal agents. End runs, co-optation, and actions outside of institutional 
structures were common throughout all case studies. However, it was not until the final 
case study – when end runs were highest – that civilians overtly challenged them and 
then attempted to curtail any anomalies. This was part of a concerted effort to both codify 
the decision-making process and consolidate subjective civilian control. 
The National Security Council’s involvement changed dramatically with each 
case study, as well. This fact was a boon for the research using existing literature; it 
offered three different leadership styles that led to different decision-making approaches. 
A consistent trend developed with each case. The NSC became increasingly involved and 
focused on procedure over time. Likewise, the NSC staff transitioned from a policy-
focused body to an implementation-focused body over the course of the three cases. 
Paired with the increasingly subjective and inclusive civil-military relationship, the trend 
corroborated a number of significant political science theories. 
Tying to the Literature 
This thesis complements the ever-expanding political science literature. The 
field’s library includes a tremendous number of works related to civil-military relations. 
Established theories, concepts, and typologies are reviewed and then applied to the cases, 
when appropriate. The author reflects on how these cases relate to the political science 
literature. The most notable minds in the field have contributed to this concept. Less 
effort has been given to the National Security Council, its history, and its theoretical 
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purpose within foreign policy decision-making and the civil-military relationship. 
However, the appropriate works are included here.  
Finally, the author identifies gaps in the literature. These are explained and, when 
possible, potential solutions are parsed out of the process tracing. The author also goes 
further and develops a new typology to complement existing works. His intention is to 
identify different categories of subjective control, determine how they relate to each other 
as well as the existing literature, and analyze how process variables influence the types of 
subjective control.  
Format 
 This work has five primary chapters beyond the introduction and conclusions. 
Chapter two is the literature review. In that chapter, the author describes the conceptual 
framework of the thesis. He summarizes the established political science works that are 
referenced in the thesis, identifies gaps in the current literature, offers a summary of his 
conceptual framework, and briefly reviews the basic arguments of the thesis. He then 
briefly outlines the analytical conclusions of each case. Finally, he delves into analysis of 
the relevant theories, concepts, and typologies that exist in political science literature. 
The incorporated theories exist within the realms of civil-military relations, National 
Security Council history as well as functionality, and various bureaucratic process 
theories. 
 Chapters three, four, and five include the case studies. The cases are presented 
chronologically. Each chapter contains a brief summary of the event therein, the 
conceptual approach used by the author, and basic analytical conclusions. The bulk of 
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each chapter involves process tracing. At the end of each chapter, analysis of the case’s 
civil-military relationship and the NSC’s role therein is presented.  
 Chapter six is an analysis of concepts and trends that exist over the entire thesis. 
The overarching arguments are presented as theoretical concepts and tied to the case 
studies, themselves. The author applies his new typologies and concepts in this chapter, 
being sure to tie them to the existing literature. In so doing, findings that arose from 
process tracing are synthesized with the works that preceded them. 
 Chapter seven is the conclusion. This includes a brief summation of what was 
done in the thesis and what the author concluded. Brief discussion of the thesis’s limits is 
included. Likewise, the author outlines the relevance of the work and how it can 
complement then expand the established political science literature. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
This thesis examines three historical moments in US foreign policy strategic 
decision making, analyzes the civil-military relationship at the civilian-principal/top-
military (CINC-JCS) level,1 and determines the characteristics of those relationships 
while assessing how the National Security Advisor/National Security Council influenced 
said relations. All cases herein are examples of subjective civil-military relationships. 
The thesis’ ultimate goal is to categorize the processes that were used and assess how 
relevant variables influence the type of subjective control.  
The methodology of this thesis requires process tracing and within-case 
congruence procedures. The thesis’s goals also rely significantly upon the literature that 
precedes it. The author is able to analyze and apply established theories only insofar as he 
is aware of the concepts, typologies, and theses that paved the way. It is for these reasons 
that we delve into the founding theories that ground this work.  
                                               
1 For the purpose of this thesis, the civilian-principal level includes the President, his advisors, all cabinet-
level officials tied to the Departments of State and Defense, all support staff for the Departments of State 
and Defense that engage in NSC protocol, as well as all NSC staff. The top-military leadership includes all 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), all military officers staffing the JCS, all Commanders in Chief 
(CINCs) of the regional commands, the CINCs’ staffs, combat commanders in theater, and any active 
military officers staffing the NSC. 
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This literature review summarizes theoretical work in the area of United States 
civil-military relations. Additionally, this chapter references the National Security 
Council’s history as well as the roles played by past national security advisors. Following 
these reviews, the author presents reflections upon how the cases relate to the political 
science literature. This is be complemented by references to the cases in the literature. 
The latter content is paired with analysis found within the case study chapters.  
The political science library contains a great deal of works related to civil-military 
relations. Some of the most significant minds in the history of the field have contributed 
to this area of study. A full anthology of work related to United States civil-military 
relations would require thousands of pages. For now, however, we quickly review some 
of the more influential theories in this topic. We begin with a summary of Samuel 
Huntington’s theory of subjective vs. objective military rule; it is the foundation of all 
relevant works today. From there we explore other theories that examine agency-based 
and structural arguments about civil-military relations. These include agency theory 
(principal-agent theory), theories on conflictual collaborative relationships, bargaining 
process theory, modern analysis of increasing objectivity in civil-military relations, and 
others. 
Literature relating to NSC history and operations includes presidential versus 
secretarial models of decision making, multiple advocacy theory, and various works of 
such leading theorists as Carnes Lord, Cecil Crabb, I.M. Destler, and Ivo Daalder.  
The author reflects on literature preceding this work and determines how it 
benefits the thought problems herein. He identifies and analyzes benchmarks in decision-
making that either reflect or refute the literature. However, much of this thesis involves 
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topics that aren’t present in the literature. Still other aspects exist in published works but 
are dealt with insufficiently. As such, this author creates new theories related to the cases 
herein. In so doing, the author discusses what is missing from the literature. Gaps that 
overlook scenarios, causality, or typologies within these cases are examined and then 
analyzed.  
All of the cases in this thesis involve subjective civil-military relationships of 
varying degrees. In each instance, the president oversees the strategic debate, decides the 
orders, and eventually gets his way to varying degrees. His final decision is ordered and 
implemented to his liking. Put succinctly, all three of these cases rest firmly within the 
subjective spectrum of Huntington’s civil-military theory. However, the method by 
which the decisions were arrived at varied greatly with each event. Though all cases are 
within the subjective realm of Huntington’s subjective/objective spectrum, the decision-
making processes and the civil-military relationships were significantly different from 
each other.  
The literature does not adequately deal with the process of subjective civil-
military relationships. As such, this author develops new typologies and categories to 
better understand the modern US foreign policy making apparatus. The form of civil-
military relationship, engagement of various national security bodies – particularly the 
National Security Council – and the interpersonal relationships of foreign policy decision 
makers all play into the new observations and theorems. 
Gaps in Existing Literature 
The most significant gap in existing literature involves the varieties of subjective 
civil-military control. Many variables contribute to the characteristics of civilian control. 
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These variables influence the style of subjective power and, more specifically, define the 
process of national security decision-making. How civilians maintain subjective civil-
military relationships is a question seldom scrutinized. This author hopes to change that 
trend with this thesis.2 
By examining some of the most influential independent variables, this author 
develops a typology related to the civil-military relationship. The styles of presidential 
leadership, decision-making process organization, the engagement as well as style of the 
NSC, and other relevant variables are considered. Each case study illuminates different – 
oftentimes fluid – degrees of subjective civil-military relationships. What’s more, the 
processes of national security decision-making and civil-military relations are unique in 
each instance. These facts help the author identify, categorize, and present new theories. 
These products complement existing typologies and theories in the literature. As such, the 
author succeeds in presenting new material while also engaging and strengthening the 
contemporary body of knowledge. 
Another glaring omission in political science literature is an examination of the 
NSC’s influence upon civil-military relations. The institution is an influential locus of 
national security and foreign policy decision-making. The duality of civilian and military 
power within these spheres makes the NSC an important variable in the relationship. 
How it is tasked, staffed, and integrated into the civil-military relationship can have 
                                               
2 Samuel Huntington recognized that many different forms of civilian control could exist. As such, a 
leading theorist acknowledged the gap as relevant. In chapter four of The Soldier and the State, he outlined 
different manifestations of subjective control. Huntington wrote, “The simplest way of minimizing military 
power would appear to be the maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military.” He 
noted that civilian groups were great in number and had many different varieties. As such, sustained 
increase in civilian control was difficult to perpetuate. It inevitably produced increased power for only 
“some particular civilian group or groups.” “Consequently, subjective civilian control involves the power 
relations among civilian groups. It is advances by one civilian group as a means to enhance its power at the 
expense of other civilian groups.” Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press, 1957. pg. 180. 
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tremendous influence on its dynamics. A body of literature analyzes the history and past 
uses of the NSC. However, few have explored how the body’s actions and relationship 
with the president have affected the civil-military relationship. This thesis looks to 
examine this gap, apply literature to triangulate its relation to other theories, and arrive at 
a better understanding of the body’s influence. In so doing, this work helps further 
resolve the gap mentioned above. 
 Another gap in the literature that impacts this thesis relates to military institutions. 
The gap exists because of relatively recent changes in U.S. military command structure. 
With the rising influence of regional commands and CINCs – abetted by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act – the traditional military leadership in the Pentagon has seen its influence 
diffused. Dana Priest is among the authors who have studied implications of this 
development. However, insufficient time and a limited number of cases have led to a gap 
in understanding. Therefore, process tracing in this thesis examines how civilian 
interaction with regional commands as well as combat commanders have influenced the 
top-tier military leadership and its relationship with civilian policymakers. 
Summary of Approach 
There is broad, long-standing consensus about most concepts and typologies in 
civil-military relations. The most significant members of the political science community 
acknowledge established terminology and trends. Generally speaking, there are two 
schools of thought regarding the dynamics within the relationship. This literature review 
acknowledges the differences between the subjective and objective camps. It summarizes 
some of the many variations and theories about causality that exist within the two 
schools. 
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 This thesis argues that the cases herein offer relevant lessons learned. Some of the 
literature resonates with the cases that are studied. What’s more, the events unveiled 
during process tracing seem to validate multiple theories. They also challenge others. 
This thesis works within the framework of Samuel Huntington’s concepts and typologies. 
Nearly all of the political science literature interacts with the subjective/objective 
spectrum that he established. All of this thesis’s cases are clear examples of subjective 
civil-military relationships, however. As such, objective military control is not dealt with 
here.   
 The fundamental question that this thesis and its literature review hinge on is the 
following: what dynamics are present within a subjective civil-military relationship when 
policy decision-making occurs? What is the process of that decision and how do the 
relevant players/variables influence it? Assuming that successful civil-military decision 
making involves all players participating in national security process, what attributes lead 
to the most judicious, inclusive, deliberative, non-coercive method? The literature has 
written a great deal about these questions. General consensus has formed around the 
premise that all relevant national security players should participate in foreign policy 
processes. This includes both civilian and military leadership. However, multiple theories 
exist over where the power locus should reside in those processes. 
 Various theories and authors are reviewed within this chapter. This author pays 
attention to sets of arguments that resonate with the case studies. In particular, 
Huntington’s theory of subjective civilian control is used to describe the civil-military 
relationships. This is fitting, as his concepts and typologies are ubiquitous within the 
field. Eliot Cohen’s work regarding the ‘unequal dialogue’ builds on the subjective 
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typology and lends itself to this work, as well. Peter Feaver’s work on principal-agent 
theory is covered and relevant, also. It lends itself well to the interpersonal, bureaucratic 
issues that exist in both civil-military relations and the National Security Council 
dynamics. 
 The published literature does not sufficiently examine how process influences the 
character of subjective civil-military control. How agents interact, what communications 
are used, whether the structures are manipulated, and various other issues go by the 
wayside. These are significant gaps if one is to understand how civilians maintain 
subjective control of the military in contemporary US national security decision-making. 
Through process tracing, this author seeks to define the characteristics of the relationship 
as well as how agents perpetuate said dynamics. The manipulation of the variables – from 
leadership to organization to NSC engagement to the authenticity of the players’ roles – 
is imperative for this study. As will be described below, Alexander George’s malfunction 
typologies are relevant in the NSC realm. They are also useful in viewing how civil-
military relations are impacted by many different styles of interaction.  
 When discussing the National Security Council and its relation to decision 
making within civil-military relations, Alexander George’s work will be of particular 
importance, as well. His multiple advocacy theory is essential to the cases in this thesis. 
There were multiple players, bureaucratic complexity, and a range of options present in 
each strategic review. George’s theory, concepts, and typologies – particularly those 
outlining failures in the process – are vital to the thesis argument. Additionally, Cecil 
Crabb and Kevin Mulcahy’s typologies of NSC/National Security Advisor leadership are 
used to describe the trends revealed through process tracing. 
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 This author acknowledges and incorporates multiple schools of thought and 
theoretical topics in this thesis. The complexity of the topics at hand is rightly 
complemented by a variety of theories. Integration is key. This thesis analyzes the 
process and characteristics of subjective control in each case. It seeks to explain how 
those processes and related variables defined that relationship. Additionally, the thesis 
examines the NSC and national security advisor’s involvement in the process. Because 
multiple agents and bureaucracies are involved, it behooves the author to acknowledge 
various process theories.  
The Cases and Summaries of their Civil-Military Relationships 
 With the first case study, it is argued that Huntington’s balance pattern theoretical 
organizational structure best describes the civil-military relations and actions leading up 
to the Iraq invasion. However, very important qualifications will be made. Among these 
are the hierarchy between the defense secretary’s office (OSD) and top military officers 
as well as the choice of military officers that were engaged by the OSD.3 Highly 
subjective civilian control of the military was maintained throughout the planning 
process. Throughout the case, the defense secretary’s office was the locus of the 
relationship.  
Secretary Rumsfeld used assertive leadership, aggressive timelines, interrogative 
communications, compartmentalized tasking, and a secretive planning process to 
maintain control of the process. Furthermore, he engaged with the regional commander – 
a known ally of his policy preferences – in order to embolden, legitimize, and assert his 
policy preferences. This co-optation of military leadership indicates the military’s 
                                               
3 Huntington’s other two types of executive civil-military relations are the coordinate scheme and the 
vertical pattern. These are explained here: Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. pg. 186-189.  
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objective power. In order to maintain subjective hegemony in the relationship, Secretary 
Rumsfeld cultivated the partnership with General Franks in order to inhibit any other 
challenges from those in uniform. 
 The NSC and its national security advisor were not significantly involved in the 
most influential moments of Iraq war planning. When the council participated it acted as 
a forum through which Secretary Rumsfeld and the abridged planning community briefed 
others in the national security apparatus of what they’d done. The low activity level and 
low influence of the NSC was inversely related to the DoD civilian leadership’s 
authority. 
 Like the first, the second case study includes a subjective civil-military 
relationship. Civilian leadership had come to doubt the policy recommendations of 
combat commanders, the Pentagon, and even the OSD. Simultaneously, the National 
Security Council had increased its activity and influence in the decision making process. 
For various reasons that will be discussed, the national security advisor was tasked to 
lead the strategy review. The process was highly compartmentalized, like the first case 
study. Likewise, it began as a secretive venture both within and outside the national 
security apparatus. Additionally, agents advocating the eventual policy decision once 
again co-opted a military voice. In this case, a retired Army general augmented the 
minority opinion in order to bolster its credibility and – later – assist in its preparation. 
 The NSC was more influential and significant to this case study. The national 
security advisor was highly involved both in policymaking as well as implementation. 
The increase in NSC influence occurred concurrently with a diminished OSD and defense 
secretary. The NSC’s counselor role helped consolidate subjective control of the civil-
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military relationship and push a policy position that was unpopular among the top-tier 
military leadership.  Like the first case study, meanwhile, a legitimate military voice 
complemented the civilian policy position, giving it added credibility. 
 The third case study reveals another subjective civil-military relationship. This 
example is significant in that it appears most like the theoretical definition of civilian 
subjective control. That is, civilian policymakers obtained and maintained the power 
dynamics through exclusively civilian-based, formalized methods. This is despite the fact 
that the Pentagon executed the most end-runs and direct challenges to civilian leadership 
of the three cases. Conversely, civilians offered the most tense and overt challenges to 
military positions. In order to maintain subjective control of the relationship, the 
president dictated a slower tempo. This calendar manipulation helped stunt various 
efforts by the military to pressure civilian decision makers into options that the Pentagon 
preferred. 
 The civil-military relationship was the most inclusive and open of the three cases. 
The highest percentage of national security and foreign policy agents participated. 
Additionally, President Obama desired a comprehensive and lengthy decision making 
process. The NSC and its national security advisor were tasked with administering the 
relationship and decisions making process. It acted in a very low policy making, high 
implementation capacity. It stressed formalized procedures and clearly delineated roles. 
The tense civil-military dialogue existed within these boundaries, though only after many 
leaks and assertive pushback from the president. The result was an impassioned but 
clearly defined civil-military relationship during a decision making process that the NSC 
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held custodianship over. This case resonates most significantly with the largest portion of 
political science literature. 
Thesis Framework 
 A number of conclusions can be drawn from the assemblage of these three case 
studies. Key trends and characteristics percolate from the events and data. This author 
describes them here and analyzes them more fully later in the thesis. How they relate to 
the literature and what theories complement them is discussed, as well. Finally, the 
conclusions are analyzed chronologically. 
 All three cases studies involved subjective civil-military relationships. However, 
the characteristics of their processes were different with each case. Many variables 
influenced the type of civilian control and processes related thereto. Of these, a number 
of categories came to the fore. The most common characteristics that appeared in each 
case were the styles of decision-making process organization, the type of presidential 
leadership, where the center of debate was located, the nature of the debate, the 
transparency of the debate, and the authenticity of the roles played by civilians. All of 
these variables influenced the process of the decision-making and, eventually, the type of 
subjective civilian control.  
 Decision-making process organization relates to how the strategy debate is set-up 
and maintained. Broadly speaking, if the process organization is high then strategic 
debate is orderly, follows an established process, and respects existing institutional 
frameworks. If the process organization is low then strategic debate is ad-hoc. This 
means that the participating agents may or may not be following their assigned roles. 
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Established procedures relating to the debate are not followed, certain relevant players 
are ignored or neglected, and the events of the debate follow whims rather than writ. 
 Presidential leadership relates to how engaged the commander-in-chief is with the 
strategy debate. If presidential leadership is low then his actions are “delegatory.” This 
means he assigns the lead role to a staffer or official outside of the White House. The 
president can be – and in all three cases here, always is – in complete control; he still has 
the final say. However, low leadership means the president may be briefed on only the 
most top-level information. A significant amount of discussion and decision-making may 
take place beyond his knowledge. High presidential leadership, meanwhile, means the 
commander-in-chief is engaged. He immerses himself in the decision process in addition 
to holding the highest authority. He is engaged with his advisors, deputies, and cabinet-
level positions on a regular basis and is aware of a vast majority of the strategy debate. 
 For the purposes of this thesis the ideal center of debate lies in the National 
Security Council. Therefore, the author assesses the debate center’s location in relation to 
the NSC. The nature of the debate can be inclusive of all relevant national 
security/foreign policy agents or it can be exclusive. The transparency of the debate can 
lead to an open debate or a secretive one. Finally, the civilians can act in a way that is 
authentic or “co-optive.”  
Authentic civilian agents act in manners consistent with the traditional definition 
of a civilian. The civilian focuses on policy decision-making, is in contact with military 
professionals, interacts with the latter as a steward of his role, and does not attempt to 
imitate or co-opt the roles of the military professional. Meanwhile, a “co-optive” civilian 
seeks to mimic or adopt military professionalism in order to maintain hegemony over the 
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relationship. “Co-optive” civilians may also foster collegial relationships with military 
professionals in order to bolster their position in regards to the military.  
While a “co-optive” effort blurs the civilians’ appearance with a lens of military 
form, the act is a highly subjective move. It is a civilian attempt to dictate military 
decision-making by adopting the latter’s professional position. Additionally, “co-optive” 
civilian behavior suggests that military professionals have an authoritative advantage in 
US civil-military dynamics. That is, if civilian agents maintained authority over military 
professionals, they would not need to drape themselves with the garb and lexicon of 
military leadership. Even if parity existed between the two roles, sufficient institutional 
structures exist so as to ensure civilian control of the military. However, if military 
professionals possessed greater authority, influence, and respect within political spheres 
then civilians would be inclined to subvert or co-opt that advantage in order to equalize 
the interpersonal relationship. 
 Each of the variables described above have characteristic spectrums. That is, all 
the characteristics can be placed on a spectrum that includes every type, from one 
extreme to the other. In the table below the major variables and the extreme 
characteristics are listed:  
Figure 2.1 – Variable Spectrums 
Variable Spectrums         
   Characteristics     
  Decision-Making Process Orderly vs. Ad-hoc   
  Presidential Leadership Engaged vs. “Delegatory”   
  Center of Debate NSC vs. Other   
  Nature of Debate Inclusive vs. Exclusive   
  Transparency of Debate Open vs. Secretive   
  Character of Civilians Authentic-role vs. Co-optation   
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Of all the variables identified in the three cases, decision-making process 
organization and presidential leadership are the most definitive. These two variables are 
most apparent, influential, and integrated with the others. The characteristics of these 
variables correlate with trends that span all three cases. As such, this author created a 
chart showing this relationship: 
   Decision-making Process Organization 
   low high 
   Ad-hoc Orderly 
       
  Delegatory     
Presidential  low    
Leadership       
  Engaged     
  high   
Figure 2.2 – Primary Variables upon Subjective Civilian Control 
 This author found that when process organization is orderly and presidential 
leadership is engaged, the NSC tends to be the center of the debate, the discussions were 
inclusive as well as open, and civilians maintain authentic roles. If process organization is 
ad-hoc and presidential leadership is “delegatory,” the center of the debate tends to be 
outside of the NSC, the NSC is of lesser influence, discussions war exclusive as well as 
secretive, and civilians are more likely to be co-optive. If a low/high combination exists 
between the two primary variables, a mix of the other variable characteristics exists.  
The author also found a direct correlation between process organization and NSC 
activity. When ad-hoc debates occur they exist outside of the NSC’s power center. When 
orderly process organization is used, the NSC is at the center of the debate. A direct 
correlation exists between presidential leadership and the nature of the debate, as well. 
When there is engaged presidential leadership the debate is open and, more often than 
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not, inclusive. When the president delegates the leadership role the debate is secretive 
and, more often than not, exclusive. 
The correlations between these variables help political scientists identify and label 
different categories of subjective civil-military relationships. Let us assume that codified 
procedures and structures are ideal for bureaucratic decision-making. Likewise, we 
suppose that decision-making should include all qualified and relevant agents within the 
bureaucratic community. Based on these premises, it can be said that orderly process 
organization and engaged presidential leadership – paired with all the trends this author 
has identified – benefit the national security decision-making process. 
This author describes this high/high combination as “Optimal” subjective civilian 
control. Conversely, the low process organization (ad-hoc) and low presidential 
leadership (“delegatory”) is described as “Alternative.” High process organization and 
low presidential leadership is “Out-Sourced” subjective civilian control while low 
process organization and high presidential leadership is “Spontaneous.” See below: 
         Decision-making Process Organization 
   low high 
   Ad-hoc Orderly 
       
  Delegatory Alternative Out-Sourced 
Presidential  low    
Leadership       
  Engaged Spontaneous Optimal 
  high   
Figure 2.3 – Typology of Subjective Civil-Military Control 
These descriptions help us identify the characteristics associated with the different 
categories of subjective civilian control. Again, through all of this, we are assuming that 
engaged, orderly civilian control is the ideal form. We further submit that civilian 
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authenticity is the most traditional, least extreme form of civilian action. Co-optive 
civilian action is less authentic, used to undercut military authority, and more subjective. 
It also indicates that military professionals enjoy an authoritative advantage in the 
relationship. Observing these trends, we can begin to see how these different subjective 
styles fit on Huntington’s spectrum of civil-military relations.  
Basic Findings of Case Studies 
As stated earlier, all three case studies are examples of subjective civil-military 
relationships. However, over the course of the three case studies the form of subjective 
control changed. The first case contains high subjectivity with moments of extremely 
high subjectivity affecting the military’s operational decision-making. It contains ad-hoc 
process organization, exclusive as well as secretive strategy discussions, and delegated 
leadership. This author further argues that the first case study can be divided into two 
parts: Case I(a) and Case I(b). A change in the level of presidential leadership during the 
first case study brought notable changes to a number of independent variables. However, 
this author argues that the amount of change was stunted by consolidated roles and power 
dynamics perpetuated by the ad-hoc process leader: Secretary Rumsfeld. The latter 
intervening variables led to an amalgam of variables characteristics. 
The first and second case studies include civilian co-optation of and then alliances 
with military figures. These were done to bolster civilian positions within a civil-military 
relationship that, though subjective, bestowed high deference upon the military 
professional.4 This was done for a number or reasons. Most significantly, President Bush 
made it a leadership priority to provide what military leaders requested. He publically 
                                               
4 There was a seeming paradox: civilian control of an environment in which military officers maintained 
greater authority and credibility. 
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sought their proffered advice. This increased an authoritative advantage enjoyed by the 
military professional. In order to maintain subjective control in this environment, it 
became necessary to co-opt military voices and embolden the civilian position. As such, 
presidential leadership perpetuated the military’s authoritative advantage and continued 
the need to maintain subjective control via ulterior methods. 
By the third case study this dynamic changed. Civilian agents reformed then 
manipulated the civil-military relationship and national security structures in order to 
equalize the sides. Civilians demonstrated a willingness to slow the decision-making 
process, combat end runs when they occurred, and intently focus on process organization. 
The result is a subjective civil-military relationship that was attained in a more 
traditional, theoretically purer means. Presidential leadership was engaged, process 
organization was orderly, and the nature of the debate was open as well as inclusive. 
 While these trends took place, the National Security Council/national security 
advisor also became increasingly involved over the three case studies. With each 
chronological event the NSC increased its influence and actively instituted process 
organization. The purview and established protocols of the NSC also increased over the 
three case studies. It increasingly became the center of civil-military and national security 
discussions. Additionally, the frequency of those events increased from case one through 
case three. By the end of the third case, for example, procedures were well established 
and process was coveted. The changes in the NSC witnessed a concurrent rise in the 
national security advisor’s implementation role. Each advisor became increasingly 
integrated in the decision-making process. Conversely, the advisor’s policymaking 
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capacity waned. All of these changes were reflective of the relative president’s leadership 
style and policy preferences. 
 Meanwhile, the locus of primary military influence shifted from combat 
commanders and CINCs/regional commands back to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
augmented by the CINCs. Presidential leadership and OSD actions appear to influence 
which top-tier military officials were granted greatest access and influence. President 
Bush made consistent efforts to incorporate combat commanders and CINCs into the 
process. This waned, as he grew frustrated with their policy stances. Likewise, President 
Obama sought to limit the direct access combat commanders had to the White House. 
The Joint Chief’s chairman filled the power vacuum and the CINC maintained influence, 
behind him. Additionally, the influence of the Defense Secretary and OSD fluctuated 
greatly over the three cases. A majority of these changes appear to be due to interpersonal 
variables, the president’s leadership style, and politicking.  
 “Flanking,” end runs, and maneuvers outside of established national security 
structures were common throughout all three cases. However, they increased over the 
three cases. It was not until the third case, meanwhile, that the president made a 
deliberate effort – albeit reactive – to stunt their prevalence. A correlation between 
increased openness in the civil-military/national security processes and end runs exists. 
Causality is undetermined here; there is insufficient evidence to reveal which caused the 
other. However, there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that the broadness of the 
decision making process precipitated the military’s end runs. As more players were 
integrated into the process, the relationships became more porous and political.  
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Applicable Theories 
 Civil-Military Relations 
Subjective Civilian Control Theory vs. Objective Civilian Control Theory 
Perhaps the most fundamental theories regarding civil-military relations were 
revealed in Samuel Huntington’s work, The Soldier and the State. Huntington examined 
the history of civil-military relations and presented theories on its characteristics. He 
created two typologies: subjective and objective civilian control. The former maximizes 
civilian power by consolidating influence over the relationship on the side of “some 
particular civilian group or groups.”5  Objective civilian control, meanwhile, maximizes 
what Huntington calls “military professionalism” by enabling the “distribution of 
political power between military and civilian groups” in a way that best fosters “the 
emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer 
corps.”6 
 Huntington made a key distinction between the natures of subjective and 
objective civilian control. He stated that the former aims to “civilianiz[e] the military, 
making them the mirror of the state,” while the latter intends to “militariz[e] the military, 
making them the tool of the state.”7 This is a vital concept to appreciate and understand. 
Huntington drew a distinction that has tremendous influence on the nature as well as 
effectiveness of military actions. Subjective control allows civilians to more easily mold 
the form and function of the military. Objective control establishes a structural separation 
between civilian policymakers and military officers; this inhibits civilian participation in 
the management and organization of the military.  
                                               
5 Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. pg. 80. 
6 Ibid. pg. 83. 
7 Ibid. pg. 83. 
32 
 
 Since all three case studies herein are examples of subjective civilian control, this 
work will not dwell on objective military control. The level of civilian subjectivity varied 
through all three cases. However, a clear trend towards theoretically pure subjectivity 
occurred over time. Meanwhile, civilian involvement in military operational decisions 
decreased, though civilian monitoring of implementation increased. Likewise, the borders 
between civilian and military positions because increasingly clear. Civilian authenticity 
increased and roles become more delineated. The co-optation of voices from the other 
side went from overt to implicit to nearly non-existent. All of this leads to a more 
traditional civil-military relationship. 
Greater objective civilian control allows military officers more independence in 
organizational and tactical decisions. This is not necessarily the case with strategic 
decisions, considering their dependence on state policies dictated by civilian 
policymakers. Meanwhile, more subjective civilian control enables civilian leaders to 
influence the organizational and tactical decisions of the military by making themselves 
players in those decisions. Objective control opens the door for civilians to potentially 
influence decisions about the officer make-up, organizational structure, and tactical 
decisions of the military. 
 Huntington was keen on recognizing the power that flows outside of formal 
channels, as well. He noted that “power exists in two forms, formal authority and 
informal influence, both of which may be measured in terms of their degree and scope.”8 
As such, individuals are able to influence others based on multiple variables. He wrote: 
Informal relationships also exist where one person, or groups of persons, 
controls the behavior of other persons not because they occupy 
particular positions in a formal structure but because they control other 
                                               
8 Ibid. pg. 86. 
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sanctions or rewards. This influence may stem from personality, wealth, 
knowledge, prestige, friendship, kinship, or a variety of other sources. 
Its distinguishing characteristic, however, is always that it inheres in 
specific individuals or groups, not in the roles or statuses which those 
individuals or groups occupy.9 
 
Regardless of the source – and there are many more – informal influences are founded in 
the individual not the role. This theoretical point allows for the subjective influence of 
individuals, beyond the limitations of structural hierarchies.  
This delineation is important when dealing with our case studies and the NSC as a 
whole. It is also a nuanced qualification that is relevant in all three case studies. It relates 
to the relationship between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and specific members 
of the military leadership during the first case study. It relates to how retired General Jack 
Keane interacted with civilian and military leadership in the second case study. It also 
resonates with manner in which the NSC, NSA Hadley, and the White House worked 
with various military officers during implementation of their decision. Civilians and 
military officials alike also used informal relationships and authority during the third case 
study.  
Huntington argued for a more objective civil-military relationship through which 
military autonomy was perpetuated by contained, structured, professional practices. This 
was a deductive argument founded in the premise that the military must serve the civilian 
leadership but, simultaneously, it must be allowed to perpetuate and perform its 
institution in the manners only it knew. Peter Feaver, among other theorists, summarized 
Huntington’s overall thesis by emphasizing the significant differences between civilian 
                                               
9 Ibid. pg. 86. 
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and military spheres. The fulcrum on which his theory moves, therefore, is 
professionalism, and “the key to professionalism is military autonomy.”10  
 Huntington wrote of the “balanced pattern” in The Soldier and the State, as well. 
He argued that the president and the secretary of defense both held purely political roles. 
It is beneath these figures that the remaining “hierarchy divides into military and 
administrative components.”11 According to Huntington, “the highest professional officer 
is the leading military adviser to the secretary;” he is also “normally” in charge of all 
military forces. As such, the top military official is “subordinate” to the president and 
cabinet-level official but neither of those civilians “exercise military command.”  
The military structure has striated over the passing decades, thus muting the 
simplicity of Huntington’s descriptions. What is not lost, however, is the glaring civil-
military divide and objective separation of military command that Huntington 
emphasized. That starkness is full grey during the first case study. However, over the 
course of the three events one witnesses trends of simplification and clarification in a 
very complex bureaucratic environment.  
 Damon Coletta and Peter Feaver argued that Huntington’s emphasis on the 
supremacy of military professionalism was manifested from a perceived need to maintain 
corporate cohesion within the military. As such, frequent subjective civilian interference 
in the execution of military decisions could cause increased politicization, divisions, and 
conflict within the military community.12 These implied differences between civilian and 
                                               
10 Feaver, Peter. Armed Servants. Cambridge: Harvard Univ Press, 2003. pg. 7. 
11 Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. pg. 186-187. 
12 Coletta, Damon & Peter D. Feaver. “Civilian Monitoring of U.S. Military Operations in the Information 
Age.” Armed Forces & Society 33.1 (2006): 106-126. Web. 20 April 2010.pg. 109. This article goes on to 
point out that “once military agents became ‘professional’ by internalizing their duty to serve the 
principal’s ends, there would be no need to devise an optimal incentive structure with some sort of contract 
bonus for each political objective achieved during a military campaign.” This ‘principal-agent’ model 
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military minds relate to another school of political science literature that is related to the 
military mind and its inclinations. Additionally, the third case study – which involves the 
highest level of overt, subjective civilian challenge to military positions – contains the 
highest level of end-runs, politicization, and overt civil-military tension. This would seem 
to validate Coletta and Feaver’s argument.  
Agency Theory (or Principal-Agent Theory) 
 Peter Feaver is a contemporary political scientist who adapted the “principal-
agent theory” – first developed as a microeconomics premise – to the civil-military 
relationship.13 The theory was originally intended for a business context and focuses on 
hierarchical relationships. Feaver echoed the principle held by Huntingon: civilians must 
control the military in a democracy. As such, he repeatedly emphasized, “Civilians have a 
right to be wrong.”14 Feaver posited that at its most base, the civil-military relationship is 
“a strategic interaction between civilians principals and military agents.”15 
 Despite the consistent ebb and flow of the relationship – with civilianizing of the 
military responding to the militarization of civilians, many times over – Feaver kept to 
the fundamental premise that courses through American civil-military relations literature. 
At its core, it is deductive just like Huntington’s work. However, agency theory differs in 
that it focuses on the strategic, political interactions between civilian and military players 
                                                                                                                                            
appears to reflect the objective civilian control model, however it has been admitted by the authors that 
there are many other sources of potential friction between civilians and military officers in said model. 
Despite “their unique profession and code of honor,” military officers may still conflict greatly with 
civilians in tactical and organizations decisions, rather than strategic or policy decisions. This problem 
arises in planning for the Iraq invasion. 
13 Sowers, Thomas S. “Beyond the Soldier and the State.” Armed Forces & Society 31.3 (2005): 385-409. 
Web. 10 April 2010. pg. 388. 
14 Feaver, Peter. Armed Servants. pg. 6. 
15 Ibid. pg. 2. 
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within established interpersonal, hierarchical constructs. Feaver wrote that civilians must 
anticipate military disobedience and that military acquiescence is not “foreordained.”16  
 The latter precepts are true because those within the civil-military relationship are 
individual agents working towards their own benefit and the benefit of their respective 
structures. These “players” are influenced by a great many “exogenous factors.”17 
Furthermore, the structures in which they exist require some – the civilians – to be 
principals in the relationship and others – the soldiers – to be agents of the former. 
Therein lies the dissonance: the players are influenced by multiple, often dissonant ends, 
all while acting – as individuals – within a hierarchical system. This creates tensions and 
a battle between “working” and “shirking.” 
 Feaver wrote that military agents have three preferences; these all have the 
potential of running counter to civilian decisions.18 Those in uniforms are inclined to 
“shirk” their roles when they run counter to their own preferences.19 As such, the 
military’s actions could land anywhere on the “work-shirk continuum” if incentives to 
work for the civilian principals or disincentives to shirk them are not present.20  
 Feaver described various ways by which the military could shirk civilian 
principals. These include giving incorrect assessments to civilians; making “end runs” of 
leaks, public protests, and appeals to other civilian policy makers; and “slow rolling” or 
“foot-dragging” which interferes with the accurate, timely implementation of civilian 
                                               
16 Ibid. pg. 14. 
17 Ibid. pg. 58. 
18 These preferences are “over policy outcomes, over how his behavior is interpreted, and over how the 
relationship is monitored.” Ibid. pg. 63. 
19 Feaver’s definition of “shirk” is “not doing something to the principal’s satisfaction.” It is the opposite of 
the ideal, which is “working.” Ibid. pg. 60. 
20 Ibid. pg. 66. 
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policies.21 Feaver also expanded on the various inequities within the civil-military 
relationship. These include asymmetry within information access/analysis, moral hazards, 
adverse selection, etc. The author focused on various ways by which the civilians – 
specifically, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) – could monitor the military 
and use “fire alarms” when issues arose.22 How other civilians can audit and monitor 
those civilian bodies, meanwhile, is conspicuously absent. 
 By way of cases studies, modeling, and analysis, Peter Feaver concluded that 
civilians are inclined to have “more intrusive monitoring because the costs of monitoring 
are low or because the expectations of shirking are high, and the military is choosing to 
work because its preferences are converging with those of civilians or because the 
likelihood of getting punished is high.”23 He also wrote “civilians ought to listen to 
military advice and weight it, but military advice will improve with a vigorous give-and-
take led by activist civilian principals.”24  
 In Armed Servants Feaver presented examples in which the civil-military 
relationship was strained by rigorous principal-agent interactions. He wrote that Secretary 
Rumsfeld sought to maximize subjective, principal civilian control. He did so by leading 
an intensive campaign to alter the DoD, its leadership, and the structures feeding to OSD. 
However, “Ironically, in an effort to undo the perceived weaknesses of earlier civilian 
leadership, Rumsfeld may have overcompensated and provoked a backlash that produced 
a comparable paralysis in civilian control.”25 That is, the secretary of defense’s bravado 
may have proved caustic enough to divide the civilian principal leadership, thus creating 
                                               
21 Ibid. pg. 68. 
22 Ibid. pg. 80. 
23 Ibid. pg. 112. 
24 Ibid. pg. 300. 
25 Ibid. pg. 290. 
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more infighting.  Feaver went further, writing that Rumsfeld’s actions united the military 
professional’s and their allies in a fight against the changes charged to them. Feaver 
provided further evidence of this, summarizing a schism between State and Defense in 
regards to Iraq war planning.26   
Feaver’s thesis is agency-based with significant acknowledgement of structural 
variables. It is devoid of cultural arguments, however. As such, Huntington’s 
conservative realism and military mind arguments are dismissed. Furthermore, Feaver’s 
thesis tends to be cynical; it refuses to acknowledge that military training, education, or 
culture perpetuates a respect of civilian control.27 The third case study suggests 
otherwise, however. One will see that when the president pressed the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs about end runs and challenges to the national security process, the admiral 
immediately responded in kind for multiple reasons. These included his personal 
deference to civilian control. 
Feaver also warned that our society may be entering a new phase in which 
military leaders shirk civilian control and “insist” on being followed.28 This foreboding 
point accents the author’s pervasive emphasis on the delicate yet vital issues of loyalty 
and implementation when it comes to civil-military relations.29 Feaver’s work was not 
entirely original or unique. As was mentioned earlier, the author adapted an economics 
                                               
26 Feaver referenced how Secretary Powell worked with various military officers in an attempt to slow the 
path to war. He mentioned the secretary’s reported conversation with General Shelton, during which he 
urged the officer to restrain the civilians and “get these guys back in the box.” Feaver cited various sources, 
including works by Kagan, Kristol, Woodward, Balz, Himmelman, and Ricks. Source: Feaver, Peter. 
Armed Servants. pg. 291. 
27 As will be shown in the President Obama/Afpak review case study, there is evidence that many top-tier 
military officers hold the premise of civilian primacy in the utmost regard. Some were overtly offended by 
suggestions they did anything but ceaselessly honor the president’s control.  
28 Feaver, Peter. Armed Servants. pg. 300. 
29 Burk, James. "Book Review: Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations." Armed 
Forces & Society 30.3 (2004): 485-488. Web. 10 April 2010. pg. 485. 
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theory. However, Sharon Weiner had already used the same method to explain the 
“motivations behind the Goldwater-Nichols reforms” of the late 1980s; that law 
transformed the NSC into its current form.30  
The “Conflictual Collaborative Relationship” and “Unequal Dialogue” 
 Another theory relating to the subjective/objective civilian control concerns the 
nature of dialogue between civilian and military bodies. Eliot Cohen posited, “The heart 
of sound civil-military relations remains now, as in the past, an unequal dialogue.”31 That 
is, the nature of civilian politics and military professionalism inherently “tug in opposite 
directions.” For this reason, the relationship is invariably contentious and civilian leaders 
“must master their military briefs as thoroughly as they do their civilian ones.” He wrote, 
“Both groups must expect a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion will 
not dictate, it must dominate.”32 The dynamic Cohen suggested is of the highly subjective 
civilian control typology.  
Cohen stated that civilians must be relentless in their self-education, 
understanding, questioning, and skepticism of the military plans and professionals. His 
theory implies that the knowledge and ethics of military professionalism are not as 
exceptional or unique as Huntington purports them to be. That is, the ability for civilians 
to know military briefs with similar aptitude suggests that the civilian leader must have 
an equal or greater intellect and capacity than the military professional.  
Cohen’s theory directly challenges Huntington’s framing of civil-military 
relations. The latter framed the dynamic as a doctor-patient relationship by which the 
                                               
30 Feaver, Peter. Armed Servants. pg. 56. 
31 Cohen, Eliot A. “The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use 
of Force.” Eds. Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn. Soldiers and Civilians. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 
pg. 457. 
32 Ibid. pg. 458. 
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soldiers provide the required solutions for the civilian’s policy ills.33 The former 
dismissed this characterization as condescending and ill informed. Instead, Cohen echoed 
Carl von Clausewitz’s argument that war is a political instrument. For this and other 
reasons, the military’s actions are founded in policy and must acknowledge the civilians’ 
master roles.34 Simultaneously, Cohen acknowledged that “a deep undercurrent of mutual 
distrust” pervaded civil-military relations.35 The latter characteristic is the defining aspect 
of the “conflictual collaborative relationship” that exists in war.  
Cohen drew from cases related to Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-
Gurion. In each, he highlighted how the leaders were deeply invested in, widely skeptical 
of, and pervasively engaged with military-related decisions. He also drew on quotes from 
Colin Powell. Cohen wrote of the “unequal dialogue” in which “both sides expressed 
their views bluntly indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly – and 
unequal, in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous and 
unquestioned.”36  
The author further outlined various leadership characteristics that are necessary 
for successful decision-making. These included the ability to know where to integrate 
ideas and strategies into planning, being able to focus on the correct and relevant details, 
and to not become intoxicated by the power that comes with leadership.37 Cohen explored 
these latter themes further in the article “The Unequal Dialogue.” He was wise to note, 
“The imperatives of politics and of military professionalism invariably, and 
appropriately, tug in opposite directions; inevitably too, professional judgments require 
                                               
33 This metaphor is used by Cohen in his book. Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, 
and Leadership in Wartime. New York: The Free Press, 2002. pg. 4.  
34 Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. pg. 7. 
35 Ibid. pg. 10. 
36 Ibid. pg. 209. 
37 Ibid. pg. 212. 
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scrutiny rather than unthinking acceptance.”38 Again Cohen emphasized that civilians 
must know the military’s material better than those in uniforms. Candor is vital, as well 
as a willingness to challenge and to be challenged during a sustained dialogue.  
Bargaining Process Theory 
 In his 1990 book Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, Alexander 
George described various management models and bargaining theory while exploring 
civil-military relations within foreign policy discussions. He summarized Robert Bales’ 
work on decision-making in bureaucracy; he said group dynamics “tend to fall ‘naturally’ 
into a moderate gradient’ and eventual group think.39 Outlier opinions tend to be 
ostracized or purged. George responded to these tendencies by arguing for a structured 
methodology within group decision-making. 
 The author wrote that groups must allow for many relevant contributions from 
various members. Furthermore, uninhibited “reaction, questioning, and suggestion 
making” must be allowed after those ideas are presented.40 George emphasized that the 
specific dynamics and leadership style invariably change with each executive. The goal is 
to arrive at open, critical dialogue by whatever means is necessary. George listed many 
threats to this theory and possible pit falls in creating said group dynamic (see 
footnote).41 He also described the differences between structural versus agency driven 
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39 George, Alexander. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information 
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40 Ibid. pg. 96. 
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of the President, but then they “do not cover the full range” of “hypotheses and alternative options;” “When 
there is no advocate for an unpopular policy option;” When advisers “thrash out their own disagreements” 
beyond the president’s knowledge and “confront him with a unanimous recommendation;” When advisers 
all agree that the president needs to make an important decision “but no one is willing to alert him to the 
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variables in the group dynamic processes. Again, he wrote of the president’s “cognitive 
style” and its fundamental influence.42  
 George also laid out three management styles presidents could use in foreign 
policy decision-making. These included the formalistic, competitive, and collegial 
approaches.43 Formalistic is the most dependent on structure and the hierarchy of the 
system. Competitive compels participants to work in zero-sum scenarios in order to 
garner the appreciation of the leader. Collegial is the most time and labor intensive for 
everyone involved. However, it also fosters the most collaborative team environments. 
He related all three to past cases, describing the costs and benefits of each methodology. 
Alexander George’s work is fundamental to this thesis and its analysis. His concepts and 
typologies regarding leadership are used to explain much of what process tracing reveals. 
George’s work also complements another stalwart of the literature: Graham T. Allison 
and organizational process theory.  
Organizational Process Theory 
 Organizational process theory is a vital concept that relates to civil-military 
relations. It seeks to explain the perceptions, analyses, and actions of governments as 
organizational actors. It is a structural theory whose aims are to understand the patterns 
and procedures of different governmental organizations. As such, it diverges from 
George’s cultural and agency heavy theories. Graham T. Allison explicated this theory in 
Essence of Decision. In it, he stated that governments perceive issues through their 
                                                                                                                                            
need for doing so;” when the decision maker “is depended upon a single channel of information;” “When 
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“organizational sensors,” which are components of the whole that are tasked as “quasi-
independent parts” meant to deal with the innumerable complexities of policy 
decisions.44 Since most issues span the domains of multiple organizations, concepts such 
as civil-military relations become necessary.  
 Complexity, due to bureaucratic size and breadth of issues, requires organizations 
to coordinate their efforts. They must develop standard operating procedures in order to 
effectively communicate and interact.45 These rules of interaction and anticipated 
behaviors allow organizations to work with each other, based on assumed tendencies. As 
such, the ability to identify and acknowledge every single variable in a situational 
equation is sacrificed for efficiency. That is, “comprehensive rationality,” or the ability to 
recognize and react to every possible alternative, is simply not possible because of finite 
resources, data, context, and time.  
Because of “the limits of human capacity in comparison with the complexities of 
the problems that individuals in organizations must face”, “bounded rationality” was 
created. This concept allows rational actors to create “simplified models that extract the 
main features of a problem without capturing all of its complexity.”46 The theory’s 
concept that the “actor is not a monolithic ‘nation’ or ‘government’ but rather a 
constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit” is 
vital if one is to understand the relations between the White House and the executive’s 
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myriad agencies.47 The theory explains the tendency for parochial priorities to develop 
within organizations, as they have limited goals and bounded rationales.  
Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Theory 
 Bureaucratic politics theory builds on many precepts of organizational process 
theory. The former finds that leaders of each governmental organization become players 
in a competitive game of bargaining; “the name of the game is politics.”48 This 
bargaining is the inevitable consequence of limited resources. But more importantly, it is 
the inevitable consequence of multiple perspectives competing to answer a given 
problem. Each player, as a representative of one organization, possesses parochial 
priorities and bounded perceptions of the greater issue. 
 As such, governmental decisions are the results of political “compromise, 
conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence.”49 This 
political game takes place within the domestic political realm. However, it intimately 
affects the decisions of foreign policy and civil-military relations. The domestic 
competition over organizational power, influence, structure, appropriations, etc. is a 
significant game with comprehensive implications.  
 Organization process and government bureaucracy theories are relevant to this 
thesis. The works are worth examining here – as well as applying to the case studies - 
because of the number and complexity of players contributing to the civil-military 
relationship. There is a high number of power loci with the military as well as the civilian 
leadership. Additionally, the National Security Council relies on interdepartmental, 
integrative work. The structures, personalities, and limitations inherit in the complex 
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system make these theories highly relevant. However it must be applied skeptically. The 
theory does not expressly accommodate the possibility of fractures within each 
organization. It will be argued that conflict within civilian and military spheres can cause 
important permutations to civil-military relations. 
Contemporary Assessments on Increasing Objectivity in Current Civil-Military Relations 
 In her book The Mission, Dana Priest wrote about increasing objectivity within 
U.S. civil-military relations. She examined the increased power of regional commands 
and their commanders in chiefs (CINCs) over the last quarter century. She wrote that the 
accumulation of influence, resources, and operational responsibility grew incrementally 
“as the DoD filled [the] power vacuum left by the White House” and an “atrophied” State 
Department.50 This occurred when civilian policy makers tended to understand less about 
the military, its systems, and its capabilities. As such, “our elected leaders often treat men 
and women in uniform with either suspicion or excessive reverence, failing to ask 
probing questions or push hard enough for reform.” 
 Priest outlined how the CINCs and regional commands garnered increased 
influence since the 1980s and the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986).51 
Simultaneously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) lost influence over policymaking; they 
were flanked by CINCs, the OSD, and to a lesser extent the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 
Since the JCS was required to report to civilians in the OSD while the CINCs’ “line of 
authority runs directly to the defense secretary and president,” the chiefs became 
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inhibited.52 What’s more, the State Department lost more than 20% of its budget since the 
1970s; this greatly hindered its ability to compete.  
 Amos Jordon, William Taylor, and Michael Mazarr co-authored a book in 1999 
that expanded upon Huntington’s – and in many respects, Priest’s – theories on increased 
objectivity. The authors recognized Huntington’s concern that military leaders would 
“broaden” their realms of influence so as to include political decisions; this would allow 
them to “gain access to the supreme levels of the policy process, but” they “would no 
longer speak on strategic matters from an adequately military perspective.”53 This 
tendency was labeled “fusionism;” the authors echoed Huntington when they argued that 
it was to be avoided. 
 The risk of fusionism is that it could relegate the military’s most pressing, 
fundamental purposes to a secondary focus, behind more administrative and policy-
focused spheres. Operational readiness, planning, and preparedness could suffer. If policy 
making and political influence were executed by the military it could lead to excessive 
focus on budgets and administration instead of tactics and operations.54 The military 
should not touch grand strategy, they argued. Meanwhile, fusionism and broadened 
military influence could increase “informal action channels.”55 This latter development 
could undermine structured changes of commands, hierarchies, and traditional civil-
military relationships. 
 The implications of regional commands’ influence, Goldwater-Nichols, and 
fusionism are present in all three case studies. The former two developments impact the 
                                               
52 Ibid. pg. 96. 
53 Jordon, Amos A., William J. Taylor, Jr. & Michael J. Mazarr. American National Security: Policy and 
Process.Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ Press, 1999. pg. 190. 
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manner in which the military communicated with civilian policymakers. They also 
influence how the civilians were able to selectively engage military leadership in order to 
achieve policy ends with minimal over tension or pushback. The latter concern – 
fusionism – seems to ebb over the course of the three cases, however.  
Applicable Theories 
National Security Council 
A body of literature exists that analyzes the National Security Council. Many 
political scientists have written numerous works that describe, interpret, and theorize the 
most influential institution of post-World War II U.S. foreign policy. This literature 
review will contain some of the most relevant works. It will start with an expanded 
summary of Alexander George’s “multiple advocacy theory.” The latter is fundamental to 
this thesis’s analysis. Throughout the review, references will be made to histories of the 
NSC. However, this work will not include expanded summaries of the NSC and national 
security advisors (NSAs) through the decades. 
Presidential and Secretarial Models of Decision Making 
 Colin Powell recently outlined two basic models of civilian-based foreign policy 
decision-making. He wrote that the presidential model finds the national security advisor 
as a standard-bearer and locus of power. He, working with the president and on behalf of 
the National Security Council, helps lead the daily foreign policy decision-making. 
Conversely, the secretarial model sees the secretary of state as the locus of policy 
decisions. While final decisions still firmly rest in the hands of the president, “the 
48 
 
bureaucracy of the State Department” holds “the principal actors” who formulate and 
implement foreign policy.56  
The latter model had been in neglect under recent administrations. This is for 
various reasons. It is linked to the continued atrophy of the State Department and its 
waning influence upon the national security decision-making processes. Similarly, it is 
related to the increased power of the Defense Department. However, the most recent 
administration has sought to bolster, embolden, and reassert the State Department’s 
influence. The net growth of influence in Foggy Bottom may be stunted, however, by 
concurrent growth in NSC power. 
Multiple Advocacy Theory 
 Alexander L. George wrote a seminal article in the early 1970s in which he 
argued for multiple advocacy in foreign policy decision-making. As a management 
oriented theory, multiple advocacy was intended to rebut centralized management 
processes that could silence disagreement within policy-making bodies.57 Instead of 
scuttling debate, the president would use management styles to “harness diversity of 
views and interests in the interest of rational policy making.” The theory is a “mixed 
system;” it openly draws on pluralistic sources but also requires active management in 
order to perpetuate the system needed for productivity. 
 George delved into dozens of scenarios and variables that influence the system’s 
output. Many of these relate to the case studies of this thesis and will be explored further. 
Suffice to say that the theory requires full, open, engaged participation from all players. 
                                               
56 Powell, Colin. “The NSC Advisor.” Inderfkurth, Karl & Loch K. Johnson. Eds. Fateful Decisions: Inside 
the National Security Council. New York: Oxford Univ Press: 2004. pg. 158. 
57 George, Alexander L. "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy." American Political 
Science Review 66.3 (1972): 751-785. Web. 8 Sept 2012. pg. 751. 
49 
 
Politicking must be kept to a minimum and altruistic actions towards the NSC’s goals are 
essential. However, contradictory inclinations pervade the NSC and make multiple 
advocacy a delicate theory. For example, when the NSC staffs itself with advisors it often 
appropriates individuals under the employ of external departments. The defense and state 
departments, the White House staff, intelligence agencies, and other organizations often 
surrender their best staff in the name of the NSC.  
Simply put, the council coopts a great deal of manpower out of the bodies of 
which it requires superior participation.58 This brain drain, or sorts, weakens the residual 
staffs at those bodies. It inhibits the State Department employee working for the NSC, for 
example, from speaking on behalf of his department; at that time, he is acting as an NSC 
official. As such, divergent missions overlap and differences are exaggerated – yet also 
stunted – within multiple advocacy bodies. This tendency is particularly worrisome when 
the NSC – and multiple advocacy theory, in general – requires full, unmitigated 
participation from numerous participants. Additionally, since the NSC funnels the final 
decision process to a small group of advisers – and the president – it’s possible for 
minority opinions to be lost or insufficiently advocated.59  
 As the pinnacle of national security/foreign policy staffers, the national security 
advisor has procured tremendous influence over the decades. The NSA’s access to the 
president is a great advantage. He and the body he governs possess are able to determine 
the topics and trajectory of discussions. Certainly, the president has eventual say and his 
personality strongly affects the structures and decision-making. Nevertheless, the national 
security advisor’s role is at the center of the policy-making processes. 
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 Alexander George’s work is a prescriptive theory. It outlines how to effectively 
nurture a policy-making process within the muddled, complex, political national security 
apparatus (most specifically, the NSC). He cited the works of Joseph L. Bower, Graham 
T. Allison, Richard Neustadt, Charles Lindblom, and Roger Hilsman throughout what 
amounts to a concise literature review.60 Hilsman had the greatest influence on George’s 
thesis. Hilsman wrote that policy decisions are most likely to be “wise one[s]” if the 
policy makers are intelligent, well informed, and at the apex of power.”61 Additionally, 
the complex jumble of national security organizations requires multiple advocates in 
order to guarantee that all perspectives are promoted.62 
 These requirements led George to the conclusion that better decisions required 
three things: 
(1) No major maldistribution among the various actors of the following 
resources: 
(a) Power, weight, influence. 
(b) Competence relevant to the policy issues. 
(c) Information relevant to the policy problem. 
(d) Analytical resources. 
(e) Bargaining and persuasion skills. 
(2) Presidential-level participation in organizational policy making in 
order to monitor and regulate the workings of multiple advocacy. 
(3) Time for adequate debate and give-and-take.63 
 
For these reasons, multiple advocacy theory requires the president and his staff to “avoid 
gross disparities” in resources, be “alert to the danger” that the range of options presented 
them is not comprehensive, and “develop certain rules of the game to maintain fair 
competition” among the advocates.”64 These are the reasons why the national security 
advisor is an essential aspect of U.S. foreign policy discussions: the NSA, as the 
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president’s senior advisor, is to act in “the custodian role” over the process and players.65 
Meanwhile, the president – as chief executive, must act as the “magistrate.” The latter 
role puts the locus of final decision-making in the lap of the president. George argues that 
this role allows the myriad advocates to cease competing with each other and commence 
advocating for the magistrate’s attention.  
 George listed nine potential “malfunctions” to the policy-making process.66 These 
were mentioned earlier, regarding George’s bargaining process theory, and will be 
explored further in this work’s case study analysis. For now, it is important to recognize 
that all malfunctions impact the deliberation and presentation processes within the NSC.  
In his conclusion, George reemphasized the need for the national security advisor 
– as custodian –not to be an advocate but, rather, a moderator. He must monitor and 
maintain the policy-making process, engaging constantly. He must not be a “watch dog” 
who simply serves and protects the president’s magisterial role.67 His responsibilities are 
broader and less deferential than that. He must maintain credibility as an “honest broker” 
and auditor over the decision-making process. Finally, George emphasized that the NSA 
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must not be the “public spokesman” for executive policy nor implement those 
decisions.68 
This author argues that George’s work is fundamental to understanding the case 
studies here. The theories he posited help explain the power dynamics in the NSC and 
how they impacted civil-military relations. His malfunction typologies are cited directly 
in the analysis and help us understand the distance between NSC theory and actual 
implementation. Ironically, this thesis finds that NSA Rice participated in the case with 
the highest number of malfunctions. This is despite the fact that she and George were 
colleagues at Stanford and she was well aware of his work. 
George’s theory complements the trends, categories, and typologies that this 
author develops. His lists of ideal practices and malfunctions relate to the variables 
present in this thesis. Specifically, his work on national security advisor leadership is 
cited extensively and fused with new theory in this work. George’s descriptions of the 
different roles the advisor and NSC play include many aspects that are present in all three 
cases.  
Carnes Lord and Analysis of the NSC post-Goldwater-Nichols 
 Carnes Lord has written thorough, respected analysis of the NSC. He has written 
a great deal about what was formally titled the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act. The legislation significantly reformed the national security 
and military apparatus. Among other things it bolstered the influence of the chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, altered the chain of command so that it ran from the president 
through the Defense Secretary and directly to the CINCs, amd decreased the influence of 
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the service chiefs to indirect advisory roles. As mentioned earlier, the Act had profound 
impact on civil-military relations. 
 In The Presidency and the Management of National Security, Carnes Lord argued 
that civil-military relations are under increasingly “subjective control.”69 Civilians 
increasingly insert themselves into the “professional military sphere.” Conversely, those 
military professionals are actively studying topics outside their purview and, thus, able to 
participate in discussions beyond their objective roles. In this environment the NSC has 
six roles, according to Lord. These include “routine staff support and information,” 
“crisis management,” “policy development,” “policy implementation,” “policy advice,” 
and “operations.”70  
 For the purpose of this thesis we shall focus on the policy development aspect of 
NSC responsibilities. Lord emphasized the body’s need to “catalyz[e] decision[s]” and 
manage “the decision process;” these were “indispensable NSC” functions.71 For these 
reasons Lord argued the need for a strong NSC that had an established, working 
relationship with the president. If a president did not want to participate in the decision-
making process the staff would have to be particularly “strong” so that he maintains 
control of the bureaucratic bodies.72 All of this resonates with the NSC’s activity – or 
lack thereof – throughout the three cases in this thesis. It also relates to the variables and 
trends that this author found. 
 Lord also posited the need for a highly networked and immersed NSC. Isolation 
leads to failure. He “most emphatically” condemned a “hermetically sealed off” NSC and 
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national security advisor. He wrote, “Strategic planning cannot meaningfully be 
conducted in the absence of full and reliable information concerning the operational 
implications of strategy.”73 Direct access to the various, relevant bodies help increase the 
likelihood of success. However, Lord recognized that there are organizational disparities 
between the players. For example, the State Department does not have a secretary’s 
office that is nearly as influential or organized as the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
It is important that the NSC recognizes each agency’s positions as well as limitations. 
 In these regards, Lord’s work agrees with the spirit of George’s writings. Both 
argued the need for an influential, legitimate, integrated NSC through which bureaucracy 
can be choreographed. The end goal is policymaking that reflects the civilian leaders’ 
decision and complements the president’s leadership style. This thesis’s case studies 
show the extent to which these goals are correlated to the type of subjective civilian 
control that is present. 
 Lord argued that the national security advisor inevitably acts as a policy adviser to 
the president. There is an air of fatalism with this conclusion. It doesn’t appear as though 
Lord was concerned that this would scuttle the advisor’s role. This thesis takes issue with 
that argument. The third case study’s process tracing shows that this is not inevitable or 
necessary. 
Lord went on to write that the NSC, as a whole, must remain strong and 
authoritative. This allows it to “adjudicate among the differing interests and perspectives 
of the various national security agencies.”74 In this respect he again echoed substantial 
pieces of George’s multiple advocacy theory. Lord further wrote that “strategic 
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expertise,” a “sense of history,” and experience are paramount for the NSC staff and 
national security advisor.75 While close relationships with the president were ideal but not 
required, strong and independent character are highly touted by the author. Lord 
famously wrote, “The best approach to countering the inevitable bias of senior White 
House staff is to strengthen the institutional presence of the National Security Council 
within the White House structure.”76  
Cecil Crabb, Kevin Mulcahy, and Typologies of the National Security Advisor’s Role(s) 
 Cecil Crabb and Kevin Mulcahy developed typologies for the national security 
advisor’s role vis-à-vis the president and National Security Council. These correspond 
strongly with the process organization and presidential leadership variables that are 
emphasized in this thesis. Based on levels of implementation responsibility (a) and 
policy-making responsibility (b), they defined the NSA’s leadership role as either 
“department-centered” Administrator [low (a), low (b)], “formalized” Coordinator [high 
(a), low (b)], “collegial” Counselor [low (a), high (b)], or “palace guard” Agent [high (a), 
high (b)].77 The two make clear that each typology is defined by the leadership styles of 
the president (see footnote, below).78 There is direct causality between the president’s 
preferences and how the NSA/NSC function.  
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                Implementation Responsibility 
     
   Low High 
   Department-Centered Formalized  
  Low - - 
Policymaking   Administrator Coordinator 
Responsibility   Collegial Palace Guard 
  High - - 
   Counselor Agent 
Figure 2.4 – Crabb/Mulcahy Typologies of NSC/National Security Advisor Roles 
These typologies are very useful when creating a synthetic conceptual framework 
to analyze events. This author uses Crabb and Mulcahy’s typologies when interpreting 
the national security advisor’s and NSC’s roles in each case study. He also relates Crabb 
and Mulcahy’s work to the theory that is developed in this thesis; the two works 
complement each other. What’s more, their typologies meld well with George’s work, his 
typologies, and the civil-military literature that has been discussed earlier. Because Crabb 
and Mulcahy’s work includes clear spectrums of both policymaking and implementation 
involvement, it relates well to the language and primary concerns of George’s 
malfunction typologies.  
The National Security Council Throughout History, Influencing Our Cases 
 There are numerous works within political science and historical literature that 
analyze the role of the NSC. From Truman to Obama the histories are increasingly 
robust. They highlight the changes in the body’s structure and influence with each 
administration. A predominant narrative is common throughout the literature. That is, 
there is substantial agreement about each president’s influence upon the NSC and which 
moments – as well as figures – served as benchmarks. For the purpose of this thesis we 
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will not delve into the history of the NSC prior to the cases in question. However, it is 
important to recognize the bodies of literature that precedes us.79  
 It is vital, meanwhile, that we take time to highlight basic trends and fundamental 
aspects of the NSC throughout history. A distinct trend since the Nixon administration 
has been the decline of State Department influence over foreign policy decision-making. 
This is particularly true within the realms of civil-military relations. Edward Kolodziej 
wrote that the National Security Council became a substitute body, of sorts, for the State 
Department. As the former’s star rose, the latter’s set within the bureaucratic arena.80 
Henry Kissinger was the pivot point for this transition. This encouraged Kolodziej; he 
argued that the NSC should take up the mantle of policy making, due to – among other 
things – its proximity to the White House staff.  
 The National Security Council cemented itself as the core of civil-military 
relations and foreign policy decision-making during the Nixon-Kissinger era. As the 
White House staff and NSC consolidated their authority as well as legitimacy, a zero-sum 
struggle saw the waning of the State Department. The primary harbinger of this change 
was funding and budgetary battles over appropriations. Concurrently, the Department of 
Defense and OSD benefited from more rigid, hierarchical structures. The OSD was able 
to maintain and grow influence because of this. No doubt it also benefited from the 
                                               
79 Some excellent historical summaries and political science analyses can be found in: Inderfkurth, Karl & 
Loch K. Johnson. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council. New York: Oxford Univ Press: 
2004; Hilsman, Roger. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs. 3rd Ed. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993; Bock, Joseph G. The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant. 
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987; Kolodziej, Edward A. "The National Security Council: Innovations and 
Implications." Public Administration Review Nov/Dec (1969): 573-585. Web. 8 Sept 2012. pp. 573-585; 
Thayer, Frederick C. "Presidential Policy Processes and New Administration: A Search for Revised 
Paradigms." Public Administration Review Sept/Oct (1971): 552-561. Web. 8 Sept 2012. pp. 552-561; 
Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment Huntington: Novinka 
Books: 2001; Hoxie, R. Gordon. Command Decisions and the Presidency. New York: Reader's Digest 
Press, T.Y. Crowell, 1977. 
80 Kolodziej, Edward A. "The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications." Public 
Administration Review Nov/Dec (1969): 573-585. Web. 8 Sept 2012. pg. 580. 
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specialized, professional assets of the military and its place in contemporary foreign 
policy. Hard power had a distinct advantage over soft policy. Kolodziej was concerned 
about the Defense Department’s rise, however.81  
The National Security Council Grows, Changes 
 The NSC more than doubled in size over the course of the late 1960s and early 
1970s. It then stabilized in size and mission until 1980. Then, President Reagan saw the 
NSC explode in size and influence.82 After the end of the Cold War the size of the NSC 
fell precipitously. However, President Clinton ultimately broadened the NSC’s purview 
and increased both its funding and size. By the end of his administration the full time 
staff numbered nearly 100.83 Clinton, meanwhile, did not focus on policy making nearly 
as much as day-to-day management of foreign policy. For this reason, in some respects 
the former mission of the NSC atrophied during his tenure.  
Under the second President Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
immediately cut the NSC’s size by over 30% to about 70 staffers. While the NSC 
remained larger than any point prior to 1996, it was a drastic move.84 It is worth noting, 
however, that NSA Rice steadily built the NSC back up and it eventually grew to be 
much larger than the body she inherited. By 2004, in fact, it was 50% larger than what 
                                               
81 Kolodziej was particularly concerned with the DoD gaining strength at the State Department’s expense 
(or, at least, to the latter’s detriment). Ibid. pg. 579. 
82 According to figures published by Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler the NSC grew from approximately 20 to 
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nearly 100 members in 2000. Destler, I.M. & Ivo. H. Daalder. "A New NSC for a New Administration.” 
Brookings Institution. Nov 2000. Web. 25 Sept 2012. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Destler, I.M. & Ivo. H. Daalder. "How Operational and Visible an NSC.” Brookings Institution. 23 
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Rice acquired. It is commonly acknowledged that she found it necessary to re-grow what 
had initially be cut in an anti-Clintonian purge.85 
Daalder, Destler, “Trust,” & Analysis of Clinton’s NSC Forward 
 When analyzing Clinton’s National Security Council, Ivo Daalder and I.M. 
Destler argued their was a need for greater integrated coordination. They argued that an 
“odd man out” national security advisor would be a disservice to national security and 
foreign policy.86 Edward Kolodziej shared an appreciation for the NSC’s precarious and 
delicate balance it must maintain. He wrote that the NSC must remain outside the fray in 
order to maintain its reputation as independent. The president must not play favorites, the 
national security advisor must serve the president’s wills, and the NSC must scuttle any 
bureaucratic infighting.87  
In their 2009 book, In the Shadow of the Oval Office, Daalder and Destler 
emphasized the many, often conflicting requirements of a functional NSC. Throughout 
their arguments, from its hybrid behavior and agency perspective, trust is paramount; it is 
essential for a successful NSC. The national security advisor and NSC must garner the 
trust of the president. What’s more, the national security advisor must be perceived as a 
legitimate, approachable choreographer, as well. The latter point is particularly true for 
the principal, cabinet-level leadership.88 This requires a significant amount of 
interpersonal skills, knowledge, engagement, and receptiveness on the advisor’s part.  
                                               
85 Rothkopf, David. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the 
Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. pg. 403, 404. 
86 Destler, I.M. & Ivo. H. Daalder. "A New NSC for a New Administration.”  
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Daalder and Destler wrote: 
National Security Advisers have one tough job. They must serve the 
president, yet balance this primary allegiance with the commitment to 
manage an effective and efficient policy process. They must be forceful 
in driving that process forward to decisions, yet represent other 
agencies’ views fully and faithfully. They must be simultaneously 
strong and collegial, able to enforce discipline across the government, 
yet engage senior officials and their agencies rather than exclude them. 
They must provide confidential advice to the president, yet establish a 
reputation as an honest broker of the conflicting officials and interests 
across the government. […] They must […] operation in the shadows 
to the maximum extent possible […] and they must handle all issues, 
large and small, in a manner that establishes and retains the trust of 
their senior administration colleagues.89 
 
Daalder and Destler emphasized that neither the NSC nor the national security advisor 
should try to play consensus seeker. While various previous administrations used the 
National Security Council as such, it can scuttle healthy dialogue or compel agreement 
too early in the process.90 The latter risks perpetuating policy decisions that are too 
elementary, atrophied, or aimless. It can also allow for players to co-opt the national 
security process through politicking. 
 These and other theories put forth by Daalder and Destler resonate with this 
thesis. The two political scientists emphasized the need for explicit procedures. 
Established processes and structures must be followed. Additionally, the roles of all 
agents participating in the national security process must be clearly defined as well as 
followed. Daalder and Destler are advocates for high process organization and role 
authenticity. Their work complements what is discussed and built in this thesis. As will 
be shown in the cases, their emphasis on the NSC’s need to be trusted and deemed 
legitimate by all players – especially the president – complements George’s theories, as 
well. 
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For Daalder and Destler “functional competence” – like that found in the “late 
Reagan, Bush, and early Clinton administrations” – was paramount and must be 
prioritized. In this way they made simultaneous agency and structural arguments. The 
two focused a great deal on the structural, bureaucratic, and procedural boundaries of the 
NSC’s mission. However, they insisted on the impact of individual personalities, 
relationships, and leadership. The latter aspect of their analysis led to an important 
conclusion: no single leadership style or NSC structure would work universally. Each 
community of civil-military and national security leaders has to adapt the NSC so as to 
complement its dynamics and optimize their service.91 Again, this matches the trends that 
are present in the three case studies. 
Daalder, Destler, and others wrote many articles throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s about necessary structural changes to the NSC as well as mission shifts for the 
national security advisor. Daalder and Destler argued that augmenting the NSC’s staff 
and modifying its bounded mission was essential. This would allow the NSC to match its 
operation to its influence. They wrote that the national security advisor must “balance this 
managerial responsibility against the role of advising the president.”92  
In 2001 John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft argued the NSC’s need 
to enhance its ability “to plan, direct and coordinate interagency programs.”93 New 
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deputy level positions were recommended. They suggested reorganization of the NSC’s 
office structure and categorizations, as well. Conversely, Daalder and Destler, in the same 
year, wrote that the National Security Council can remain larger but must pare down its 
jurisdictions and roles. Legislative affairs and communication offices could be culled.94 
Their argument was that any public roles were distracting from the NSC/NSA’s first and 
foremost role: choreographing foreign policy internally.  
For this reason Daalder and Destler were critical of Bush’s first national security 
advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and her highly prominent diplomatic role. They argued that 
instead of a mouthpiece, the advisor should be a stage manager. They wrote, “To best 
serve the president and the nation, experts agree, the National Security Council staff 
needs to be strong, small, subdued, selective in its issue engagement, and focused above 
all on management of the policy process.”95 This statement best summarizes their thesis 
vis-à-vis the National Security Council and its role. Their argument also agrees with what 
this author found during process tracing.  
Daalder, Destler, and Others’ Analysis of Bush’s NSC 
Daalder and Destler have written a great deal about the mission and operational 
capacity of the National Security Council. Much of their work has included historical 
case studies; they have analyzed modern administrations’ use of the body. In their book 
In the Shadow of the Oval Office, for example, Daalder and Destler spent significant 
effort analyzing President George W. Bush’s National Security Council. This included an 
examination of Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley as national security advisors.  
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Daalder and Destler argued that President Bush appointed Condoleezza Rice as a 
policymaking adviser, first and foremost. Likewise, Rice perceived her role more as 
staffing the president and less as managing the civil-military or national security 
processes; this led to the neglect of various institutional processes.96 Rice also became 
one of the most visible policy spokespersons for the Bush White House. For Destler and 
Daalder, this “atypically active” presence was distracting, undermined the credibility of 
the national security advisor, and was troubling to the prospect of stable national security 
processes.97 Furthermore, Rice was one of the youngest, least experienced national 
security advisors in history; she held approximately three years of government experience 
prior to her appointment in 2000.98 NSA Rice took immediate steps to alter, trim, and 
consolidate the NSC that she inherited from Clinton’s administration.99 According to 
Daalder and Destler’s research and argument, this allowed for other principals to 
overtake the processes Rice should have controlled.  
Politicking was rampant amongst the cabinet-level leaders of Bush’s White 
House. Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld made overt power plays early in 
the administration’s first term.100 Rumsfeld expressed “great disdain for the process that 
Rice was supposed to run” and made immediate, comprehensive efforts to control all 
                                               
96 Destler, I.M. & Ivo. H. Daalder. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. pg. 251. Also, Rothkopf, David. 
Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American 
Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. pg. 405. 
97 Daalder, Ivo H. "More Than a Few Campaign Stops: How Rice Has Redefined the Role of National 
Security Adviser." Center for American Progress. 22 October 2004. Web. 25 Sept 2012. 
98 Destler, I.M. & Ivo. H. Daalder. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. pg. 257. 
99 NSA Rice believed Clinton’s NSC had become too powerful, specifically condemning its focus on 
implementation. She sought to explicitly limit the NSC’s role to “staffing the president; pushing his policy 
priorities; and coordinating the rest of the government.” Destler, I.M. & Ivo. H. Daalder. In the Shadow of 
the Oval Office. pg. 259-260. 
100 Daalder and Destler give anecdotal evidence of various times Cheney and Rumsfeld made policy 
decisions outside of the NSC apparatus then failed to notify NSA Rice (or the State Department for that 
matter). Ibid. pg. 275-276. 
64 
 
communications coming out of the Pentagon.101 Cheney, meanwhile, initially tried to 
chair the NSC principals committee meetings; this would have been an unprecedented 
usurpation of the advisor’s power by the vice president.102 The vice president also staffed 
his own office with intelligence and national security personnel. NSA Rice described 
Cheney’s “mini-NSC,” as Richard Haass described it, as being unencumbered. Others 
described it as intimidating, networked, and belligerent in the face of established NSC 
protocols.103 This was despite the fact that NSA Rice met with President Bush upwards of 
eight or nine times a day with face time sometimes lasting over four hours.104  
Daalder and Destler present many examples of NSA Rice’s inability to contain 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s aggressive power plays. Neither Rice nor anyone else successfully 
compelled Rumsfeld to attend meetings regularly; if he did not agree with their premises, 
he simply ignored them and did not attend.105 Rumsfeld’s Pentagon “mind meld” also 
continued without fail. This allowed the OSD to neutralize dissenting voices within the 
military, flank the Joint Chiefs, and more easily co-opt voices at the CINC level when 
they complemented the secretary’s policy preferences.106 
Meanwhile, various players within the national security process marginalized 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Neither Bush nor Cheney consulted him on the 
nomination of Rumsfeld. Once the administration began, Powell found himself outside of 
some of the most confidential and impactful policy discussions. Daalder and Destler cite 
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evidence that NSA Rice failed to end the secretary of state’s isolation in national security 
policy discussions. They go on to argue that it was Rice’s responsibility to do so.107 The 
secretary of state wasn’t the only principal who was subdued at the time; President Bush 
removed the UN ambassador from the cabinet-level and kept the position outside of vital 
NSC events.108  
A majority of Daalder and Destler’s argument is framed around process and 
leadership. Significant civilian agents, particularly those who could have maintained 
procedural organization, shirked process. As such, leadership from the top did not 
attempt to resolve the atrophy. The work Daalder and Destler did, therefore, corroborates 
and enhances the trends developed in this thesis.  
Daalder and Destler argued that Rice’s passive role as national security advisor 
was the primary reason that the Iraq war planning process was anemic, unchallenged, and 
incomplete.109 From Rice’s aloof position at the start of the discussion through her 
willingness to cede post-war planning to the Pentagon, she failed to manage the myriad 
roles and agencies of U.S. civil-military/national security policymaking.110 A significant 
and influential body echoed their argument: the 9/11 Commission found Bush’s first term 
National Security Council to be highly dysfunctional and ineffective in multiple 
organizational responsibilities.111  
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In President Bush’s second term Condoleezza Rice became secretary of state and 
former Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was appointed to his boss’s 
position. Hadley held much more experience within the government and NSC, in 
particular.112 Hadley made overt moves to reform and re-administer the NSC’s policy 
implementation role. His close proximity to and relationship with President Bush – like 
Rice’s – allowed him to garner tremendous trust and influence. He prided himself on 
being able to read and even anticipate the president. This time, a relative absence of 
challenges coming from Cheney and Rumsfeld helped Hadley. Hadley also maintained 
the policymaking timbre of Rice’s national security advisor tenure. When the Iraq 
strategy review commenced in 2006 this would become particularly consequential; 
Hadley and his top regional advisors – Crouch, O’Sullivan, Feaver – were strong 
proponents for a surge.113  
Daalder and Destler presented evidence that Hadley and his staff’s minority 
position during the 2006 strategy review gained influence due to Hadley’s proximity to 
the president. What’s more, as national security advisor, Hadley was able to corral 
outside voices/proponents in ways other bureaucrats were unable to do.114 Through these 
actions, Daalder and Destler argued, Hadley used his role as a way to greatly influence 
policymaking. However, their protestations were muted because he was also able to 
simultaneously execute the portion of his job that they found paramount. That is, Hadley 
served his rank and role by choreographing a wide-ranging strategic review that would 
have been unlikely if not for his leadership. As such, he enacted their prescription of 
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NSC/NSA functions, if for no other reason than creating an opportunity to present his 
position. 
According to Daalder and Dester’s evidence, arguments, and typologies, Hadley 
succeeded in leading outside of the limelight. He was a covert liaison who was trusted by 
the president and a legitimate, networked figure within civil-military and national 
security apparatuses. Daalder and Destler were willing to dismiss Hadley’s significant 
policy making role because he executed his primary roles as national security advisor 
despite the policy-based tangent. In this respect, their silence serves to amplify Carnes 
Lord’s voice; his theory that the national security advisor is inevitably a policy-making 
figure while serving the NSC’s mission rings true. 
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Chapter Three 
Case One: Iraq War Plan (2001-2003) 
 
 In the days and weeks after the September 11th attacks there were numerous 
meetings amongst the top tier civilian leadership. The Bush Administration was reeling. 
However, it was also resolved to identify strategic threats in order to neutralize them and 
ultimately declare victory. Fires still raged at Ground Zero and smoke still billowed from 
the Pentagon when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld first suggested a broadened front in the 
new Global War on Terror (GWoT). Within weeks, President Bush requested a review of 
the Iraq invasion plans that were on file. Within months a comprehensive overhaul of the 
Iraq war plan was underway. The velocity and trajectory of the war planning efforts were 
products of civilian policy preferences and willing military acquiescence.  
From the fall of 2001 through early 2003 a swift, massive, covert process of war 
planning and operational preparation took place. The president catalyzed the process via 
direct policy requests. The process was implemented based on distinct policy goals and 
strategic objectives laid out - in varying precision – by the top tier of civilian policy 
leadership. However, a significant question remains. Through all of this – from the initial 
request until the final “go” order – what were the civil-military dynamics? The puzzles 
that this case seeks to answer include: What methods did civilian leaders and military 
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officers use to plan the Iraq invasion? What were the dynamics between these players 
during the war planning process? How was the process organized and to what extent did 
the president lead during this moment of subjective civilian control? In so doing, it is the 
author’s intention to define the nature of the events leading up to the Iraq war. This is 
relevant to the overall thesis in that it helps illustrate the state of civil-military relations at 
the beginning of the project’s focus. 
This case spans from immediately after the attacks of September 11th through the 
19 March 2003 National Security Council (NSC) meeting in which President Bush gave 
the final “go” order to invade Iraq. This author argues that the case is a clear indication of 
highly subjective civil-military relations. Process tracing reveals a stark fact: the 
Secretary of Defense and his office – the OSD – succeeded in their goal of controlling the 
operational planning process. President Bush delegated his primary leadership role 
during the earliest, most formative moments. Additionally, the National Security Council 
failed to moderate the entirety of the strategic debate. From the earliest stages through the 
latest revisions, Secretary Rumsfeld kept in frequent and direct contact with General 
Tommy R. Franks, the commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). The Secretary’s 
contact with the regional command’s Commander in Chief (CINC) marginalized other 
top military leaders. This includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs.  
The locus of power was firmly in the Secretary of Defense’s office throughout the 
war planning efforts. Furthermore, this author argues that Rumsfeld’s relationship and 
contact with Franks constituted the co-optation – however willing – of a senior Army 
general. This strengthened the OSD’s position and allowed for Rumsfeld’s preferences to 
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be executed more easily, without pushback or challenges to its validity. In many ways, 
Rumsfeld was able to circumvent traditional bureaucratic channels and chains of 
command. The end result was a highly subjective move by civilians to maintain control 
within a civil-military environment where – despite being firmly subjective – military 
professionals held an authoritative advantage.  
Additionally, due to political preferences and civilian policy decisions, a near 
entirety of the planning process was highly secretive and exclusive. The secrecy and 
structure of the war planning decreased the manner in which players – civilian and 
military, alike – could influence the eventual design of the invasion. This worked to 
Rumsfeld’s advantage for multiple reasons; increased difficulty for other civilians to 
challenge the tempo and nature of the planning was not the least of these reasons. A 
relatively weak National Security Council and a National Security Advisor – in 
Condoleezza Rice – who did a poor job of moderating power dynamics within the 
civilian leadership, further compounded the process. 
Throughout this case it is essential to remember this fact: the processes of 
defining operational goals and developing the Iraq invasion plan were done within an 
environment of comprehensive and rapid transition of civil-military relations. This all 
occurred during a civilian-led campaign to reorganize and re-prioritize the missions and 
assets of the military. This was the case before the attacks of 11 September 2001. 
However, the catastrophic effects of that day accelerated and broadened these goals of 
subjective civilian control.  
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Political Context 
 To appreciate the nature of civil-military relations leading up to the Iraq invasion, 
it is important to explore context. In order to appreciate context, it is necessary to 
understand the prevailing policies and political ideologies within the civilian leadership. 
There is a substantial volume of sources that indicate the ideological positions of many 
relevant actors in the Bush Administration. A significant proportion of these sources 
reveal a penchant for shifting away from the Powell Doctrine’s legacy of cooperative 
internationalism. Instead, they preferred a move towards more assertive militant 
internationalism, neo-conservative foreign policy goals, and an eventual adoption of 
offensive liberalism. 
 Many top civilian political officials and highly influential policy advisors in the 
Bush Administration participated in various neo-conservative think tanks and 
organizations leading up to the 2000 election. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz, Chief of Staff to the Vice President I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, and Zalmay 
Khalilzad – among others – publicly supported the “Defense Planning Guidance” as early 
as February 1992.115 This document was one of the earliest calls for neo-conservative 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Its positions included a call to “address sources 
of regional conflict and instability” and encouraging “the spread of democratic forms of 
government.”116 Among its list of numerated U.S. interests were “Persian Gulf oil,” 
protection against “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” and “threats… from 
terrorism or regional or local conflict.” 
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 In June 1997, the Project for the New American Century published a “Statement 
of Principles” as a response to the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy decisions. In 
it, the think tank warned that the United States was “in danger of squandering the 
opportunity and failing the challenge” to reshape the international community to fit the 
nation’s “principles and interests.”117 In January 1998,the organization sent a letter to 
President Clinton; it urged him to announce a new strategy towards foreign policy and 
military engagement. This strategy, it stated, “should aim, above all, at the removal of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in the 
difficult but necessary endeavor.”118 Paul Wolfowitz and the eventual Defense Secretary, 
Donald Rumsfeld, were among the organization’s members. 
 These brief examples indicate that various Bush Administration officials had 
established inclinations towards neo-conservatism and offensive liberalism. They are 
examples of policy positions held by the administration’s group of influential civilian 
policymakers. Indeed, there existed in the Bush Administration an overarching agreement 
in a neo-conservative foreign policy ideology. Many individuals who espoused such 
policies and political positions were out of power throughout the Clinton Administration. 
There was a good deal of discontent not only with foreign policy decisions but also the 
organization and utility of the military. As can be expected, a good deal of that frustration 
focused on Iraq. 
 Conservatives and Republicans were amongst those most frustrated over over the 
results of the first Gulf War.119 Specifically, they were most upset that Saddam Hussein 
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remained in power, still threatened regional stability, was still believed to have biological 
and chemical weapons capabilities, and still sapped the economic, political, and military 
resources of the United States. However, by the middle of the 1990s, various strategies 
proved to be either ineffective or too costly and time consuming; the United States was 
eventually compelled to perpetuate a containment policy of Saddam while musing over 
various ways to influence substantial change.120 
 The frustration increased in magnitude and volume over the course of the decade. 
Nearly 300 editorials in The New York Times and Washington Post critiqued the status 
quo policy and, in the final two years of the decade, a majority of writers on the subject 
declared containment dead and/or lobbied for regime change.121 On November 13, 1997, 
House Resolution 322 was approved; it called for unilateral force against Iraq if the U.N. 
Security Council tried to veto multilateral force as a part of sanctions.122 Furthermore, in 
October 1998 President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act. This legal document 
proclaimed the “ouster of Saddam Hussein” as “the goal of American foreign policy 
toward Iraq.”123 It also provided funding that was specifically appropriated to help topple 
Saddam. By the end of the decade, there was a critical mass of popular opinion, political 
will, and legal precedence behind the idea of regime change in Iraq. 
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Through all of this, regime change hawks and neo-conservatives escalated their 
rhetoric as well as their commitment to said goal. They began to suggest that while 
regime change catalyzed by domestic forces was ideal, it might be necessary for the 
United States to commit troops in order to achieve their policy goals.124 It was a stark 
policy conclusion: the fundamental goal had become regime change by whatever means 
necessary, including direct and comprehensive American military engagement. With this 
conclusion, “for Republicans, regime change was taken for granted by 2000.”125 
Throughout the 2000 Presidential election campaign Senator John McCain, advisor (and 
eventual National Security Advisor) Condoleezza Rice, and others spoke openly about 
the need to institute new strategies aimed at complete regime change. 
These desires and policy intentions were brought into the Bush White House. 
Initially, however, it was recognized by many civilians that Iraq was not a priority and 
that more significant national security issues needed to be managed. National Security 
Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice, for example, indicated that Saddam fell below issues 
pertaining to Russia, China, NATO expansion, India, and even Africa. Regardless, Iraqi 
exiles such as Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress (INC) cohorts frequently 
advised on war plan scenarios.126 What’s more, in the hours and days following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a rapid re-prioritizing of national security goals. 
Almost immediately, the simmering issue and policy goals of Iraq boiled to the surface.  
This shift in priorities reflected an elevation of offensive liberalism that, contrary 
to normative suppositions, reconciled with the neo-conservative ideology well. As the 
trauma the September 11th attacks amplified the concern of policy failures and an 
                                               
124 Ibid. pg. 248. 
125 Ibid. pg. 253. 
126 Hersh, Seymour M. "The Iraq Hawks." The New Yorker. 24 & 31 Dec 2001: 58-63. Print. pg. 59, 60. 
75 
 
inability to engage a new enemy, civilian leaders adopted offensive liberalism strategy 
more aggressively. Realist grand strategies were shirked while neo-conservative foreign 
policy ideas were elevated. The idea that the international community could be – and 
should be – altered by way of offensive military engagement blossomed.127 This, added 
with the idea of “the benign influence of democracy on the external behavior of states 
and on international security” – which was commonly held by neo-conservatives in and 
outside the administration – compounded the adoption of offensive liberalism.128  
As such, key civilian policymakers perceived a need and opportunity to 
offensively alter the international community. This fusion of neo-conservatism and 
offensive liberalism brought forth the idea that “benevolent American hegemony” was a 
necessary purpose of the United States, as sole super-power.129 This was to be achieved 
in a way that was perceived to be morally right and humanly inevitable.  
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Bureaucratic Context 
The neo-conservative penchant for offensive liberalism was complemented by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s intention to dramatically reorganize the 
Department of Defense. This had inevitable consequences upon civil-military relations. 
When Secretary Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon for his second tenure in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), he was committed to altering a military that he saw as 
“too set in its thinking” and “too attached to the weapons systems and fighting doctrines 
of the past.”130 Rumsfeld was one of many top civilian leaders in the Bush 
Administration who felt that the Department of Defense required a massive 
reorganization. He was also one of many leaders who believed the opportunity for a 
drastic change in military and foreign policy had arrived.  
There was a continuum that connected neo-conservative foreign policy to a belief 
that the Powell Doctrine hindered civilian control of the military. Developed by many of 
former Vietnam-era junior officers who moved up the ranks (including General Colin 
Powell), the Powell Doctrine sought to restrict the influence and decision making 
abilities of civilian policymakers upon wars that were in progress; when the guns start, 
the policy hawks should remain silent.131 It was a form of objective civil-military 
relations that was born out of the assumption that political interference greatly 
contributed to tactical and strategic failures of the past, most specifically in Vietnam. As 
such, the doctrine was intended to alter the structure of civil-military relations and allow 
for more military autonomy once policy decided that there was a need for war.  
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Among the frustrations associated with the Powell Doctrine, however, was that it 
restricted options for civilian policymakers and, thus, increased the possibility of larger 
conflict. The logic of this argument was that the doctrine – as a concept developed by 
military minds – required large build-ups of resources and still larger magnitudes of force 
deployment in order to execute the form of massive combat that it favored.132 The Powell 
Doctrine’s top priorities included the insurance of offensive dominance, force protection, 
and the limiting of military force as a tool for diplomacy. It was a hyper-inflated 
application of tactical determinism, in which policy determination defers to military 
professionals the moment that force is agreed upon.133  
Michael Desch and others have argued that the Powell Doctrine, while “for the 
most part externally focused… nonetheless undermined civilian control, by asserting a 
greater domestic role for the military in foreign policy decision-making.”134 This 
doctrinal trend further enhanced the elevated stature that military professionals enjoyed 
after the first Gulf War. As military successes became more explicit and impressive, 
fewer citizens volunteered for military service. The exclusive and outstanding appearance 
of military professionals amplified their legitimacy as well as their authority in the public 
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sphere. This led to an increasing authoritative advantage for those who wore a uniform. It 
was an advantage that was seemingly bestowed by civilian leadership; politicians rained 
praise on soldiers throughout this period and perpetuated the appearance of willing 
deference.  
Meanwhile, there were concerns that the doctrine limited strategic adaptation to 
changing political events; it also inhibited the use of force as a signaling tool. It was 
further argued that because of this trend – which was established for the specific benefit 
of combat effectiveness – adversaries were able to more easily identify American 
maneuvers, anticipate military operations, and test the authenticity of statecraft and 
diplomatic actions. As stated by one theoretician, “Americans… are incapable of 
modulating violence for political purposes and would not contemplate massive war for 
the sake of secondary or tertiary interests.”135  
Many among the Bush Administration’s leadership and Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
office shared these concerns; they perceived the Powell Doctrine as an ineffective and 
even dangerous precedent. Furthermore, Rumsfeld and others believed that the doctrine 
allowed the military to pervert civil-military relations and reverse the tradition of military 
deference to civilian authority. Rumsfeld believed that it allowed for the entrenchment of 
the many expensive, bloated weapons programs and strategies that were superfluous in a 
post-Cold War, globalized world with advanced weapons and information technology.  
Meanwhile, the fulcrum on which Rumsfeld’s reorganization pivoted was the 
existence of advanced weapon systems, specifically precision-guided munitions.136 With 
these tools, and the development of maneuver warfare, the civilian leadership began an 
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assertive, rapid, and subjective change to military doctrine. The new emphasis was on 
“speed, agility,” and “flexibility.”137 Key members of the Bush campaign, many of which 
became civilian policymakers in the Bush Administration, emphasized that a “revolution 
in military affairs” had occurred and that a fundamental “transformation” of the DoD was 
necessary. The very nature of such a civilian-catalyzed structural reconstruction and 
reinterpretation of military strategy required highly subjective civil-military relations; the 
unequal dialogue had been reversed and amplified.  
Civil-Military Relations Context 
Secretary Rumsfeld and his civilian staff were highly assertive and aggressive 
when implementing their desired ends. One of their high priorities was to control the 
discussions and decision-making in the Pentagon. They did this by emphasizing the 
subjective civilian control hierarchy and a balanced pattern of civil-military relations. 
They also maintained control by dictating the tempo of discussions and decisions. They 
used aggressive maneuvers with the military leaders with which they disagreed, then 
promoted or co-opted military officers with whom they agreed. These actions served to 
dramatically alter the prevailing civil-military relations prior to Iraq war planning, as well 
as relations during the process itself. 
As mentioned above, there was a significant shift in ideology on the side of the 
civilian policymakers. Secretary Rumsfeld and his OSD staff represented these changes 
and took it upon themselves to aggressively enact reforms. There exists a large volume of 
anecdotal and qualitative sources that reveals the goals as well as tactics used by civilian 
policymakers to this end. Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, is one 
civilian who was intimately involved in the reorganization of the Pentagon and civil-
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military relations.138 He agreed to many interviews throughout his tenure and, in 2008, 
published a book about his experiences under Secretary Rumsfeld titled War and 
Decision. His descriptions of the decisions and events that took place between the OSD, 
White House, and military officials offer an invaluable glimpse into the processes. 
Feith’s and others’ writings indicate how civil policymakers – specifically 
Secretary Rumsfeld and his office –influenced the military. They reveal an unequal 
dialogue in which civilians dictated the policy discussions, topics of focus, and decision-
making. Feith states, “It was typical of Rumsfeld and his team to introduce concepts and 
principles into policy discussions and consider ways to influence public thinking about 
strategic matters.”139 While this is not atypical, it is important to recognize that the 
civilian side of the relationship was instigating synthetic reform of the military structure. 
It did so by injecting questions and challenges into the relationship. This was a shrewd 
application of critical-thinking; it compelled military leaders to answer difficult questions 
that challenged the justification of their weapons systems, war plans, and strategic logic. 
It compelled change by way of inquisition.  
The establishment of the Campaign Planning Committee (CAPCOM) is another 
example of change and reorganization of the civil-military relationship. There, Vice 
Chairman Marine General Peter Pace met with Feith frequently to discuss various 
strategic concepts and problems, as well as bureaucratic structure reforms.140 As Feith 
attests: 
The CAPCOM allowed us to eliminate the longstanding but grossly 
unconstructive practice of the military and civilian sides of the Pentagon 
each continually sending in to the Secretary’s office ideas that the other 
side had not seen and did not approve. The CAPCOM was an important 
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innovation at the Pentagon, although it has received virtually no 
attention…141 
 
 This and other reforms were meant to improve efficiency, reduce redundancy, and 
integrate various civilian and military organizations in the Pentagon. There were many 
commendable arguments for these changes, to be sure. However, simultaneously, other 
actions took place that did not simply alter military organization and bureaucratic size; 
they were altering the balance and reciprocity of civil-military relations.  
 If the Powell Doctrine hindered civilian control of the military and perverted any 
preceding balance in civil-military relations, the Bush Administration’s actions rapidly 
and dramatically shifted the advantage the other way. While most of the Bush 
Administration’s actions were to this end, they occurred at a time in which a revolution 
of civil-military relations was already brewing. The effects, in turn, were compounded as 
well as amplified. This was largely due to the same information technology and weapons 
advances on which Rumsfeld’s objectives so heavily relied. 
 The development of numerous computer, precision weapon, and 
telecommunications technologies was rapidly altering policy and tactical decisions.142 
Secretaries of Defense preceding Rumsfeld had already made efforts to adapt these new 
technologies to civil-military relations and military decisions, much to the chagrin of the 
military. There was a perception that automated systems could take over bureaucratized 
personnel positions and even compromise objective military control. However, the initial 
success of the Afghanistan campaign was perceived as a clear indication of the Rumsfeld 
Doctrine’s superiority. The notions that “speed kills” and that forces could be smaller and 
less bureaucratic or logistically supported were percolating amongst civilian leadership 
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and some key military officers. Simultaneously, other generals, such as McKiernan and 
Thurman, were skeptical and voiced concerns to the CENTCOM commander, General 
Tommy Franks.143  
 These standing tensions were compounded by Secretary Rumsfeld’s well-known 
goal of transforming the organization of the Department of Defense. His top-priority was 
to dramatically alter the military, often talking about a Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) that emphasized the utilization of information technology.144 Movements to 
incorporate theoretical concepts such as Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and other 
integrative programs were to be applied. Civilian policymakers intended to impose rapid, 
subjective, and transformative change to the military’s bureaucracy and departmental 
organization. Throughout the process there was a tendency, however, to focus more on 
data capture and categorization than applying it to the tactical environment.145 This 
would perpetuate various issues down the road. 
The ultimate goal was to increase resource efficiency and to integrate the service 
branches. Again, speed became the emphasis of these new Information Age theories of 
military organization. “Transformation and network-centric warfare will first and 
foremost equip the military with speed.”146 However, these changes would threaten the 
organization process and bureaucratic structure of the military, as the newly networked 
assets would theoretically require less logistical support. Regardless, the rapid success of 
the Afghanistan campaign gave credence to Rumsfeld’s doctrine and influence. The 
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political capital he gained would help amplify his authority when it came time to plan for 
Iraq. 
Process Tracing 
Shifting Priorities after 9/11 
Secretary Rumsfeld was jotting down notes within hours of the 9/11 attacks. In 
them, Rumsfeld indicated his intention to reprioritize foreign policy, strategy, and tactical 
goals in light of the massive terrorist attacks. At a briefing that was held while the 
Pentagon still smoldered and Lower Manhattan lay in ruin, the Secretary of Defense 
penned an aggressive objective: “Judge whether good enough [to] hit S.H. [Saddam 
Hussein] at same time – not only UBL [Usama bin Laden]. Go massive. Sweep it all up. 
Things related and not.”147 On 12 September, President Bush held a war cabinet meeting 
and Secretary Rumsfeld wondered aloud if the attacks presented an “opportunity” to 
engage Iraq militarily.148 When a vote was taken, the principals decided four to zero not 
to engage Iraq immediately; Rumsfeld abstained.149 
On Thursday, 13 September, one of Rumsfeld’s “snowflake” memos arrived at 
the Third Army’s headquarters in Fort McPherson, GA. It directed the commander – Lt. 
Gen. Paul Mikolashek – to create a plan for seizing Iraqi’s southern oil fields; the order 
was given the highest level of secrecy, known as Polo Step.150 The defense secretary, 
alone, ordered this directive; President Bush had not yet asked for revised – let alone new 
– war plans concerning Iraq.  
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The next day, 14 September, President Bush met with his closest advisors at 
Camp David. Over the course of the discussions Secretary Rumsfeld again raised the idea 
of targeting Iraq and Saddam Hussein, specifically. The president table vetoed the 
idea.151 Over the course of the two-day conference, Rumsfeld pushed Wolfowitz to bring 
up Iraq. 152 Throughout the policy discussions there was push back on the issue from 
Secretary Powell as well as other civilian policy advisors.153 Meanwhile, President Bush 
continually stated that they would maintain focus on al Qaeda for the time being.  
However, on Sunday 16 September, the president contacted National Security 
Advisor Rice and said he wanted plans created “in case it turned out that Iraq was 
somehow implicated in the 9/11 attacks.”154 Then, on Monday 17 September, President 
Bush gave a secret directive ordering the military to review its Iraq invasion plan; the 
president’s formal policy request was dispatched four days after the Secretary of Defense 
sent his secret request to the Third Army. Within the week, meetings were held with the 
Defense Policy Board to discuss the merit of targeting Saddam Hussein.155 On 19 
September Rumsfeld again raised the idea of targeting Iraq. He went further and asked 
the regional commanders to identify worldwide targets for the GWoT if it was to expand 
beyond Afghanistan.156  
On Wednesday 26 September, Secretary Rumsfeld met with President Bush in the 
Oval Office. At the end of that meeting the president asked his secretary of defense to 
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review the war plans for Iraq that were on file. Rumsfeld remembered the president 
saying, “he wanted the options to be ‘creative.’” Rumsfeld understood this to mean that 
Bush was approving the use of smaller, faster forces and that the campaign was to be 
comprehensive in strategic goals.157 In Rumsfeld’s eyes, civilian policy now required the 
DoD to be operational prepared for engaging Iraq in the near future. 
Formal War Plan Review and the Start of Planning 
Little happened during the next eight weeks in regards to Iraq war planning. The 
Third Army continued to prepare its ordered plans and a number of meetings took place 
about the current state of plans concerning Iraq. It is not until the 21 November NSC 
meeting that President Bush again pulled Secretary Rumsfeld aside, this time into an 
unoccupied conference room in the Situation Room complex.158 No one else was present. 
Multiple sources later confirmed it was at this meeting that Bush asked Rumsfeld to 
undertake a formal review of the Iraq war plan. Furthermore, according to some, the 
president ordered that new war plans to be drawn up.159 Another source states Bush asked 
Rumsfeld to confirm that the CINC at CENTCOM – General Franks – was already 
updating the Iraq war plan.160 This portrayal presupposes a direct order for that war 
planning to take place. Whether the 26 September Oval Office meeting included said 
order couldn’t be determined with full certainty. The NSC nor NSA Rice participated in 
this decision or implementation. 
                                               
157 Rumsfeld, Donald. Known and Unknown. New York: Sentinel, 2011. pg. 425. 
158 Ibid. pg. 427. 
159 Graham, Bradley. By His Own Rules. pg. 327. 
160 Herspring, Dale R. Rumsfeld's Wars. pg. 89. 
86 
 
President Bush stressed to Secretary Rumsfeld that the review must be 
confidential and the war planning must remain secretive.161 Rumsfeld stressed that the 
work involved in reviewing and revising a war plan was tremendous; it could take a great 
deal of time. The president understood but reiterated that he should not speak with 
anyone outside of the DoD. Within hours, Rumsfeld had informed the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs – General Richard Meyers – that the president had requested said actions.162  
By the end of the day, the Pentagon had contacted CENTCOM and General 
Frank’s office. Tommy Franks was directed to “devise a concept of operations” around 
the strategic goal of invading Iraq and overthrowing Saddam Hussein.163 Immediately, 
Franks’ deputy director of operations at CENTCOM – Air Force Major General Victor 
Renuart – was notified.164 With that, the process of reviewing and creating a war plan 
estimate was underway. 
Secretary Rumsfeld arrived in Tampa four days later to meet with General Franks 
at CENTCOM headquarters. During that 21 November meeting Franks presented the 
current war plan to Rumsfeld. General Zinni’s staff last revised Op Plan 1003-98 during 
Clinton’s second term. Op Plan 1003 was a massive document that “outlined an attack 
and invasion of Iraq designed to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein.”165  
The document was muddled and massive; it called for the deployment of well 
over 400,000 troops and depended on tactics that predated the recent proliferation of 
more advanced technologies and armaments.166 The plan required a slow, massive, 
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conspicuous build up of troops that could take upwards of seven months.167 It had not 
been updated since 1998 and lacked the official approval signature of this sitting 
secretary of defense.168 It was also incompatible with Rumsfeld’s policy preferences. 
Franks and Rumsfeld met by themselves for over an hour and scoured the plan for its 
fundamental assumptions and dominant tactics.  
The secretary of defense was displeased with nearly the entire plan. He stressed a 
need for “surprise, speed, shock, and risk, as well as actions that… would add to the 
momentum for regime change.”169 Rumsfeld told Franks that the plan would have to be 
drastically altered and the asset volumes slashed. The pressure for change was consistent 
and Franks responded affirmatively. By the end of the day a concept request was 
submitted to CENTCOM; they had three weeks to prepare and present a new war plan. 
Five days later Rumsfeld sent a message to Franks – via the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs – ordering him to create a “commander’s estimate to build the base of a new Iraq 
war plan.”170 In the top secret order Rumsfeld laid out the strategic goals of engaging 
Iraq: removing Saddam Hussein from power, eliminating any Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) threat, and ending any support of global terrorism. The CENTCOM 
commander had three days to execute an order traditionally given thirty. This was despite 
the fact that his command was preoccupied with the Afghan campaign.  
At this point many military circles were exhausted. CENTCOM staffers were 
fatigued from their responsibilities attributed to the Afghanistan campaign. They were 
working around the clock to execute that plan, which was rushed in the months after the 
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terror attacks.171 Now they were being handed what amounted to a huge distraction on a 
tight deadline. Morale plummeted and officers at various levels wondered aloud why 
attention was being diverted to Iraq.  
There was discontent within the military community, as well. General Franks was 
known to berate and pressure the soldiers below him; he had a tendency to ask for and 
require immediate answers. This created an even tenser atmosphere at MacDill Air Force 
Base, home of CENTCOM headquarters. However, with all these issues swirling around 
the simmering morale issues were not boiling over. As one senior officer on the Joint 
Chiefs said, “there were lots of concerns, anxieties, and private conversations, but it 
never went public, or into a formal dissent.”172 
On Tuesday 4 December 2001 General Franks video-conferenced with Rumsfeld 
at the Pentagon; General Renuart, his operations director (J-3), was at his side. Franks 
had previously asked Rumsfeld whom he may include in the planning effort. The 
secretary gave him permission to involve Renuart in the planning process.173 In the 
meeting, Franks presented three preliminary options: robust, reduced, and unilateral. To 
date, Franks was able to decrease the Op Plan numbers down to 385,000 troops.174 None 
of the iterations impressed Rumsfeld and he told the CENTCOM commander that there’d 
be no need for more than 400,000 troops in the campaign.175 Franks agreed with 
Rumsfeld on the troop cap. This decision was made before tactics or specific operational 
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goals were agreed upon. Rumsfeld then told Franks to work on “out of the box” ideas and 
ordered him to meet again on 12 December.  
Based on Rumsfeld’s feedback, Franks created a matrix for the next meeting. This 
ideational structure showed Franks’ approach to strategy innovation. It also indicated that 
the CENTCOM commander was willing to work with Rumsfeld in challenging and 
changing fundamental military assumptions regarding war planning.176 By the next 
meeting General Franks had decreased the troops levels by another 85,000 bodies. 
Rumsfeld remained unsatisfied and continued to stress the need for rapid troop build up 
and limited numbers in theater. He also asked that the force accrual be done in secret.177 
Most significantly, the secretary of defense placed tremendous time pressure on the 
military planners. He said the war plan could be ordered as early as April or May 2002, 
giving the planners only four or five months.178  
Franks and Rumsfeld met again on 19 December, when the general presented a 
third iteration of CENTCOM’s war plan revision. Rumsfeld was still “not fulfilled” with 
what was being offered by the military planners.179 This was despite the fact that in less 
than a month the military had decreased troop levels to 145,000 from over 500,000.180 
Rumsfeld let Franks know that President Bush requested the general’s presence at 
Crawford Ranch over the Christmas holiday. Tommy Franks was scheduled to meet with 
him personally in order to present the current state of war planning. 
On Friday 28 December General Tommy Franks arrived at the president’s ranch 
in Texas; General Renuart attended, as well. A videoconference was scheduled with 
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Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, and Tenet. At the end of a confidential intelligence briefing 
Franks was given the table. This is when Franks first presented his commander’s estimate 
to President Bush. During the briefing the general stressed that particular aspects of Op 
Plan 1003 would need to be changed further, including troop numbers and the integration 
of other government resources outside of the DoD.181 Overall, the idea was to mimic the 
Afghanistan campaign’s use of precision ordinance, Special Operations forces, and 
networked data.182  
Rumsfeld interjected on numerous occasions throughout the meeting. He stressed 
that the troop numbers were “soft” and were still being worked downward.183 
Conversely, Franks enumerated a list of military expectations; this outlined each 
branches’ expectations and needs if a campaign was to be undertaken.184 Some perceived 
this as a pushback from the CENTCOM commander at a time when the sides were 
assessing civil-military power dynamics. Franks made it clear that the DoD would 
require a great deal of infrastructure build up, budget increases, and operational 
improvements – ie. new headquarters and technology – if a war plan was to be executed. 
Around the same time, Rumsfeld made the unusual offer for civilian OSD staff to assist 
the CENTCOM planning team. Franks welcomed them, though some officers perceived 
the move as a civilian, subjective invasion upon military terrain.185  
Within ten days of the Crawford Ranch meeting, Franks presented to Rumsfeld an 
actionable war plan on Iraq.186 If the war planning hadn’t yet moved from the 
hypothetical to the plausible, the New Year brought that transition. Up to this point 
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significant groundwork had occurred. All of it had been done between Secretary 
Rumsfeld, his office, and General Franks’ staff. It was insular and thoroughly removed 
from the larger national security apparatus. 
Throughout this period of winter into early spring of 2002, meanwhile, a “running 
internal review of America’s policy option on Iraq” was taking place separately in the 
Bush Administration.187 This included representatives from the DoD (Wolfowitz and 
Feith participated), State Department, National Security Council, CIA, and Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. The work influenced the policy decisions, to be sure. However, it was removed 
from the civil-military relationship that worked on how the policy was to be 
implemented. By review’s end the group agreed that current containment policy was no 
longer sustainable or viable. Regime change was recommended as the new goal. 
Frequency and Nature of Civil-Military Contact 
Throughout the planning process Secretary Rumsfeld was in constant contact with 
General Franks. The secretary of defense had a direct, secure line connecting him to the 
CENTCOM commander and they frequently talked more than once a day.188 When 
Franks met with Rumsfeld he had a tendency to give meticulous descriptions and lay out 
even the most inane details so as to confirm that the secretary of defense understood.189 
This was despite the fact that Rumsfeld’s temper wouldn’t allow for the tempo. 
Oftentimes, the secretary of defense would ask questions related to costs as opposed to 
tactics; this appeared to frustrate the CENTCOM commander as it was a distraction from 
the primary focus.190 
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Rumsfeld’s style of rapid and constant inquiry conflicted with Franks’ demand 
for rapid responses. The combination created a frantic atmosphere on the war planning 
staff. General Franks later said that the frequency and character of the Secretary’s 
communications with CENTCOM “was beginning to border on harassment;” his staff 
found the “daily barrage of tasks and questions” to be distracting and challenging.191 The 
secrecy of the operation compounded stress levels on the planning staff. Franks engaged 
his staff for hours straight during marathon day sessions. They would break briefly to 
reset and then jump back in again. Simultaneously, the CENTCOM commander made 
sure that communication between the planners was limited and different focus groups 
were not aware of what the others were doing.192  
The Growth of Plans and their Iterations 
On 1 February 2002 Franks met with Rumsfeld at the Pentagon and gave the 
secretary of defense a fifth iteration of the Iraq war plan. By this point the CENTCOM 
planners had shifted to what was named the “Generated Start Plan,” or GSP. It was 
thought this might satisfy operational goals and civilian policy expectations.193 Under the 
GSP all forces would be in theater prior to the start of the campaign, though the build up 
would be rapid and public. Franks estimated that it would take ninety days to deploy 
160,000 troops to the region, with an eventual 275,000 making up the force.194 Rumsfeld 
believed that timeline and visibility was unacceptable and asked for a thirty to sixty day 
“ramp up.” 
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Ensuing discussions regarding the timing of air versus ground assaults and the use 
of Special Operations assets ultimately led to a transition to the “Running Start Plan.” 
Under this concept, the build up would not take two months. Rather, the attack would 
start immediately with the forces already in theater. The following, weeks long air 
campaign would generate momentum as a massive force build up occurred 
simultaneously.195  
The first meeting at which President Bush attended and was briefed on an 
actionable war plan was held on 7 February 2002.196 Held in the Situation Room, Franks, 
Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and others were in attendance. This constituted the largest 
contingent of NSC principals in attendance, to date. However, the meeting was more of a 
summary than a policy or planning discussion. The CENTCOM commander described 
the current state of the GSP. Discussions about a running start-type iteration were already 
occurring, but at that time a ninety day build up, forty five day heavy bombardment, and 
ninety day 300,000 force invasion – dubbed “90-45-90” – was the primary plan. When 
Franks completed his briefing Rumsfeld interjected and told the president that further 
changes were in the works. The defense secretary described some of these as “shock and 
awe.” However, at that time Franks was not in agreement and his concerns about smaller 
forces were not yet allayed.  
Three weeks later Rumsfeld and Franks met to review a list of nearly 4,000 
targets that CENTCOM planners had identified as possible targets. At meetings end, 
Franks emphasized that the Joint Chiefs and NSC needed to be involved at this point. The 
planning and plausibility of action had developed too far for political and diplomatic 
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choreography not to be considered.197 It wasn’t until a month later, however, that General 
Franks met with the Joint Chiefs in the “Tank,” a high security conference room at the 
Pentagon in which the chiefs frequently met. Integration of the service chiefs was an 
afterthought that occurred only after military officers compelled the OSD to acquiesce.  
It was on 29 March that the CENTCOM commander presented the Iraq war 
plan’s current iteration to the service chiefs.198 Franks had previously sparred with the 
service chiefs during the Afghanistan campaign and according to attendees tensions 
during the meeting were palpable. As Franks made his way through a presentation of 
more than seventy slides, some generals protested that the seriousness of the discussion 
was hard to determine. Was this a legitimate option or a thought exercise? General Eric 
Shinseki – the Army’s chief of staff – voiced concern about the plan’s logistics and the 
troops size. Throughout, the senior tier of military generals expressed a considerable 
level of skepticism. They had been flanked and rendered practically useless during the 
war planning effort and there was little they could do. 
As the meetings between the civilian policy heads and senior military officers 
continued through the late spring, the CIA executed an expansive war game in regards to 
Iraq. The goal was to test numerous invasion and occupation plans; the primary focus 
was on Phases III and IV of the war plan. The war games began in May 2002 and the 
DoD initially sent representatives to participate. However, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense ordered them to cease cooperation when it learned of the joint exercise.199   
On 11 May President Bush held a long planning session at Camp David. Larger 
civilian participation and NSC involvement began at this point. However, a vast majority 
                                               
197 Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. pg. 111. 
198 Ibid. pg. 117-119. 
199 Fallows, James. “Blind Into Baghdad.” The Atlantic Monthly. Jan/Feb 2004. Web. 21 April 2010. 
95 
 
of information and decision making was still funneled through Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
office. During the meeting Franks went into the tactical and strategic intricacies of the 
current, five-front invasion plan.200 Beyond that, the president and his advisors also asked 
highly in depth questions; President Bush also offered advice and made requests. By this 
point, meanwhile, discussions between Franks and Rumsfeld made it clear to the 
CENTCOM commander that the GSP was not possible. It could not satisfy operational 
demands and civilian policy desires. Franks started to present the Running Start Plan as 
an alternative.201 This was not yet a replacement of the GSP but, rather, an augmented 
plan. 
Under the RSP, the air war would last forty-five days. Simultaneously, the force 
build up would be executed. This allowed for greater secrecy, faster deployment, and the 
option to start the ground war three to six weeks into the air campaign. During this 
presentation and ensuing discussion the civilians brought up more questions and 
scenarios with which they were concerned. The military officers responded in kind and 
adapted to the administration’s concern about a fortified Baghdad, attacks on Israel, and 
various other contingencies.202 On 3 June Franks again presented an expanded version of 
the Running Start to Rumsfeld during a videoconference meeting. The secretary of 
defense approved of the plan and ordered that it be pursued further.203 However, the 
Generated Start was still on the table. Thus, by the 19 June meeting there existed two 
different war plans for an Iraq invasion.204  
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Civil-Military Relations Evolve 
At this time Franks decided to focus planning efforts almost exclusively on 
Running Start. The manner of civil-military conversations and civilians’ focus on an 
aggressive start time dictated his decision. Franks told the planning staff that Rumsfeld 
clearly preferred the RSP’s options and design.205 Meanwhile, the planners had finite 
resources at their disposal; this was certainly a contributing factor. The war in 
Afghanistan required a great deal of focus and work hours. What’s more, to date only 
two civilian policy officials had worked directly with the planning effort in Tampa.206 
Even these individuals were mixed blessings.  
Abe Shulsky and Bill Bruner were the OSD civilian policy staffers who worked 
with CENTCOM planners. They spawned a significant amount of tension throughout the 
war planning process. Soon, the fenced off trailer in which the planners worked was 
sarcastically nicknamed the “Love Shack.” Over late winter and early spring of 2002 
Franks began to suspect that the two staffers were feeding information back to Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s office.207 The suspicions arose when OSD appeared to be aware of internal 
differences amongst military planning staff. Eventually Shulsky and Bruner were notified 
that they were not welcome at the center of the planning process if there were acting as 
moles for the civilian side. The two left the Love Shack, though they continued to 
contribute to briefings at other military installations as deployment plans were developed. 
                                               
205 Herspring, Dale R. Rumsfeld's Wars. pg. 99. 
206 Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision. pg. 293. 
207 Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor. Cobra II. pg. 45. 
97 
 
Planning continued over the course of the summer and military participation 
slowly expanded beyond MacDill Air Force Base.208 As more players came into the mix 
the debate over proper force size grew more contentious. As late as August the secretary 
of defense’s office was still pushing remarkably small force numbers – some proposals 
were as low as 50,000 to 80,000 troops.209 This was all part of the often contentious 
process of determining a coherent war plan out of the numerous plan iterations. The 
volume of plans made it very difficult for multiple players and positions on both sides – 
civilian and military – to get on the same page. This dissonance only amplified the 
frustration within the military. 
By this point, President Bush was in consistent contact with General Franks. 
Between December 2001 and August 2002 the president spoke with the CINC of 
CENTCOM more than a dozen times.210 Many of these conversations happened outside 
of the NSC and its organizational structure. Numerous international players came into the 
mix, as well. By summer, British policy makers and intelligence officials participating 
with the Bush Administration were convinced that the president was resolved to act 
militarily even if the plan and timing were not yet firm.211 This was while the multiple 
plans still existed and a significant amount of tactical as well as strategic questions were 
yet to be parsed.  
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During the first week in August 2002 one of the more significant moments of the 
planning process and civil-military relationship occurred. At an NSC meeting held of 4 
August, General Franks presented yet another permutation of the invasion plans.212 The 
general’s top-secret presentation consisted of 110 slides; the meeting took place in the 
Situation Room.213 After quickly summarizing the current statuses of the Generated Start 
and Running Start options, Franks described what was dubbed the Hybrid Plan. For all 
intents and purposes this plan was an amalgam of the first two plans; it blended the 
former’s strike capabilities and deterrent with the latter’s decreased build up timeline and 
rapid tactics.  
Franks had continued to pare down the force size and operational length of GSP 
and RSP. With the Hybrid Plan, meanwhile, CENTCOM had developed what was called 
an “air bridge” of all available civilian aircraft to augment DoD’s mobility command.214 
This would increase deployment volumes and decrease the time needed to build up 
forces. During the ensuing discussions Franks raised a concern of the military planners –
that the campaign could succeed too rapidly.215 CENTCOM planners had wondered 
aloud what issues would have to be dealt with if Saddam’s regime crumbled faster than 
anticipated. Phase IV issues were significant concerns to Franks and his staff. 
Throughout the discussions it appeared that civilian policymakers held assumptions that 
erred on the optimistic side, which is to say that the military’s concerns were dismissed. 
Civilian policy officials were confident that the Iraqis would maintain order, that 
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infrastructure would be of satisfactory status, and Iraqi self-governance and security 
would be in place shortly after the completion of Phase III operations. 
Despite the CENTCOM planner’s concerns, President Bush liked the Hybrid 
Plan. By his recollection Franks had already set up “basing and overflight permissions” 
from various Gulf states.216 The plans were coming together quickly, targets were being 
identified, and the logistics required to pull off such operations were in progress. This 
meeting was the moment in which the military sufficiently altered its planning and 
shifted its tactics to the desires of the civilian policy leaders. The generals succeeded in 
developing new strategies so as to achieve mission success while also meeting civilian 
expectations. The uniforms had acquiesced and – at the highest level – agreement on 
Phases I, II, and III had been attained. 
About a week later, on 14 August, Generals Franks and Renuart met with 
Rumsfeld to hash out the specifics of the Hybrid Plan. However, a significant portion of 
the meeting was spent educating Rumsfeld on the process of target selection; the process 
involving nearly four thousand options fascinated the secretary. Frustration grew as the 
generals’ focus was on dozens of other more pertinent, higher priority issues.217 Franks 
was also dealing with irritation from the broader OSD office. Douglas Feith and other 
policy minded undersecretaries were making multiple attempts to suggest various non-
operations related concepts to CENTCOM. These overtures were met with aggravation 
and noted silence from the soldiers.218 
The 14 August meeting occurred on the same day that a number of the principals 
– including Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld but not President Bush – met to discuss 
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courses of action regarding invasion start and Phase IV follow through. It wasn’t until 
mid-August that the administration created an official document that outlined the goals of 
the military campaign. The top secret text was titled, “Iraq: Goals, Objectives and 
Strategy.”219 In it, various goals were outlined, including the original three that were 
given to CENTCOM in late 2001; beyond them the objectives had expanded to include 
democratizing efforts and regional stability. On 29 August, President Bush signed the 
document, stating the mission objectives.220 
By this point the military plan was nearly completed from a strategic standpoint. 
What remained were various tactical and operational details that could be ironed out 
within the multi-tiered framework that was already established. Since the major 
operational attributes had been decided, most of the meetings by late summer and early 
fall focused on Phase III scenarios. Specifically, the civilians raised a number of 
questions about how to secure the oilfields, conquer and control Baghdad, maintain or 
rebuild infrastructure in country, as well as various other topics.221  
Throughout this process there was a consistent focus on certain riding 
assumptions. The military made a sustained attempt to plan for a wide range of 
possibilities. However, civil-military dialogue brought the planning back to a numerated 
list of perceived givens; civilian policymakers were confident of the environment that 
would be engaged. As such, they continually framed discussions around simplified 
scenarios and contingencies. For example, President Bush and the NSC staff was very 
concerned about a “Fortress Baghdad” scenario in which Saddam loyalists and the 
Republic Guard retreated then embedded themselves in the capital. Franks and the 
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CENTCOM planners had eventually adapted the Hybrid Plan so that coalition forces 
could tactically prevent such a development.222  
Beyond the example above, there were many moments in which military 
commanders were prompted to focus on particular scenarios because civilian 
policymakers objectively assumed they would occur. At one point during a 9 October 
videoconference meeting General Franks was compelled to guarantee President Bush that 
there’d be no need to engage in urban warfare.223 This was despite the fact that there was 
no indication it could be absolutely avoided. Meanwhile, one of the most significant 
riding assumptions – one that was fundamental to the military planning process – would 
end up being altered because of civilian policy preferences. 
Phase IV and Shifting Responsibilities 
 Military officers at CENTCOM made it clear early in the planning process that 
the DoD would expect assistance from civilians during Phase IV of the war. Franks 
expected that numerous civilian bodies would assist in the occupation and rebuilding of 
Iraq after major combat operations ceased. According to numerous officers who were at 
CENTCOM, the planners were explicitly told that other areas of the federal government 
would be responsible for “postwar responsibilities.”224 However, as summer became fall 
in 2002 there was a shift.  
The Joint Chiefs had been flanked throughout the war planning process, but they 
were resolved to raise concern about how little Phase IV planning had occurred. The 
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chiefs eventually held their own top-secret war game to identify shortcomings in the 
current plans; it was named Prominent Hammer II.225 Based on ensuing findings, the 
Joint Chiefs recommended that a headquarters be created whose sole focus was Phase IV. 
This could be led by the military and augmented by civilians, but it would run in tandem 
with Franks’ war plan assets and operations.  
By 16 October Chairman Myers wrote that Rumsfeld agreed with an iteration of 
this plan. As such, “POTUS/Dr. Rice agreed that DOD lead initially was OK.”226 
Military assets would now be in direct control of all Phase IV operations, with a civilian 
leading the reconstruction and governance. Military commanders would execute all 
security and training of Iraqis; they would also report to CENTCOM. Suddenly the 
largest, most opened ended, highly volatile phase of the Iraq war had been put on the 
military’s plate just months before execution. 
Troop Deployments and Highly Subjective Control 
One of the most significant and overt examples of subjective interference within 
the civil-military relationship began in late November 2002. On the 26th of that month 
General Franks delivered what he called “The Mother of All Deployment Orders.”227 
This was the MODEPS – “the mobilization deployments of U.S. military forces for war” 
– that contained invasion related troop deployments. It requested that 300,000 troops be 
deployed to the region; the number revealed the military’s desire to plan for the largest, 
longest possible scenario in the spirit of operational preparedness.228 However, the sheer 
number and length of the MODEPS concerned Secretary Rumsfeld. He balked.  
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The structured request was standard military procedure. It was part of a highly 
integrated and automated deployment scheme – TPFDD, or Time-Phased Force and 
Deployment Data – which depended on the assumption that all material and personnel 
deployments would be executed exactly as planned.229 This was part of the larger Joint 
Operational Planning System (JOPS) – the fount of logistical operations. The entire 
institution was highly integrated and systemized.230 However, from Rumsfeld’s 
perspective the order was too large, too fast, and would limit the president’s options 
beyond military engagement. His concerns were substantiated and valid; President Bush 
was in the middle of pursuing UN resolutions and international diplomatic solutions to 
the perceived crisis. If the world saw U.S. military forces building up rapidly for 
offensive engagement it could scuttle various peaceful paths.231  
Additionally, Secretary Rumsfeld believed that the system was another example 
of bloated, outdated group think that needed to be modernized. Rumsfeld balked for two 
weeks before the first large sets of deployment orders were transmitted on 6 December. 
However, through the rest of the deployment phase Rumsfeld and his office micro-
managed the orders to an unprecedented level. He refused to approve the deployment 
orders as designed. Rumsfeld wanted the ability to slow, divert, or change the orders as 
written. This usurpation of power not delegated to the secretary’s office deeply 
concerned numerous military officers.232 
Secretary Rumsfeld spent a tremendous amount of time reviewing the deployment 
orders; there were suspicions that he didn’t trust the generals to best deploy their troops. 
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Frustration ran high through military circles as Rumsfeld refused senior Army officials’ 
requests to notify reservists prior to Christmas that they might deploy in the near 
future.233 Some senior officers condemned OSD and Rumsfeld, saying later that the 
civilians “simply did not understand how dependent the military was on reservists, 
especially for logistics.” Because of Rumsfeld’s meticulous review, he eventually 
approved units on a case-by-case basis. However, due to the various intricacies of timing 
and unit capabilities the repercussions were large. In some cases material arrived on time 
but could not be deployed because those trained to do so hadn’t yet been approved.234  
Throughout the MODEPS and TPFDD issues CENTCOM continued to plan and 
prepare for war. In mid-December the joint forces participated in a Qatar-based war game 
called Internal Look.235 This exercise helped the military identify areas for improvement 
in the war planning; it challenged all aspects of the war plan, to date, including multiple 
iterations of the initial invasion. The briefings that came out of the exercise helped the 
military identify risks and opportunities throughout the air and land campaigns. 
Concurrently, military planners were still tweaking the Hybrid Plan and even coming up 
with significant changes.  
Late Pivots to the War Plan 
Eventually, by the end of December, President Bush approved 200,000 troops to 
the region.236 Regardless, one of the generals at CENTCOM, Lt Gen David McKiernan, 
told Franks at the end of January 2003 that he was worried. He and his staff had concerns 
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regarding the Hybrid Plan throughout the fall, in fact.237 Now, although he was confident 
they could get enough forces in the region for the beginning of the invasion, he was 
concerned there wouldn’t be enough forces to continue the invasion and Phase III, as 
planned in the timeline.238 As such, the military commanders and planners made 
modifications to the operations; they were not willing to be hamstrung. McKiernan and 
his staff felt that the Hybrid Plan satisfied Rumsfeld’s doctrine and preference for speed 
but contained tactical deficiencies. Therefore, to allow for sustained speed and offensive 
effectiveness McKiernan drew up a plan that was larger and tactically different than the 
Hybrid Plan.239 This plan was eventually approved by McKiernan and brought to Franks; 
the CENTCOM commander then approved it and brought it to the White House. 
Throughout November and December McKiernan, Franks, and other military 
planners debated the merits of the new Cobra II plan. They felt that it offered better 
tactics, more effective strategies, and a higher chance of operational success. It was 
agreed amongst them that there was a small window in which they could compel the 
civilian leaders to accept this change; the Hybrid Plan had already been presented to the 
president and approved. Over a period of weeks the new plan was brought to Rumsfeld, 
who reviewed it and was compelled. By the end of December he eventually approved the 
changes and troop increases, bringing yet another iteration of the Iraq war plan.240 The 
changes were stark; the plan looked much more like the Generated Start Plan than the 
Hybrid. Specifically, it required a larger number of forces, took longer to build up, and 
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had a staggered start as opposed to a running start with prolonged air campaign. In so 
doing, the military succeeded in pivoting the war plan back towards their starting position 
less than four months from the start of the war. 
The shift in the war plan was just in time for the military. During a 9 January 
meeting with General Franks, President Bush asked, “What’s my last decision point? 
When have I finally made a commitment?”241 The president was ready to give the “go” 
order as soon as all players were confidently ready to execute. At approximately the same 
time, President Bush took Secretary Rumsfeld aside and told him they would be going to 
war. The secretary of defense interpreted the conversation as a “go” order.242 Then, on 13 
January President Bush welcomed Secretary Powell to the Oval Office. During the 
meeting he notified his secretary of state that they would be going to war with Iraq. The 
State Department was marginalized throughout the entire planning process and the 
Saudis had even been notified before Colin Powell. It wasn’t until NSA Rice insisted that 
the president tell Secretary Powell that Bush scheduled the meeting.243   
Then, on 20 January 2003, President Bush signed National Security Presidential 
Directive Number 24.244 OSD’s Office of Special Plans drew up the document and it 
created a new organization, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA).245 The document gave full postwar Iraq control to the Department of Defense; 
Phase IV was officially in the military’s hands. However, since late fall the postwar 
planning had slowed dramatically. Additionally, multiple players including OSD’s 
Douglas Feith knew full well that ORHA would be able to do little in the time it was 
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given.246 The cards were stacked against Phase IV prep despite the myriad scenarios that 
were recognized as possibilities, to say nothing of the many others that were dismissed. 
Civil-Military Relations Strain and Devolve 
By this point, civil-military relations were beginning to degrade. The growing 
discontent and concern among senior military officers was having an affect on the 
planning process. Military officers were less willing to entertain the civilians’ operational 
suggestions. Likewise, officers often ignored or scuttled civilians’ questions or 
recommendations about policy related programs. Civilian policy officials from OSD 
were increasingly using back channels and less formal, assertive channels to convey 
suggestions to the military. This was because the normal bureaucratic channels – via the 
Joint Chiefs – often brought curt responses or blow back from CENTCOM.247  
Frank Miller, the NSC staff director for defense, had a unique vantage point 
regarding this civil-military degradation.248 Since summer 2002 he was head of the 
Executive Steer Group (ESG), which was intended to oversee interagency coordination; 
it was the eyes for NSA Rice. What Miller witnessed concerned him greatly. Miller 
found that OSD lacked planning managers. It was also top heavy with deputies more 
interested in grand strategy and policy papers. Eventually Miller reported to Rice that 
communications between civilians and the military within the Pentagon were 
“catastrophically broken.”249 He also found that various senior members of the Joint 
Chiefs were unwilling to engage the defense secretary or his office; this inhibited their 
active participation in Iraq war planning.  
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Simultaneously, there is anecdotal evidence indicating that the secretary of 
defense did not properly involve or prepare his staff when he was disliked a particular 
process. Andy Card, President Bush’s chief of staff, said that when Rumsfeld sent his 
staff to meetings in his stead they often weren’t fully briefed or weren’t given permission 
to speak for the secretary.250 This tended to happen when the secretary of defense didn’t 
like the organization or track a body was moving on. In those cases, he would send a 
deputy without real authority or simply not participate. It was a shrewd way to neuter any 
decision making beyond his preferences and purview. This further amplified his efforts to 
maintain hegemony over the war planning process.  
For example, when Rumsfeld and Franks briefed the NSC the secretary of 
defense would personally distribute the presentation materials.251 He would then request 
that no one take notes during the presentation and, finally, collect all the briefing slides 
and material at the end of the meeting. He would then return the material to a personal 
safe that he had in his office. This compounded his order for compartmentalized 
planning, secrecy within planning circles, and approval order on many aspects of the plan 
both large and small.  
The Final Plan and “Go” Order 
On Friday 24 January 2003 General Franks presented the final war plan to 
President Bush. Among others, Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman Myers were in 
attendance.252 At this point no other changes would be made, though tweaks to smaller 
tactical decisions would still occur. “This is the plan,” the CENTCOM commander 
proclaimed. Rumsfeld created a simple timeline document for the president, since he was 
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the civilian closest to both the commander in chief and senior military officials. It was 
still called the Hybrid Plan, though McKiernan’s Cobra II changes had been inserted. 
Prior to the meeting Secretary Rumsfeld already approved the troop deployments and 
material needed to start the invasion. By the middle of February over 140,000 troops 
would be in theater. 
Six days later on 30 January President Bush welcomed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
the White House. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and relevant combat 
commanders were also present.253 The president went around the table and asked each 
service chief for his assessment and opinion on the war plan; he made it clear that he 
expected a candid and honest response. Chairman Myers said he was happy with the plan 
while both Navy and Air Force heads praised it. Army chief of staff Shinseki gave “a 
more qualified assessment” of the plan and requested a number of prerequisites; these 
included more troops at the start of the campaign and a guarantee from Turkey that a 
northern front would be possible.254 However, after voicing these suggestions Shinseki 
did not go further and he eventually gave tacit approval of the war plan.255 It was with 
this meeting and the Joint Chiefs’ participation that President Bush could now say that 
the war plan had the backing of the senior leadership from all military branches. 
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15 February was the earliest possible start date for the campaign, per Franks’ 
plans and the troop deployments. However, the president’s decision to give the “go” 
order was also dependent on other variables. Among these were the pursuit of UN 
resolutions and effective weapons inspections, both of which were diplomatic attempts to 
avoid the fog of war. When the window arrived, President Bush contacted Secretary 
Rumsfeld and ordered that the military’s public preparations be slowed; he said the plan 
was “accelerating too fast relative to where we need to be because of the diplomatic 
side.”256 He was concerned about the optics while diplomatic solutions were still being 
pursued. For this reason the “go” order was delayed and operational readiness was 
slowed for the time being. 
When the diplomatic channels were deemed sufficiently exhausted for public and 
foreign relations’ sakes, President Bush was prepared to give the final “go” order to 
begin the war. On Wednesday 19 March the president called for an NSC meeting in the 
Situation Room. With all principal civilian and senior military officers present, President 
Bush gave the order to begin Operation Iraqi Freedom.257 Within hours, a year and a 
half’s worth of intense, subjective civil-military relations would be made manifest with 
shock and awe. 
Analysis 
This case is an example of highly subjective civil-military relations. Due to 
political preferences, delegated presidential leadership, and ad-hoc process organization a 
vast majority of the operational planning process was secretive and exclusive. This 
secrecy and structure of the war planning decreased the likelihood that all relevant 
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players – civilian and military, alike – could influence the eventual design of the 
invasion. The National Security Council proved weak throughout the process. 
Additionally, the national security advisor did a poor job of moderating power dynamics 
within the civilian leadership; this compounded the characteristics of the case herein.  
The idea to engage Iraq militarily was first presented by the Secretary of Defense 
in the days following 11 September 2001. Secretary Rumsfeld was persistent in his 
suggestions that the United States review tactical and strategic planning regarding Iraq. 
Less than a week went by before President Bush secretly asked Secretary Rumsfeld to 
review the military’s plans. The conversation was done privately and no members of the 
national security apparatus outside of the President’s office, OSD, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs office, or CENTCOM commander’s office were notified.  
The compartmentalized, confidential nature of the early review/war planning 
sprung from this precedent and continued until well into 2002. Meanwhile, it was not 
until late December 2001 that key principals were first briefed on the Op Plan 1003 
review. Up until that point – and well after it – the CENTCOM planners worked in 
isolated cells that were not fully informed of the larger mission or how their work 
integrated into it. What’s more, the military reported to the OSD and Secretary Rumsfeld 
who briefed the president when it was deemed necessary. 
The war planning process occurred despite NSC structures rather than through 
them. That is, the secretary of defense controlled all of the operational process 
organization. From the earliest stages through the latest revisions, Secretary Rumsfeld 
kept in frequent and direct contact with General Tommy R. Franks, the commander 
CENTCOM. Even after the civilian participation grew, most information was channeled 
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through the OSD. The secretary’s contact with the regional command’s CINC also 
marginalized other top military leaders. This includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as 
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.  
All of this worked to Rumsfeld’s advantage for a variety of reasons; not the least 
of which was an increased difficulty for other civilians to challenge the tempo and nature 
of the planning. The locus of power was firmly in the Secretary of Defense’s office 
throughout the war planning efforts. Furthermore, Rumsfeld’s relationship and contact 
with Franks constituted the co-optation – however willing – of a senior Army general. 
This strengthened the OSD’s position, since the general’s professional credibility and 
military authority amplified the defense secretary’s bargaining position. It also allowed 
Rumsfeld’s preferences to be executed more easily, without pushback or challenges to its 
validity.  
In many ways, the secretary of defense was able to circumvent traditional 
bureaucratic channels and chains of command. This includes the NSC, the chairman and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other civilian principals such as intelligence leaders and the 
secretary of state. The end product of this was an invasion plan that was closest to 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s preferences. That plan was the result of an ad-hoc process 
organization that was most heavily influenced by the OSD’s subjective control under the 
final authority of President Bush. 
 Process tracing indicates that various civilian players were eventually 
incorporated into the war planning process. President Bush’s leadership was more 
engaged during the second half of the war planning process, as well. The increased 
openness and inclusion of civilian agents, starting in spring 2002, allows us to perceive 
113 
 
the case as occurring in two parts. However, this broadening, of sorts, occurred after the 
power dynamics were firmly established. This hindered their abilities to serve their 
intended roles, let alone encroach upon Secretary Rumsfeld’s authority. That is, Secretary 
Rumsfeld consolidated his authority so successfully that key decision-making remained 
exclusive even after they became integrated into the process. Additionally, OSD’s power 
was enhanced by the NSC’s inability – or unwillingness – to take over process 
organization. 
 What is most significant throughout the source material is how inconsequential 
the NSC and NSA Condoleezza Rice were throughout the planning and decision-making 
process. The National Security Council was most likely to be engaged when updates were 
being provided to civilian principals. However, evidence of protracted, in-depth debates 
about the war plan and merits of engaging Iraq is conspicuously absent. Instead, the most 
consequential debates about the war plan’s tactics and strategy occurred between 
CENTCOM and Secretary Rumsfeld’s office. NSA Rice did not campaign for control of 
the process, nor did she insist that the deliberative process be brought under the NSC’s 
purview. For this reason – compounded by the secrecy of the enterprise – Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s office was able to more easily maintain civilian control and demarcate limits 
to their colleagues’ influence. 
 With the civilian influence resting in the OSD, civil-military relations were highly 
subjective for many reasons. The civilians were able to maintain their authority, dictate 
tempo of planning, and compel military findings by way of various methods. Perhaps the 
most effective method of subjective civil-military relations was the split structure via 
secrecy. As mentioned above, because of a desire for secrecy, the civilian policy makers 
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made sure that CENTCOM’s planners were kept in the dark about the overall mission. 
The smallest possible number of military officers was involved in the planning and they 
were kept isolated from their compatriots. The source material indicates that the circle of 
incorporated military professionals only grew at the behest of General Franks or other 
senior military leaders. It is reasonable to suspect that the level of secrecy would have 
remained much higher for much longer if not for their requests. 
 Civilians maintained control of the planning by manipulating the calendar, as 
well. Secretary Rumsfeld continually demanded exceptionally short turn around on 
changes to the war plans. It was not uncommon for the civilians to demand a month’s 
worth of work be completed in less than a week. Secretary Rumsfeld also told General 
Franks that the planning would need to be ready much earlier than was realistic or, in 
fact, what occurred. In another example, Rumsfeld told the military planners in late 2001 
that the invasion order may be given as early as late spring 2002. This had many effects 
upon the military planning process, including the hindrance of debate or challenges to 
civilian requests. 
 Subjective civil-military relations were further compounded by Rumsfeld’s 
persistently interrogative manner of compelled military change. Rumsfeld engaged with 
General Franks for multiple reasons, not the least of which being that he was the 
CENTCOM commander. He was also a proponent of the changes Secretary Rumsfeld 
proposed. Regardless, Franks and his staff continually presented mission plans that the 
civilians found to be unsatisfactory. Despite the fact that the findings came from military 
professionals, the civilians refused to accept them if they failed to satisfy established 
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civilian partialities. Rumsfeld would commonly use persistent questioning in order to 
reveal his preferences or flaws in what the military presented. 
 The immense pressure of civilian subjectivity had detrimental affects on military 
morale and, in the later stages, cooperation. The latter issue exacerbated what was already 
deemed a poor civil-military relationship. The high demands and constant expectations of 
Iraq war planning occurred at a time when the same planners – and CENTCOM, as a 
whole – were consumed by the war in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Rumsfeld and his OSD 
staff engaged the military professionals in a way that sparked tension and frustration. 
These feelings existed throughout Iraq war planning and increased towards the end of the 
exercise. Process tracing has revealed many moments during which officers complained 
to each other, challenged the presence or influence of OSD staffers, or openly questioned 
the merits of the exercise overall. 
 The most significant body of unsatisfied military officers was the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Throughout the case study the heads of the DoD branches were marginalized. It 
was not until Franks compelled President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld to incorporate the 
Joint Chiefs that the March 2002 ‘Tank’ meeting took place. Consequences to the civil-
military relationship with the service chiefs were an afterthought. Before and well after 
that moment tension remained high. The service chiefs worried about the merits of an 
invasion yet were only afforded the opportunities to symbolically approve or disapprove 
of the plans once they had been established.  
 The civil-military relationship was most subjective when it came to force 
deployment. The military had a highly structured and automated method of transporting 
troops and equipment to the theater: the TPFDD. However, Secretary Rumsfeld took over 
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the process after initially balking at the military’s established timeline and size of the 
operation. His highly subjective participation in approving specific units’ orders and the 
schedule therein was based on his great skepticism of military bureaucracy. It led to 
tremendous frustration amongst the military planners and outright confusion in the force 
deployment. Many reserve units did not arrive on time and equipment preparation was 
delayed because of Rumsfeld’s orders.  
 Throughout the subjective control within civil-military relations there was 
minimal pushback from the military. General Franks and his planners tended to quietly 
acquiesce to Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush’s requests. The flow of Generated 
Start to Running Start to Hybrid Plan shows a military officer corps that responded to 
civilian requests regardless of the amount and level of concerns expressed by those in 
uniform. Source material shows us that many military planners were concerned about the 
civilian’s preferred plans. They also shared frustration when they had to educate 
Secretary Rumsfeld about numerous tactical issues and engage him on decision-making 
that was left to the military in less micro-managed events. 
 The largest exception to this trend, meanwhile, was one of the most significant 
moments of the case. In the eleventh hour General McKiernan and his staff within 
CENTCOM pushed Cobra II up the chain of command. This war plan was closer to the 
initial, military-generated plans than the Hybrid Plan that was preferred and pressed by 
President Bush. Military officers outside of the top-tier military officer corps – which had 
led the vast majority of Iraq war planning – established Cobra II. Still, it ended up being 
employed after rapid approval and campaigning from CENTCOM. Cobra II became the 
war plan that was executed.  
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Cobra II was the result of late pressure from military planners who were in 
theater. It was accepted by civilian policymakers who were, if not distracted, preoccupied 
with other issues related to the coming war (not the least of which being the campaign for 
UN support as well as Phase IV planning). When the civilian policymakers decreased 
their subjective involvement, the military immediately leapt at the opportunity to 
implement their preference. As such, development of Cobra II proved to be an isolated 
moment of military objectivity within the civil-military relationship. It was successful 
and must be recognized as a significant moment within an otherwise highly subjective 
civil-military relationship. 
 Overall, the Iraq war planning exercise involved highly subjective civilian 
control. Delegated presidential leadership and an ad-hoc process organization perpetuated 
this dynamic. A fraction of the civilian leadership led a secretive, exclusive effort to 
maintain subjectivity in an environment that could have benefited the military 
professionals. Instead, civilian agents succeeded in subjectively compelling military 
leaders to produce as well as execute strategies they desired. Secretary Rumsfeld and his 
office proved to be the most active and influential players in the process. This was despite 
and at the expense of other civilian policy makers. The State Department was, perhaps, 
the most marginalized player in the decision-making process. The National Security 
Council was never the exclusive venue nor the most significant player in the process, 
either. As such, fellow civilian players or bureaucracies never significantly challenged 
the OSD’s leadership. What’s more, Secretary Rumsfeld succeeded in imparting highly 
subjective control over the top tier military leadership. He did so with various tactics and 
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tools. One of the more notable decisions that worked to the OSD’s benefit was the active 
engagement and co-optation of General Franks, the CENTCOM commander. 
 Throughout the Iraq war planning case study it is clear that tension was high 
within the civil-military relationship. Dysfunction was also present. Military officers who 
participated in the war planning consistently complained of high stress, aggressive policy 
demands, and an inundating presence of civilian oversight. Basic cooperation was heavily 
strained towards the end of the war planning. Various observers of the events – in the 
moment as well as in retrospect – found the relationship troubling and the structures 
strained. Frank Miller of the NSC infamously described communication as being 
“catastrophically broken” within the civilian and civil-military circles. 
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Chapter Four 
Case Two: Strategy Review – Iraq (2006) 
 
 On February 23, 2006 a bomb ripped apart the dome of the Samarra Mosque – 
one of Shii’a Islam’s holiest sites. If a clearer sign of Iraqi civil war preceded this event, 
it has not been credited. By spring, the trajectory of Iraq was looking increasingly dire. 
Violence was increasing, sectarian divisions were growing, the insurgency was 
metastasizing, and questions swarmed about the viability of the current strategy. The 
summer brought exploding violence and mixed messages from civil as well as military 
circles; President Bush showed resolve while commanding generals pivoted vis-à-vis 
withdrawal and redeployments. In the public sphere, it wasn’t until the midterm elections 
“thumping” that the Bush administration began to review its course in Iraq.258 Finally, in 
January of 2007, new leaders were announced and a different strategy was put forth. 
What happened during the months between Samarra and the surge? Why did the 
strategic review begin? How did it come to pass? What were the dynamics between the 
civilian policy makers and the military commanders? To date, a great deal has been 
written about the summer and fall of 2006. Many individuals have published their 
actions, the vying perspectives, and the compartmentalized push towards the surge. In 
                                               
258 Madison, Lucy. "Obama's 2020 "Shellacking" is Like Bush's 2006 "Thumping."" CBS News. 1 May 
2012. Web. 4 Aug 2012. 
120 
 
this chapter, the author reviews the timeline of events and reconstructs the dynamics to 
the best of his abilities. As the events are unearthed and analyzed, a picture of what 
happened is captured. 
The goal here is to identify the characteristics of civil-military relations during the 
Iraq strategy review in 2006. From the start of the review through the decision on a 
strategy, this chapter process traces events, analyzes dynamics, and identifies typologies 
of civil-military relations. The timeframe spans from late spring 2006 – when key civilian 
players began to shift towards strategy review – through the beginning of winter 2006-
2007, at which time a new strategy was created and both sides made moves to implement 
the appropriate changes.  
 The chapter reveals that, based on source material, the Iraq strategy review was 
catalyzed, led, and dominated by civilians. There existed a subjective civil-military 
dynamic throughout the process. This included lots of interactions outside of formal 
structures and chains of command. Additionally, the Bush Administration lost confidence 
in its combat commanders and ultimately became willing to dismiss and then overtly 
flank them. Prominent civilian players who campaigned for a surge benefited from those 
latter actions. Conversely, a relatively small percentage of the strategy review occurred 
within established, traditional civil-military structures.  
While divisions existed within both circles during the review process, some 
civilian players complemented their findings with the opinions and overt lobbying of 
active duty as well as retired generals. In the case of the former, civilians went under 
combat commanders’ heads – as it were – and spoke with officers beneath them. This 
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enhanced pro-surge civilian positions and allowed them to better engage different 
positions on both sides of the civil-military relationship.  
Multiple, compartmentalized strategy reviews existed during a significant portion 
of the strategy review; this was true within civilian and military environments. 
Furthermore, various civilian and military circles accessed – as well as depended on – 
different data sources and intelligence. This helped perpetuate the significant differences 
between various players including those of the National Security Council, commanding 
generals in theater, and service chiefs at the Pentagon. 
An apparent paradox is that this all took place within a culture of consensus that 
was encouraged by the highest levels of the Executive Branch. President Bush put 
emphasis on concurrent and complementary opinions. This created challenges and put 
great stress upon the review efforts. That is, by attempting to maintain unified opinions, 
positions contrary to the status quo were not easily developed or well supported. It also 
led to a tendency to go around leadership levels rather than challenge them directly.  
President Bush’s closest advisors were fiercely loyal confidants. In the case of 
National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley, he and the president both stressed how 
closely and frequently they met. Trust was ever present; because of this, the president 
ultimately delegated various influential duties to Hadley. At many points prior to and 
throughout the strategic review Hadley took significant actions without President Bush’s 
explicit request or knowledge. In this way the president’s inclination to delegate was 
similar to how Secretary Rumsfeld and the OSD consolidated influence in the first case 
study.  
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Ultimately, moderate to high levels of subjective civilian control were maintained 
throughout this case study. This correlated with delegated presidential leadership – 
President Bush relied heavily on NSA Hadley’s management – and orderly process 
organization that was centered within the NSC, albeit exclusive and secretive. The 
enacted strategy was closest to positions within particular civilian circles that were 
augmented by external policy advisors; the latter group included a number of retired 
military professionals. In fact, the idea to surge troops did not come from active military 
circles. As such, co-optation of military voices – in this scenario, retired ones – was 
present in this case. 
Process Tracing 
Brewing Concerns 
 According to President Bush, by the spring of 2006 he was already thinking that 
the strategy in Iraq wasn’t working. He had voiced this concern to his national security 
advisor, Stephen J. Hadley.259 By 6 June, Jim Jeffrey and Philip Zelikow – Secretary 
Rice’s coordinator for Iraq policy and a counselor for the Department of State (DoS), 
respectively – presented the secretary of state an eleven page secret, internal memo with 
three options going forward. These included a transition to a full counterinsurgency 
strategy (COIN), adoption of particular COIN aspects, and a less intensive pull pack 
option who’s goal was to “keep the lid on” the violence.260 The memo reflected concerns 
that the situation in Iraq was not sustainable; the feelings were held by various civilian 
bodies, including members of the State Department. However, there is no evidence that 
the memo was shared outside of DoS. 
                                               
259 Bush, George W. Decision Points. New York: Crown, 2010. pg. 364. 
260 Woodward, Bob. The War Within. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008. pg. 54-55. 
123 
 
 At the same time some key members of the president’s National Security Council 
(NSC) were concerned about the violence. According to Peter Feaver, he and other 
“senior civilians” on the NSC staff “believed the situation warranted launching a top-to-
bottom reassessment of the strategy” by the end of May.261 Meghan O’Sullivan, the 
Deputy National Security Advisor on Iraq/Afghanistan, was using her densely developed 
network of contacts to get a picture of Iraq that was not offered during the combat 
commanders’ video conferences.262 She believed that the nature and frequency of 
violence indicated a much more volatile environment.263  
These opinions ran counter to what General George Casey, the Commanding 
General of MNF-Iraq, was indicating. In his weekly briefings to the president and NSC 
he would frequently cite figures about the number of insurgents captured or killed and 
number of patrols completed. The metrics he used showed a ramp up of missions and 
perceived success. However, it was not data that was relevant within counterinsurgency 
circles and several advisors felt the information was not only distracting from proper 
goals but also detrimental to success.264 
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 The dissonance between military briefings and civilian beliefs reached an 
actionable level by the time President Bush asked for a multi-day review of Iraq strategy. 
On 12 June, the President met with his principal advisors. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Director of National Intelligence John 
D. Negroponte, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Peter Pace, and National Security 
Advisor Stephen J. Hadley were present; they were complemented by various support 
staff and advisors.265 NSA Hadley moderated the agenda and the direction of discussions. 
He framed the event around grand strategy questions and devoted ninety minutes in the 
morning to more abstract concepts such as, “Is our political strategy working?”  
 This was followed by briefings from General Casey, Secretary Rice, and others. 
Casey briefed the group on the current strategy; he focused on Baghdad and listed various 
risks that threatened mission success. Rice, meanwhile, presented the State Department’s 
position that the current track was not improving Iraq.266 Other civilian advisors, 
including Peter Feaver and Eliot Cohen, presented different options including troop 
increases and faster transitions to Iraqi training and standing down.267 The National 
Security Council suggested an expansive internal review modeled after Solarium during 
President Eisenhower’s administration. While the meetings at Camp David were candid, 
at the end of the abstract exercises President Bush did not authorize a formal review. 
Instead, he followed precedent and accepted his combat commander’s position; they 
would wait and give the current strategy more time to work. 
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A Long, Hot Summer 
 General Casey’s June assessment found that American troop drawdowns could 
accelerate. He was confident that sectarian violence would slow after the 7 June killing of 
Zarqawi.268 However, by July he reversed his position, much to the surprise and 
consternation of Chairman Pace. The security situation had deteriorated by such an extent 
that Lieutenant General Pete Chiarelli, Commander of MNC-Iraq, requested that the 
172nd Stryker brigade from Alaska be called back and its tour extended. This was after a 
majority of the unit had already rotated home.269 The move was intended to help stabilize 
the security in Baghdad; the unit would augment forces currently assigned there. 
However, by the beginning of August, President Bush’s daily briefings indicated that the 
situation continued to fall apart.  
On 1 August, details of “150 attacks a day in Iraq, six an hour” were coming in. 
What’s more, the weaponry and tactics used by the insurgents were increasingly lethal 
and sophisticated.270 On 3 August, when General John Abizaid – the CENTCOM 
commander – was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he stated that 
the violence in Iraq and around Baghdad was the worst he had seen.271 He ruled out any 
reductions in US troops, citing the increase in sectarian violence.272 The escalation of 
violence and trajectory of Iraq’s instability became increasingly worrisome to the 
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president and commanders. 2006 had done nothing significant to allay their concerns or 
indicate that the status quo was achieving desired results. 
Lack of Consensus 
 By mid to late July members of the NSC determined that strategy discussions had 
to be started. It was felt within civilian policy circles that any leak of a strategy review – 
even one that was preliminary – would create political and optics issues that were ill 
afforded at the moment. This opinion strongly influenced the initial form of strategic 
dialogue. As such, the first attempts to broach the subject across civil-military lines were 
informal and vague. For example, NSA Hadley began by sending broad questions to 
Secretary Rumsfeld and numerous generals. These were intended to spark relevant 
discussions about Iraq strategy.273 Explicit intent was not presented. 
 Prior to a 22 July meeting, Secretary Rumsfeld concurred with Hadley’s position 
and sent fourteen strategic questions to General Casey. They were meant to spark debate 
about the current plans and even included a “grand strategy” sub-heading that would be 
discussed. Secretary Rumsfeld, Chairman Pace, General Casey, Vice President Cheney, 
Ambassador Khalilzad, General Abizaid, and others were in on the meeting.274 The 
meeting broached the topic of a strategic review but again the combat commanders – 
Casey, specifically – were cautious and skeptical of embracing COIN tactics such as 
prioritizing population security. He firmly believed the current course should be 
followed. To date, the civilian leadership made it a point to support the commanders’ 
wishes.275 
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 Three and a half weeks later, on the morning of 17 August, a meeting took place 
in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. It became a significant moment on the road 
to strategic review. In it, President Bush expressed his consternation in regards to the 
trajectory of Iraq.276 He specifically stated that they needed “a clear way forward coming 
out of Labor Day” and implied that tactics were constantly being reassessed but strategy 
stayed immobile. The latter point seemed to displease him. His combat commanders and 
ambassador were video conferencing in on the meeting and pushed back by providing 
context to their positions. Abizaid outlined three major regional problems that influenced 
Iraq. Casey emphasized his confidence in training the Iraqis and planning for drawdowns; 
he also insisted that things were improving. Khalilzad suggested that the President make 
a rousing, “defining speech” on the issue.277  
* * * 
 The 17 August meeting indicated that by that date the positions of the players 
were consolidated and moderately entrenched. The combat commanders – General 
Casey, specifically – were insistent that the current course was the only viable option. 
From their perspective, American troops were distractions that made the Iraqi population 
displeased and increased target opportunities for insurgents.278 Furthermore, if the Iraqis 
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weren’t trained to be self-sufficient in all aspects of government and security then they 
would become dependent on an occupier that was enormously unpopular.279  
The State Department believed that the war was discrediting the United States 
abroad, sapping it of valuable blood and treasure, and was distracting the country from 
more legitimate missions. Secretary Rice also thought that the war was hindering other 
grand strategic priorities. President Bush and his closest advisors on the National Security 
Council – best exemplified by NSA Stephen J. Hadley – believed that Iraq had to be won 
from both a national security and a political standpoint. As such, a winning strategy had 
to be found and implemented, immediately; managing failure was not a viable option. 
 Throughout the summer of 2006 different civil and military players became 
increasingly certain of the conclusions they were reaching. Hadley and his NSC team, 
emboldened by Meghan O’Sullivan’s experience and sources, believed that a 
comprehensive review – with the expressed intention to change strategies – was 
imperative. Combat commanders felt that they needed more time and that the only viable 
path was the one they were on. State had an established position that did not resonate 
with the President; he wasn’t going to accelerate a pull back from Iraq. 
The different positions were distancing and consolidating because, among other 
reasons, they were using different intelligence and data sources. The briefings that 
combat commanders gave the president contained assessments that various players 
deemed irrelevant, biased, or incorrect. On 25 August, for example, General Casey 
delivered a secret report whose numbers indicated progress. It relied heavily on figures 
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showing the numbers of insurgents killed and damage done to targeted adversaries.280 
However, the CIA indicated that many of the stated successes in the report were 
temporary; insurgents were pouring into areas immediately after “clearing.” What’s 
more, Iraq’s borders were porous and new fighters were able to travel with relative ease. 
As such, the middle goal of the “clear, hold, and build” trifecta was not being achieved. 
Staffers at the State Department even went so far as to say that Casey’s report was “a 
smoke screen.”281  
And yet, while displeasure in the format and content of intelligence was brooding 
amongst civilian policy makers, there’s no indication that there were sustained attempts 
to push back or challenge it. Instead, they were simply going to different sources. Deputy 
National Security Advisor Meghan O’Sullivan, for example, established a network of 
contacts and sources on the ground in Iraq when she worked there. One of the most 
influential contacts she used throughout the strategy review, meanwhile, was General 
Petraeus. Throughout the review, both sides used the back channel they established.282 By 
the summer of 2006 she was in the routine of communicating with numerous sources on 
multiple continents and retrieving copious amounts of information about the situation in 
Iraq. She recorded the data, tracked the information, and used it to bolster her position.283 
President Bush was in a position that straddled these points for a number of 
interpersonal and structural reasons. First, he had made it a priority of his administration 
to support his combat commanders and heed their opinions with great respect. He also 
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refused to micro-manage the tactics and daily operational aspects of their duties. The 
president’s tendencies thus magnified the influence that General Casey and other combat 
commanders had earlier in the Iraq campaign. By putting faith in the generals on the 
ground, the president was more inclined to suppress skepticism and delay changes if 
those generals expressed confidence in the current tactics and strategies. Likewise, this 
faith diminished a willingness to take action upon any disagreements he may have with 
what he was briefed. 
President Bush’s position also straddled these two positions because of a culture 
of consensus that he deliberately promoted within his Administration. He was intent on 
having his advisors agree on whichever path he decided. This priority created an 
expectation of agreement that did not promote contentious debates and dialogue. In short, 
strategic review and its necessarily critical – and sometimes confrontational – lens ran 
counter to Bush’s preferred leadership style.  
This certainly didn’t prevent him from viewing the combat commanders with 
skepticism. It also didn’t inhibit him from debating a change of course or expressing 
those thoughts with his closest advisors. After a 17 August meeting in the Roosevelt 
Room, for example, President Bush was dismayed with General Casey’s position. He was 
also concerned with how poorly Operation Together Forward was progressing.284 Josh 
Bolten, White House Chief of Staff, asked the President “what radical measures can the 
team recommend” if Iraq continued to deteriorate? The President at this point was 
convinced that options had to be drawn up and a review had to take place. He stated that 
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he and his national security advisors “would have to develop those measures” 
themselves, if need be.285 He then authorized Hadley “to formalize the review the NSC 
Iraq team had been conducting.” With this decision, Hadley began to lead a confidential, 
civilian-centric review of Iraq strategy.286 The military was not directly involved. 
Multiple, Confidential, Compartmentalized Strategic Reviews 
 By late September 2006 there were multiple strategic reviews taking place at 
various levels of civilian and military circles. They were confidential and 
compartmentalized; there were no overt or sustained attempts to synthesize what was 
being reviewed. A plurality of players deemed action necessary, but overtly challenging 
the status quo was deemed difficult. To date, President Bush had not requested a broad 
review or alternative plans. Rather, his only order was to NSA Hadley and it was for a 
secretive review. President Bush expressed his concerns to a few of his closest 
confidantes; any actions that he requested were done quietly and within strict boundaries. 
Most significantly, the reviews done at the president’s behest were executed without 
involvement of the defense secretary or military. 
Staff within the NSC was reviewing options informally throughout the summer. 
Amongst those on staff there was a clear, established preference for escalation in Iraq. It 
was at the beginning of October – when he was aware of informal reviews taking place at 
the State Department and Pentagon – that NSA Hadley ordered a report with 
recommendations be written. However, the timeline of events here is slightly ambiguous. 
By one account, on Sunday 1 October, Hadley had his deputy J.D. Crouch meet with 
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NSC staff member and Navy Captain William J. Luti. Crouch asked that a plan be drawn 
up that would promote a surge of forces in Iraq.287 The request required an “operational 
concept” that would help change the trajectory in Iraq; Luti was given five weeks.  
By another account, on 3 October NSA Hadley asked that Crouch meet with him 
in the West Wing. There, Hadley asked Crouch to complete a strategy review and 
recommend a plan. It was then that Crouch called Luti and submitted the request, citing a 
lack of options or alternatives being presented by the Pentagon. In this account, Crouch 
emphasized that this “briefing about a new strategy for Iraq” was to be quiet and of 
utmost confidence.288 What is consistent between these two accounts is that Hadley 
ordered a strategy review of Iraq. Furthermore, it was meant to be confidential, 
exclusively within NSC circles, and expansive enough to include strategic options. 
By 11 October Luti delivered his report to Crouch;289 it was titled “Changing the 
Dynamics: Surge and Fight, Create Breathing Space and Then Accelerate the 
Transition.”290 In its ten pages, it suggested a surge of troops – approximately five 
brigades, or 20,000 troops – that would allow for consistent “secure and hold” operations. 
It also suggested that American forces increasingly target insurgents, thus going beyond 
the training mission that was emphasized under General Casey. Furthermore, it 
recommended an increase in the overall force size of the Army and Marine Corps.  
At this moment, a NSC staffer – at the request of the national security advisor – 
made comprehensive tactical and strategic recommendations without direct military 
involvement within the chain of command. The report was also completed without 
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Deputy National Security Advisor on Iraq/Afghanistan Meghan O’Sullivan’s 
knowledge.291 It was a bold recommendation made outside of the body’s traditional role 
and without full knowledge of some of the most relevant figures within the National 
Security Council. 
It wasn’t until 17 October that, with President Bush’s permission, NSA Hadley 
asked O’Sullivan start a full “review quietly.”292 She was expressly told that no military 
or intelligence assets could be consulted or notified in the process; only a handful of State 
Department staffers could be involved. During the ensuing meetings, members of the 
review – including State’s David Satterfield – expressed concern about how ambitious 
the review had become, considering no military professionals were being consulted.293 
Two weeks after it started, however, O’Sullivan finished a memo titled “The Way 
Forward.” Multiple options were presented, including a surge of troops and strategic shift 
towards COIN. 
At the State Department, Secretary Rice’s senior advisors began a review based 
off of the Zelikow memo from earlier in the spring. Through November, State continued 
to voice a concern that significant strategic and grand strategic priorities were being lost 
because of Iraq. Secretary Rice’s top deputies published a report saying as much. This 
occurred at the same time that – unbeknownst to them – the NSC was aggressively 
researching and posturing for a troop surge.294 
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 While all this was occurring within civilian policy circles, Chairman Pace quietly 
ordered sixteen leading colonels from across four branches of the military to assemble at 
the Pentagon; if asked, they were to say they were helping conduct “research for a series 
of war games.”295 On 27 and 28 September, however, they were briefed by the staff 
director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. Walter Sharp about a three-month plan to 
create strategic options for Iraq. Chairman Pace told the colonels to “think broadly and 
creatively;” 296 they did not need to come to a consensus and dissenting opinions were 
encouraged.297 The group was dubbed the “Council of Colonels” and worked under what 
the chairman called “extraordinary secrecy.”298 They reported to Pace and the service 
chiefs every Friday, for two hours. From a civil-military perspective, it was significant 
that no notification or integration occurred with Secretary Rumsfeld or OSD. 
 A 12 October meeting, meanwhile, represents one of the less prevalent moments 
in which civilian and military players communicated directly with each other about any 
strategic review. Chairman Pace requested the meeting; during it Secretary Rice 
welcomed the general in her office at the State Department. Pace presented to Rice some 
disconcerting figures that indicated a failure of the status quo in Iraq. Towards the end of 
the meeting, Pace told Rice about the Council of the Colonels, though Rice indicated that 
she had already heard rumors of it “through the ether.”299 Reciprocally, the secretary of 
state told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs that her staff, too, was undertaking a similarly 
expansive and critical strategic assessment, albeit from a more political/diplomatic lens. 
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There appears to be no mention – or knowledge – of the NSC reviews. By meeting’s end, 
Rice and Pace agreed that the political, public, and internal environments did not allow 
them to share efforts. They would update each other but remain independent. 
 By this time, the preferences of each review – and respective bodies – were 
becoming increasingly clear. The most influential civilian review occurred under the 
National Security Council. NSA Hadley and a number of his influential staffers preferred 
a surge in troops and believed a COIN strategy could be viable as well as effective.300 
This ran counter to the State Department’s findings. Secretary Rumsfeld, meanwhile, still 
agreed with General Casey that the priority was training Iraqis and transitioning security 
to them. This complemented his military doctrine of rapid, small footprint operations and 
allowed for less US engagement in the situation. It also complemented his established 
leadership style vis-à-vis combat commanders and their directives.  
However, President Bush’s increasing dismay and decreasing confidence in his 
combat commanders reinforced his strategic concerns. For him to break from his 
established support and deference of combat commanders, he would need a great deal of 
encouragement and evidence that the schism was the right thing to do. Ultimately, the 
catalyst for the change came from outside of the official civilian circles: think tanks 
staffed with retired generals offered the opportunity. By the time this occurred, the 
defense secretary ultimately threw his hat in the wrong ring and reinforced his path to 
resignation.  
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Assessments from Outside the Civil-Military Structure 
 Over the course of the summer, as violence in Iraq worsened and the public 
position of the president indicated intransigence, various experts and retired generals in 
several think tanks became increasingly concerned. After the failure of Operation 
Together Forward, members of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) verbalized a 
desire to help. Frederick Kagan raised the idea of creating strategy options to retired 
general Jack Keane; he thought it was an excellent idea.301 Keane was on the Defense 
Policy Board, was a former Army Vice Chief of Staff, had close connections with 
Secretary Rumsfeld as well as those close to him, and shared a deep concern about the 
trajectory of Iraq.302  
 AEI eventually created a strategy that required a surge of 35,000-45,000 troops.303 
A formal PowerPoint briefing was created for a conference in early December.304 The 
strategy focused on making population security a priority, ceasing violence within major 
urban centers like Baghdad, and bolstering reconstruction as well as other engineering 
projects. It also emphasized a good deal of commander flexibility. In short, AEI 
recommended that an increase of troops, adoption of various COIN concepts/strategies, 
and willingness for flexibility/adaptability be enforced.305   
 Keane decided to request a meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld in order to give his – 
and by extension, AEI’s – assessment of Iraq and the current strategy. On 19 September, 
he met with the secretary of defense. By both men’s accounts the meeting was a healthy 
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discussion complemented by skeptical questioning and various hypothetical comments. 
Keane was blunt with his assessment and emphasized the need for change. He 
emphasized his high regard for COIN and its potential application in Iraq.306  
 Three days later, Keane met with Chairman Pace after the latter requested a job 
evaluation of sorts. Keane was frank in his assessment that Iraq was failing and that the 
chairman’s leadership was contributing to that end. He also suggested that the combat 
commanders and ambassador to Iraq were hermetically sealed in their environment, 
working too hard, and perhaps not seeing the forest through the trees.307 That is, he felt 
that they were unable to accurately evaluate the current strategy because of their 
proximity to and immersion within the threat environment. What’s more, Keane 
suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff weren’t making success in Iraq a high enough 
priority, thus contributing to the morass. He ended the meeting by recommending an 
internal review, changes of command in Iraq, and a new head for CENTCOM. Whether 
the first recommendation spurred or quickened the Council of Colonels cannot be 
confirmed, though the closeness of this meeting to the colonels’ first briefing seems to 
discount the former. 
In the coming weeks and months Keane’s input, travels, and connection 
significantly influenced the tactical and strategic discussions. Civilian and military 
leaders – both active duty and retired –felt his influence.308 Furthermore, his stature as a 
retired four star general and his reputation within the military community bolstered the 
positions he held, to say nothing of the civilians who heeded his recommendations. Over 
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the course of the fall he made numerous trips to Iraq to assess the situation, hone his 
position, and analyze how particular combat officers perceived the campaign.309 
Throughout this period Keane remained a retired Army officer and active member 
of the Defense Policy Board.310 Meanwhile he was also in contact with NSA Hadley and 
other NSC staffers. Keane continued to advise the civilian administration’s staff and 
leaders throughout the fall. His access, actions, and career allowed him military 
professional credentials and civilian policy access. This hybrid role was both a catalyst 
and a conduit. He and AEI were able to act as uncharacteristically critical voices within 
Bush’s leadership circles. He could also submit proposals and commentary that would 
not be appropriate or politically viable coming from internal positions.311 Meanwhile, as a 
retired general he was able to act as a channel through which various civil-military 
dialogues flowed. He gave assessments of civilian positions to commanders in the field. 
He also told civilian players what various officers were thinking and doing.  
Keane was not the only outside advisor influencing civil-military relationships 
and the strategy review. Many experts from numerous organizations participated. 
Meghan O’Sullivan specifically asked that Army general Kevin Bergner be assigned to 
her staff, as we was a proponent of COIN after implementing it in Mosul, 2005.312 Dr. 
Kalev Sepp – a Naval Postgraduate school faculty member and US Army Special Forces 
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veteran with COIN experience – advised General Casey.313 Bruce Hoffman – a COIN and 
terrorism specialist at RAND Corporation – was tapped to advise various civilian leaders. 
Still other academics – like Eliot Cohen – and retired generals – such as Barry McCaffrey 
and Wayne Downing – advised the President and NSC staff.314  
The participation of these civilians – both former active duty soldiers and not – 
within the strategy review highlights a significant degree of informal, unstructured 
correspondence. There were numerous players who had no formal elected or appointed 
positions. They did not report directly to civilian policymakers or any officers within the 
military chain of command. This amplified the civil-military relationship’s unorthodox 
nature in the summer and fall of 2006. Influential as well as important discussions 
frequently occurred outside the traditional legal structures of civil-military relations. This 
allowed for certain individuals – with or without title – to influence the decision making 
process far more decisively than normal. 
Rumsfeld is Out, Full Formal Strategy Review Begins 
 The day after the 7 November midterm elections, Secretary Rumsfeld resigned as 
the civilian head of the Defense Department. President Bush recognized that a change 
was needed; he had already met with Robert Gates at his Crawford Ranch to discuss 
taking over the DoD.315 Until mid-December, however, Rumsfeld remained in the 
position in a highly diminished capacity. As such, NSA Stephen Hadley acted as the 
point person for President Bush during this phase of the strategy review; his position 
became even more influential and relevant.  
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By this point it was clear that Hadley favored an increase in US troops as well as 
a transition to tactics and strategies focusing on population security and COIN.316 To date 
Rumsfeld had been in agreement with Casey, Abizaid, and other combat commanders 
that a troop increase was not advisable (and, in fact, could be detrimental).317 Hadley 
continued to garner data and individuals to support his position despite this. In the 
beginning of November, with Rumsfeld’s resignation, Hadley grasped the greatest 
opportunity to lobby his position. 
On Friday 10 November, President Bush held a meeting in the Oval Office; 
principals were in attendance.318 It was at this time – after Rumsfeld resigned and the 
Republicans were on their heels – that the president requested a formal strategy review of 
Iraq. He wanted the participants to make the review their top priority and report back to 
him within sixteen days. Furthermore, he assigned Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. 
Crouch as the head of the effort. The same day, meanwhile, Crouch handed Luti’s report 
over to two of the generals leading the Pentagon review: Lt Generals Richard Sattler and 
Douglas Lute. He asked that they review the material and “to seriously consider” its 
recommendations.319 Crouch also relayed specific tactical and strategic opinions; he 
viewed Anbar Province and Baghdad as linked and vital to success in Iraq.  
Four days later the first formal strategy review meeting took place in the 
Eisenhower Executive Office Building, a large stone structure close enough to the West 
Wing that it casts its shadow on the Situation Room every afternoon. Per the president’s 
orders, senior representatives were present from the Departments of State and Defense, 
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice President’s office, the Director of National 
Intelligence’s office, and the National Security Council.320 Representatives for the current 
combat commander were conspicuously absent. Deputy NSA Crouch distributed binders 
that included Meghan O’Sullivan’s lengthy paper on the four strategic options the NSC 
thought realistic: “adjust at the margins; target our effort; double down; bet on Maliki.”  
In the coming weeks, memos and leaks from various players appeared to 
influence – or in the very least, attempt to influence – the group’s work. On 18 November 
DoD representatives distributed a secret memo that rehashed the position held by Casey, 
Rumsfeld, and a plurality of generals in the Pentagon; it was necessary to maintain the 
course of training Iraqis forces and standing down U.S. troops.321 The document 
proposed a compromise of boosting the number of US teams focusing on the transition.  
At the same time, members of the Joint Chiefs released reports that indicated 
pessimism about the status quo and a need to make longer strategic goals a priority. One 
stated that the U.S. had “strategic and moral obligations to leave the people of Iraq with a 
working democracy.”322 Mixed messages were coming from within the Pentagon, even 
within individual groups like the Council of Colonels. While acknowledgement of failure 
– or in the least, a lack of success – was easy to come by, opinions ranging from 
maintaining the course to implementing COIN to expediting training and drawing down 
were heard throughout. 
A 22 November memo from OSD confirmed the civilian office’s agreement with 
Casey. “General Casey has a good plan. He has identified ways to do things faster and 
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accelerate the timeline to Iraqi self-reliance,” it read in part.323 Rumsfeld and his staff still 
believed – along with Casey and a plurality in the Joint Chiefs’ office – that transition 
was still the key to eventual success. 
As a body the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a priority to plan for innumerable 
scenarios and challenges to national security. With the current troop deployments and 
rotation schedule – to say nothing of the prospect of increasing force levels in Iraq – there 
was real and growing concern about force exhaustion. Strategic overstretch was also a 
concern. Various senior officers within multiple branches indicated that this was the case. 
Lt. Col. Andrew Krepinevich, for example, has stated that “American commanders are 
reluctant to ask for additional troops because they realize how stretched the force is 
already.”324 The military’s preferred ratio of forward deployed to home stationed soldiers 
was out of balance; this required more troops to deploy longer with fewer (and shorter) 
stretches at home.325  
These concerns had near term effects both on the health and effectiveness of the 
deployed forces. It also made it more difficult for commanders to willingly suggest troop 
increases, since they were already concerned that soldiers could succumb to the current 
strain. Retention was an issue, let alone the readiness of the active forces. All of this, 
meanwhile, influenced the branches’ ability to plan for and respond to any crises on the 
horizon.  
In the midst of this Lt General Sattler, head of the strategic plans and policy 
directorate, met with Deputy NSA Crouch to summarize the benchmark positions coming 
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from different civilian and military circles.326 Various military voices were expressing 
and responding to very different recommendations. Additionally, President Bush had 
already asked Casey what he would do with a hypothetical increase in troops; this is 
despite the fact that no active military source had recommended said course of action. 
When Chairman Pace notified the Council of Colonels of this, the responses were 
negative. Feeling that the chiefs were already softening the blunt assessments they had 
constructed, a number of the colonels voiced concern that they – and many military 
leaders, at large – were not being listened to through the process. 
NSC’s Formal Report is Submitted; Iraq Study Group Publishes its Report 
On 26 November, principals met with President Bush in the White House’s 
Solarium to review Crouch’s strategy briefing; he had finished the 14-page document the 
Friday night prior.327 In it, Crouch noted that an “emerging consensus” was coalescing 
around an acceleration of “transfer of security responsibilities of Iraqis.”328 However, he 
wrote that the group should consider a “significant surge in U.S. forces.” He also wrote 
that securing the population’s security needed to be a priority and that U.S. forces could 
not stand by without working to that end. The report prompted a frank debate about what 
the U.S. could realistically achieve in Iraq. By the end of the meeting no decisions were 
made but the established positions of the State Department, NSC, and Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s office were rehashed. 
By this meeting, NSA Hadley had arrived at the conclusion that President Bush 
decided on a surge of troops.329 He was correct. During a late November meeting with 
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President Maliki in Amman, Jordan, President Bush decided that he had “faith” in the 
Iraqi leader. As such, Bush determined that the prime minister of Iraq needed more time 
and that a surge of troops with a strategic shift was the best way to achieve that end.330 
This decision appeared to have immediate influence on discussions between civilian 
leaders and military officials. In the coming weeks, direct conversations about strategy 
shifts and tactical questions increased in frequency.  
Then, on 6 December the Iraq Study Group privately met with President Bush in 
order to deliver their finished report.331 Within its seventy-nine points it recommended a 
drawdown of troops that would remove most of the current numbers by the beginning of 
2008. However, it also stated that the group would support a “short-term redeployment or 
surge of American combat forces” with the intent of bringing Iraq security under control 
and facilitating a responsible withdrawal. At a time when public approval of the president 
and the war were extremely low, the bi-partisan commission had expressed willingness to 
do what was counter-intuitive to the public and exactly what the president desired.  
The next day, 7 December, Chairman Pace met with NSA Hadley and emphasized 
that a significant amount of the national security advisor’s recommendations were 
already in place under Casey’s command. He also let him know that an internal surge was 
possible; combat commanders were able transfer forces within Iraq to Baghdad and 
Anbar Province.332 He acknowledged the importance of optics and the need for the 
American public to see significant changes in the way Iraq was being handled. That being 
the case, he told Hadley that the latter could be achieved under the current battle plans. 
The men also discussed a need to reevaluate deployment and rotation policies. Citing 
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exhaustion and difficulties maintaining operational readiness, Pace said active duty and 
National Guard/Reserve forces must be bolstered. 
At this point in the strategy review the State Department’s position was being 
marginalized. In an 8 December NSC meeting Secretary Rice again stressed her 
skepticism of the level to which the U.S. was engaged in Iraq. She was adamant that the 
Iraqis needed to take more responsibility and, as such, U.S. forces should only engage in 
order to stop egregious sectarian violence. However, Chairman Pace immediately 
asserted that the military would not accept a ‘to stop genocide only’ mission. The tactical 
and ethical dilemmas of such a plan made it unfeasible, and the head of the Joint Chiefs 
immediately undercut the Secretary of State’s position.333  
Discussing Logistics and Run-up to “The Tank” Meeting 
 On Saturday 9 December a secure videoconference meeting was held between the 
NSC and General Casey. President Bush was very assertive in this discussion and led 
with questioning that revealed his disposition to send more U.S. troops.334 Various topics 
were covered including a perceived need to deal with insurgents within Sadr City, the 
limitations Maliki’s leadership presented to American ends, tactical decisions within 
Baghdad, and the makeup of forces in the area. The civilian leaders and President Bush 
were directly challenging the military’s position more frequently and in an increasingly 
transparent manner. 
 By this point, frustration was mounting within numerous military circles. A poll 
done by the Military Times found that less than 40 percent of troops supported a troop 
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surge in Iraq.335 Many vocal “senior commanders” also argued that the U.S. “needed to 
lower its profile and reduce its footprint.” General Abizaid told Senator John McCain that 
“every division commander,” General Casey, and multiple officers on down said no when 
they were asked if more U.S. troops would “add considerably to” their “ability to achieve 
success in Iraq.” Far from the field, the commander of STRATCOM – General 
Cartwright – was quoted as saying that “clearly the strategy’s got to change” and needed 
“to have a global context.”336 
What’s more, combat commanders like General Casey believed that President 
Bush had lost confidence in their opinions and actions.337 The Council of Colonels felt as 
though their work had been distilled and politicized. Various members of the Joint Chiefs 
felt that their opinions – let alone their grand strategic concerns of operational readiness 
and preparedness throughout the globe – were dismissed. Indeed, there is little evidence 
that by this point – and even through the eventual policy decision – the chairman or the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had substantial influence on the development of surge strategy. 338 
General Peter Schoomaker, United States Army Chief of Staff, rose as the leading voice 
of this frustration.339  
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Odierno Takes Command; Formal Chain of Command Continues to be Flanked 
 An influential, rising combat commander thought differently. In December 2006 
General Ray Odierno took command of the MNC-Iraq forces. He replaced General Peter 
Chiarelli in this role.340 On 4 December, Odierno was briefed on the plan he was to 
implement; it was named “the Bridging Strategy” or “TBS.” At that moment he decided 
to formally be against any increase in U.S. forces, thus mirroring his commander’s 
position. Over the course of the ensuing weeks a small advisory group briefed Odierno. 
Within a short period of time the general shifted his position; Odierno believed they 
needed more troops.341  
 Tensions quickly built between General Casey and General Odierno as the latter 
became more outspoken. Odierno and his staff came to a consensus that eight more 
brigades were needed.342 Assuming that the established combat command would not 
approve this, they went about developing contingencies to bolster force effectiveness; 
these included adding smaller units such as helicopter squadrons and special operations 
forces. Meanwhile, Odierno’s chief of staff noted that as MNC commander, Odierno was 
speaking with Jack Keane one to two times per week. His contact with the retired general 
was a boon for AEI, Keane, and those in the administration who lobbied for a surge. At 
that point Odierno was one of the few active duty generals who were clearly in the surge 
camp. 
 Odierno and Casey continued to conflict with each other. What’s more, Casey 
became agitated when Keane and other civilian officials communicated directly with 
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officers beneath him. Thomas Ricks confirmed that by December officials in the White 
House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and staff of the Joint Chiefs “were 
bypassing several echelons in the chain of command to call” Odierno and ask his staff’s 
colonels what they’d do with more troops.343 Furthermore, Keane had kept in contact 
with him and other officers, including General Petraeus, who were sympathetic to what 
he was lobbying. Keane made a number of trips to Iraq in order to meet with Odierno as 
well as other relevant officers in theater.  
 Keane’s connections from his career in the military, present position on the 
Defense Policy Board, as well as access to active military and top civilian advisors alike 
made him a formidable figure. After one of his trips to Iraq he was asked to meet with 
President Bush on 11 December, along with four other outside experts.344 In that meeting 
Keane presented copies of AEI’s PowerPoint briefing to Vice Present Cheney.345 He also 
expressed an opinion and strategy plan closest to the ultimate decision. He bluntly stated 
that the military did not have a plan to beat the insurgency. He succinctly restated his 
ideas that were attributed to the AEI plan – surging troops, making population security a 
priority, adopting multiple COIN tactics/strategies, and complementing the military shift 
with a civilian surge of economic as well as political initiatives.  
Keane complemented his opinion with a pronouncement that General Odierno’s 
assessment was similar to his; Odierno had come to the conclusion that a five brigade, 
two-battalion surge was necessary.346 Keane presented himself and Odierno as allies, of 
sorts. Odierno’s opinion also helped to bolster the AEI plan. Keane made full use of this 
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fact in both the Oval Office meeting and a briefing with Vice President Cheney around 
the same time. 
A Civil-Military Afterthought is Noticed: Service Chiefs 
As tension and frustration grew within military circles and Keane was straddling 
the civil-military divide, Chairman Pace asked President Bush to sit with the Joint 
Chiefs.347 To this point they felt marginalized and were increasingly concerned that vital 
operational and strategic decisions were being made without military opinions. Two days 
before that meeting was to be held, Pace indicated that many concerns and grievances 
would be aired; General Schoomaker would be the most assertive to this end.348 
However, the chairman also suggested that the chiefs would be willing to support a surge 
if their concerns were entertained and responded to in earnest.349 Ever concerned with 
building consensus and equally aware of the political delicacy of a surge decision, 
President Bush made a rare trip to the Pentagon on 13 December. He intended to meet 
with the Joint Chiefs on their turf, in order to hear their opinions and honor their 
professional positions. The meeting would take place within a highly secure, windowless 
conference room nicknamed “The Tank.” 
The Meeting in “The Tank;” Posturing to Influence a Surge 
 The meeting lasted almost two hours. President Bush, Vice President Cheney, 
soon to be sworn in Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and National Security Advisor 
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Stephen Hadley were the civilian principals present.350 One day prior General Casey, via 
secure videoconference in an NSC meeting, told the president that only the Iraqis could 
ensure long-term success. He also reaffirmed that he was not recommending an increase 
of U.S. troops and that a surge would be a step backwards.351 Now President Bush was 
meeting with the officers in charge of operational readiness and grand strategic 
preparedness. They and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs were the top tier of military 
professionals and, legally, were the closest advisors to the President.352  
 Vice President Cheney began the meeting by posing a number of questions meant 
to reveal weakness in non-surge opinions and direct the conversation towards the 
president’s strategic preferences.353 Each of the service chiefs was given an opportunity 
to voice his opinions and concerns. Three fundamental concerns arose. One was that 
Maliki was not strong enough to quell sectarian violence and that, as such, any significant 
American efforts were set to fail. Another was that the Iraqis had to be responsible for 
implementing a non-sectarian security plan. Finally, it was agreed among the chiefs that 
there should be no safe place of al-Qaeda in Iraq.354  
 Beyond these political, tactical, and strategic concerns, the chiefs also expressed 
concerns about strategic overstretch. General Schoomaker said that an increase in force 
deployments to Iraq would put an “unacceptable strain on ground forces.”355 Multiple 
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scenarios – including an invasion of South Korea by North Korea and Iranian regional 
aggression – were presented. These were among myriad contingencies for which the Joint 
Chiefs were responsible to prepare. Schoomaker bluntly stated that they could not assure 
strategic success if these crises arose, based on the volume of forces deployed in Iraq. He 
also reminded President Bush that when a five-brigade surge is discussed, fifteen are 
required.356 However, while unforeseeable conflicts were priorities for the Joint Chiefs, 
President Bush made clear in the meeting that winning Iraq in the near term was his 
priority.  
 Civilian leadership was not indifferent to the legitimate strategic concerns that 
were presented. President Bush that in order to garner a consensus that was anything 
beyond tepid – to say nothing of secure – specific accommodations would be necessary. 
As such, the principals came to the meeting with “sweeteners” for the generals.357 
President Bush was willing to support a DoD budget increase as well as increases in the 
sizes of the active duty Army and Marine Corps. These moves would help ease the 
pressure on the military’s strategic forces. They could also allay the chief’s fears and 
bolster support for a surge strategy in Iraq. This move appeared to work. 
 In the following days there were significant shifts in the prevailing assumptions 
and tone of the strategic review. The meeting in the Tank verified the expectation that 
President Bush wanted to increase U.S. troops in Iraq. While a number of the chiefs were 
dissatisfied with the review and disagreed with a surge, Chairman Pace told NSA Hadley 
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that he was comfortable with it.358 Within three days of the meeting, The New York Times 
reported that military planners and budget analysts were asked to draw up cost estimates 
vis-à-vis a surge.359 The Office of Management and Budget was also asked for cost 
estimates related thereto. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs were asked to identify which 
brigades would be available for deployment.360  
 Simultaneously, the strategic review’s focus shifted from whether to surge forces 
to how many forces would be involved and how to deploy them. General Casey adapted 
to the new reality but was still very reticent about recommending troops. He approved 
plans that called for a surge of only two brigades and two battalions of Army and Marine 
Corps soldiers, respectively.361 Through all of this Keane continued to communicate with 
General Odierno.362 Keane sent a copy of the AEI plan to the general. Ensuing 
conversations confirmed that Odierno supported the strategy.  
By the final week of December, meanwhile, even the Joint Chiefs was pivoting 
away from Casey; the service chiefs were beginning to come around to a larger, five 
brigade surge that was at the core of Keane/AEI’s plan and the preference of NSA 
Hadley. However, this was a slow and disjointed shift. Chairman Pace was ambivalent 
about Casey’s “two and two” plan; generals at the J-3 operations directorate indicated 
that the chairman was more concerned about selling a plan to the president than getting 
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more troops.363 Other generals on the Joint Chiefs and supporting staff, meanwhile, were 
concerned that unless the surge was five brigades or larger the effectiveness would not be 
sufficient.364 Throughout the staging of all this, Keane was in contact with generals in the 
Pentagon. He briefed NSA Hadley and Vice President Cheney’s office numerous times, 
updating them on the shifting debates and divisions within the Pentagon. He further 
advised the civilians to be assertive in regards to surge numbers. 
Preparing for Implementation and Stacking the Military Leadership 
 On his full first day in office, 19 December, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
met with General Petraeus. Gates had Petraeus fly in from Ft. Leavenworth, KS and give 
him an assessment of what to look for in Iraq.365 Gates was already considering tapping 
Petraeus to help implement the pending strategy shift in Iraq. Again, the civilian policy 
makers were going beyond the fold – outside the chain of command – to elicit strategic 
opinions.366 In this case, Secretary Gates approached an officer who was the Army’s 
leading expert in counterinsurgency and had a well-known preference for large troop 
deployments.  
 Four days later Secretary Gates met with President Bush at Camp David. There, 
the secretary of defense said he wanted General David Petraeus to be the combat 
commander in Iraq. President Bush agreed and they decided to promote Casey out of the 
position; he would become the Army Chief of Staff.367 President Bush and his advisors 
had established that a surge of troops would occur. They maneuvered the discussion so 
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that strategic shifts towards population security and COIN would be implemented. They 
were in the process of reorganizing the combat commanders as well as the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The final details – including the firm number of troops – were now being 
addressed. 
 At this moment, the presiding combat commanders were still behind the two and 
two plan. Chairman Pace told President Bush, during an NSC meeting at Crawford 
Ranch, that Casey recommended that plan.368 He then said that Petraeus and Odierno 
were also consulted and they both wanted “the maximum force available.” By the end of 
that meeting, President Bush notified the chairman of the Joint Chiefs that he was going 
to order the higher number of troops. After a long, frustrating period of pivoting, the 
president could now say that he accepted the key recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. 
 On 2 January General Petraeus was formally asked to take command of MNF-
Iraq. Two days later news leaked of this development. Just over a week later President 
Bush addressed the nation in a prime time speech. Over the course of that speech he 
declared that the strategy in Iraq was changing, more troops would be deployed, and that 
the leadership transformation was meant to guarantee a sea change. With any luck, that 
shift would bring success.  
Analysis  
 The Iraq strategy review was catalyzed, led, and dominated by civilians. The 
civil-military relationship was moderately to highly subjective and broadly similar to that 
found in the first case study. A significantly higher amount of communications during the 
strategy review occurred outside of a formal chain of command. However, the NSC was 
far more involved and instrumental in this case study; the national security advisor also 
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had more authority and influence. Conversely, the secretary of defense and his office 
maintained less power in this case study. As such, civilian power dynamics shifted back 
towards the White House throughout 2006. 
A number of external civilian and retired military figures were involved in the 
strategy review. These individuals served as conduits of information, advocates for 
unpopular positions, and sources of legitimacy for otherwise inconsequential officials. 
Jack Keane was the most significant of these players. Their participation benefited a 
particular group of civilian policymakers in particular: those staffing the NSC. As with 
the first case study, those civilians bolstered their arguments by positioning themselves 
with authoritative military figures. This time, this maneuver included retired generals 
who were active in the private sector and non-profit communities. 
While more of this case study occurred within the NSC structures than the first 
one, a majority of it did not occur collaboratively. The NSC was a policy-making leader 
throughout the case but it was not a forum of discussion until the most significant debates 
had occurred behind closed doors, involving a fraction of the relevant players. 
Furthermore, a plurality of those most significant decisions was made outside of the NSC 
structure. Most of these occurred before the strategy review became public or formalized. 
There is a significant amount of evidence indicating that the president had made his 
decisions before the formal review had finished reporting.  
A tremendous amount of work and posturing occurred prior to the public, formal 
review. During the summer and early fall of 2006 numerous reviews took place in 
multiple venues; nearly all of them were confidential and none were inter-agency. This 
occurred for many reasons; the Bush Administration’s emphasis on consensus was 
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among them. Because the difficult questioning of a strategic review was unlikely to 
produce wide spread agreement, the culture within the national security community 
inhibited open – and uncomfortable – questioning of the status quo. Holders of unpopular 
or seemingly untenable positions kept quiet unless they had ample protection or believed 
that a critical mass of support existed. 
Unlike the first case – Iraq war planning – the 2006 Iraq strategic review did not 
begin with an overt campaign for engagement. No single individual advocated for a 
review in any NSC meetings or public exchanges. Instead, numerous players in various 
agencies believed a change was needed. The ideas of a strategic review and course 
correction percolated within various areas of the bureaucracy. These positions became 
increasingly dissonant against the timbre of the dominant military voices. 
Over the spring and summer of 2006 combat commanders continued to express 
confidence in the status quo; General Casey pressed the need for accelerated training and 
withdrawal. CENTCOM commander General Abizaid continued to support the combat 
commander’s position, even though he reported the worst violence he had seen in the 
war. Secretary Rumsfeld continued to support and advocate for the status quo, even 
though his political capital was waning rapidly; he proved to be relatively impotent over 
the course of the review. 
President Bush, meanwhile, developed a culture within civil-military relations 
that made it difficult for him to challenge the commanders’ positions. His leadership style 
set a well-established precedent: he would not micro-manage, challenge, or deny support 
to what the military deemed necessary. This inevitably created tension when those 
military leaders maintained a stance that caused the president consternation. Thus, an 
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apparent paradox developed: highly subjective civil-military relations complemented by a 
deferential commander in chief after the orders were given.   
 This style further inhibited real, substantive, challenging debates of the status 
quo. However, this did not mean that the president and his staff didn’t grow concerned. 
Process tracing provides multiple examples of President Bush expressing displeasure to 
his closest staff and White House advisers. He became increasingly willing to challenge 
General Casey over the course of the summer’s video-conferences. Ultimately, the 
combat commander openly acknowledged the president’s displeasure and assumed he 
was on borrowed time. Conversely, the closeness and exclusivity of the White House 
staff ultimately afforded President Bush the opportunity to begin a confidential review, 
internally.  
By requesting an appraisal by NSA Hadley in late August, Bush incited a strategy 
review while maintaining the consensus-focused national security and civil-military 
apparatuses. Hadley was the president’s choice for three reasons. First, the man had a 
remarkably close relationship with President Bush, establishing a high degree of trust and 
camaraderie. Second, it was well known that Hadley and his staff held strong opinions in 
regards to strategy in Iraq. They felt that a change was needed; Hadley was an 
appropriate voice for reform. Third, as national security advisor, Stephen Hadley was 
able to use established resources in order to review and engage the military’s position. 
 The war’s trajectory, the taboo nature of openly challenging the status quo, the 
subdued nature of the president’s displeasure, and his confidential request for a review all 
contributed to a civil-military/national security apparatus that was disoriented by fall 
2006. However, a plurality of players acknowledged the problems at hand. As such, 
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many secretive strategy reviews were begun in multiple corners of government. The State 
Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with their “Council of Colonels”), and various 
intelligence agencies were outlining the current situation and creating possible solutions.  
All of these efforts were isolated and lacked integration. In one instance, 
Chairman Pace and Secretary Rice held a meeting because they had heard rumblings of 
each other’s reviews but wanted to confirm. Even the review Hadley initially headed was 
pursued without direct assistance from the OSD or Pentagon as a whole. This led to one 
of the more startling moments of the case study: Luti’s report included comprehensive 
military recommendations without any input from the DoD or direct knowledge of the 
Pentagon. 
 All of the nascent reviews of late summer and early fall proved to be overtures for 
the coming, formal review. Increasingly comprehensive and integrated reports were 
published as the weeks and month drew on. By mid-September, one of the most 
influential players in the strategy review began engaging the civilian principals. Retired 
Army General Jack Keane approached multiple civilian and military leaders. Keane 
proved to be a significant catalyst and conduit throughout the strategic review. He 
advocated a line that Hadley and his staff agreed with: increased troop numbers and pivot 
towards counter-insurgency strategy. 
 Keane’s participation epitomized the type of frequent, informal correspondence 
that occurred throughout the latter half of this case. Towards the very end of the strategy 
review Keane travelled numerous times to Iraq, spoke with various candidates for 
military leadership in theater, and helped shepherd the implementation of COIN strategy 
within civilian as well as military circles. This was a role that was informal, exceptional, 
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and a hindrance to the established procedures within national security/civil-military 
relations. Keane’s role as a conduit of information to military officials in various 
locations in the chain of command helped compel a strategy change despite the culture of 
consensus. The retired general ferried information and stage-managed a change in 
military leadership in a way that avoided overt tension within the principal-level 
leadership. In so doing, President Bush’s leadership style and policy preferences were 
satisfied despite an appearance of mutual exclusivity. As such, Keane’s role was 
extraordinarily shrewd and effective. 
 Meanwhile, Secretary Rumsfeld was not a significant player in this case study. 
His political capital waned significantly through his tenure. After the mid-term elections, 
he submitted his resignation. Throughout the summer and even after his resignation, 
however, Rumsfeld consistently backed the combat commanders’ opinions. He 
acknowledged oversights on his part but did not waver in promoting the status quo 
strategy of training and leaving as soon as possible. This may have contributed further to 
his political impotence within the administration. 
Issues around OSD and civil-military relations existed well before 2006. The Iraq 
Study Group even noted that a “new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to 
build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior 
military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the 
Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council.”369 What existed 
during this case was anything but healthy and, perhaps, unequal to a fault. End runs were 
attempted as the number of participants grew. However, the amount of posturing and 
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decision making that occurred in secret – prior to the formal review – bolstered the White 
House and NSC and maintained subjective civil control of the military. 
 NSA Hadley filled the power vacuum that developed with Rumsfeld’s decline and 
resignation. Hadley’s influence increased throughout the case and expanded with 
Rumsfeld’s departure, followed swiftly by the public formalization of the strategy review 
on 10 November. His overtly pro-COIN stance influenced the policy discussion. Hadley 
acted as custodian of the review and policy adviser to the president, simultaneously. This 
did not change even when more players were brought into the process. His influence 
benefited from Keane’s participation, especially when it came to preparing the military 
for the coming decision. 
 Meanwhile, part of the reason the civil-military relationship changed so little 
when the formal review commenced was that most of the pressing decisions were made 
before the process began. That is, a significant amount was decided during the 
confidential period of the review. Very little discussion occurred and even less of the 
military’s majority position was acknowledged. The combat commander’s 
recommendations were openly disqualified, the chairman’s “Council of Colonels” effort 
was diluted and dismissed, and the Joint Chiefs felt even more marginalized than during 
the Iraq war planning.  
The service chiefs’ frustrations were significant enough that – like during the first 
case – a meeting in the “Tank” was held. This event allowed the Joint Chiefs to express 
their concerns about the events and path the civilians were implementing. It proved to be 
a moment of simultaneous military acquiescence and civilian accommodation with 
certain “sweeteners” that would satisfy some of the branches’ concerns. However, like 
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the first case study, in this instance the civilian approach to the service chiefs was a 
formalized afterthought rather than a deliberate priority. 
 Civilian subjectivity was overt throughout the entire process, perhaps no more so 
than when President Bush, his national security staff, and Jack Keane worked in tandem 
to reorganize the combat command leadership. After President Bush decided that NSA 
Hadley, his staff, and Keane were correct, the civilian leadership began vetting 
candidates for a military leadership change. Throughout that process they contacted 
various officers directly, bypassing numerous levels of the chain of command.  
They cherry-picked General Petraeus based on his experience and body of work. 
They communicated directly with General Odierno and requested work related to the 
review while he was serving under General Casey, in theater. These and other moves 
created tension between the civilians and military; Casey complained that his authority 
was being subverted while he was still being asked to enforce the current strategy. 
However, most of the tension played out within the military ranks themselves. Keane was 
particularly influential during this stage of the review. His networking, military 
professional experience, and ability to travel frequently to Iraq allowed him to serve the 
NSC’s and president’s wishes.  
Ultimately, the strategy that was decided upon and implemented was closest to 
the stances held by particular civilians in the civil-military relationship. Specifically, 
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and his staff held the position that was 
ultimately augmented by retired General Jack Keane: surge of troops and pivot to COIN 
strategy. In fact, the idea of implementing said strategy was never raised or presented by 
the top tier active duty military professionals. As a retired Army general, Jack Keane was 
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a military voice of sorts. His role certainly helped bolster the civilian’s minority opinion. 
However, as a retired officer, he was officially a civilian at the time of this case study. 
Meanwhile, the position did co-opt key voices and published positions that existed within 
other circles of the military. 
As mentioned earlier, a significant amount of posturing and review occurred 
before the formal, public strategic review began. This was for various reasons outlined 
above, but the result was striking. A minority opinion was developed within an otherwise 
consensus-focused environment. Minimal time was given for alternatives or aggressive 
review, but a response to the combat commander’s – and by extension, Pentagon and 
OSD’s – position was submitted. This led to a substantial change in strategy. It also 
occurred within a tense, uneven civil-military relationship.  
The top combat commander eventually acknowledged that he had lost credibility 
in the president’s eyes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed mounting frustration over 
various grand strategic concerns; they also felt slighted during most of the review. The 
most significant attempt by the Pentagon to review the current strategy – the “Council of 
Colonels” – saw its report diluted and shelved. The secretary of defense had minimal 
credibility for myriad reasons, not the least of which being his decision to side with the 
combat commanders with whom President Bush disagreed; Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
ultimate resignation was the final out. Meanwhile, the most influential NSC reports were 
authored without formal military assistance.  
All of these examples indicate the type of civil-military relationship that existed 
up and through the second case study. When the formalized strategy review eventually 
commenced, President Bush delegated a significant amount of his leadership role to NSA 
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Hadley. The NSC maintained orderly process organization during a rapid, exclusive, and 
secretive event. From the start the deck was stacked towards a particular outcome, 
significant amounts of posturing had already occurred, and there is evidence that the 
president had already made up his mind. Through the formal strategy review, meanwhile, 
subjective control was maintained through ordered process and despite delegated 
presidential leadership. 
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Chapter Five 
Case Three: Strategy Review – Afghanistan (2009) 
 
 Throughout his presidential campaign Barack Obama relayed a recurring theme: 
Iraq was a distraction and the necessary fight was in Afghanistan. He promised to refocus 
the country’s military and foreign policy efforts on the central Asian theater if he was 
elected. Furthermore, he promised that his administration’s priority would be to destroy 
Al Qaeda wherever it resided and to defeat the Taliban. Upon election the president 
continued to publically emphasize the importance of the war in Afghanistan. In a matter 
of weeks, an opportunity arose for President Obama to put his campaign promises and 
posturing into practice. Events on the ground, decisions within the principal civilian 
leadership, and concerns voiced by senior military officials catapulted the young 
president towards a path of strategic consequence and decision-making. 
From mid-winter through late fall 2009, the Obama Administration was 
compelled to deal with rapidly changing –situations in Afghanistan. The actions of the 
president, his staff, and the military leadership under his command ultimately led to a full 
strategic review that was unprecedented in that part of the world. Within weeks of his 
inauguration President Obama ordered a review of the Afghanistan campaign. He also 
took significant steps to reestablish the NSC structures that were weakened under 
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President Bush. The president may have believed that these actions and his decision for 
an immediate mini-surge would stabilize Afghanistan. He may not have. Regardless, that 
outcome was not to be. In a few month’s time shake ups within the military leadership 
and sharp increases of violence would force Obama to deal with Afghanistan directly and 
comprehensively. 
The goal of this case study is to describe and define the civil-military relationship 
between President Obama, his principal level of civilian advisors, and the top-tier of 
military leadership throughout the 2009 Afghanistan-Pakistan strategic review. The case 
spans from early February 2009 – when the Riedel review was commissioned – through 
the beginning of December 2009 – when the new strategy was announced. It was during 
this window that multiple strategic reviews and major policy decisions were debated. 
From the Riedel review through the changing of military commander in Afghanistan and 
ultimately the full AfPak strategic review, this case study delves into the interpersonal 
and bureaucratic relationships that influenced strategic decision. Questions that are posed 
include: What catalyzed the decision to undertake the strategic reviews? Which 
personalities led the reviews? What structures were used to influence the civil-military 
relationship throughout the strategic review(s)? What was the decision-making process 
and how was it organized? 
The author shows through process tracing that the AfPak review contained the 
most contentious open debates of the three cases studies. One reason for this was that a 
larger number of individuals and bureaucratic offices/institutions influenced the review 
(ie. NSC, vice president’s office, Department of State, Department of Defense, 
CENTCOM commander, and field commanders). What’s more, the players used a great 
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many means of communication and avenues of power in order to influence the decision 
making process. Some of these included end runs to legislators as well as the media. This 
made the strategic review the most publicly contentious of the three herein. 
An argument is made that this review involved the most emboldened and 
influential National Security Council of the three case studies. This is due to President 
Obama’s deliberate effort to re-energize the NSC both structurally and from a 
personnel/staffing perspective. The president’s active efforts to promote intense, open 
debate propelled multiple players and positions into the strategic review, thus allowing – 
and, indeed, requiring – the NSC to choreograph the national security discussions. This 
shuffling of influence within a zero-sum civil-military relationship inevitably decreased 
the power ratio of the military professionals involved. The dynamic created a contentious 
environment. The military leadership responded, in kind, by forcibly and publically 
arguing its position; end runs, public statements, and briefing the president’s legislative 
opponents were some of the tactics used. 
Ultimately this case study reveals that the AfPak strategic review saw a purer, 
theoretical form of subjective civil-military control than those preceding it. The 
subjective control was enacted through a very orderly process organization. The NSC 
was the center of the strategic debate and perpetuated an open as well as highly inclusive 
review. Highly engaged presidential leadership complemented this process organization. 
President Obama and his staff immersed themselves in the strategy review. They actively 
participated throughout the entire process, aggressively worked to choreograph its stages, 
and intently preserved their authority throughout the process.  
167 
 
While the previous case studies reveal a great deal of subjective civilian 
influence, there had been a significant amount of deference given to military authorities. 
As such, civilian policy makers made it a habit of co-opting military voices that agreed 
with their positions. This maneuver legitimized their arguments and allowed them to 
more successfully enact their will when engaging with military opponents who had 
tremendous professional credibility and influence.  
In this case study, meanwhile, the president used his rank – as commander in 
chief – and the calendar in order to bend the military professionals’ influence. As such, 
much of this case study will reveal an open power struggle to shift the civil-military 
relationship, to the benefit of a young, inexperienced Democratic president. Ultimately 
President Obama decided on a plan that was closer to the military’s recommendations 
than his own starting point. However, Obama’s emphasis on process and his determined 
effort to enforce subjective military control led to a decision on his terms. The method of 
this process and the structural changes therein were as significant as the decisions that 
were made. 
One should note that the AfPak review was an ambitious and wide ranging 
strategic exercise. The author will focus exclusively on the aspects of the strategic review 
that dealt with the military’s operational planning within Afghanistan. As such, the 
review of policy vis-à-vis Pakistan, the development of expanded drone operations, and 
various aspects of the civilian surge will not be discussed. This decision was made in 
light of the scope of this thesis, the relatively small number of available sources at this 
time, and the length of the overall project. 
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Process Tracing 
Obama’s Emphasis on Process and the Early Power Players 
 Many individuals who have reported on or served in the Obama administration 
have repeatedly noted the president’s consistent focus on process and procedure. 
President Obama made it a top priority to develop, enact, and maintain clear, codified 
rules of decision-making. Foreign policy and civil-military relations were no exception. 
Obama immersed himself in minutest details of policy posturing. In one instance he 
huddled with Vice President Biden and wrote out exactly what he wanted him to say 
during a Meet the Press interview.370  
 Obama’s immersion went beyond simple public interviews, however. Internally 
he demanded contact and updates with his closest circle of advisors. One of these men – 
Dennis McDonough – is quoted as saying, “Regular order is your friend;” this mirrored 
the president’s emphasis on organization.371 One way in which President Obama enacted 
these priorities was by signing Presidential Directive 1 on 23 February 2009.372 This 
document significantly expanded the National Security Council’s size and authority; the 
body had atrophied greatly under the Bush administration. President Obama also 
reincorporated various principals and cabinet level officials into the NSC community’s 
active policy discussions. The attorney general, UN ambassador, and others were 
welcomed back into the consequential fray. 
 The decision to resurrect the NSC immediately amplified civilian policymakers’ 
ability to choreograph and influence civil-military relations. With the national security 
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advisor and supporting civilian staff preparing agendas and issuing directives, the 
military had to answer to an established, highly network, authoritative body. 
Furthermore, the total number of players contributing to the national security 
conversation increased. As such, NSA Jones affirmed that the processes were 
“extraordinarily inclusive” and that “no one [got] left out.”373  The NSC quickly became 
the nexus of civil-military and national security related issues. Thomas Donilon, the 
deputy national security advisor, immediately began overseeing the integration of 
structures and participants; he regularly led up to four deputy level meetings a day as the 
administration made a concerted effort to include myriad players.374 
 President Obama’s efforts to expand, consolidate, and amplify civilian influence 
upon national security occurred at a time when whisper campaigns implied that retired 
General James Jones – the National Security Advisor – was aloof and not fit for the 
position.375 While Secretary Gates supported Jones, there were numerous players – 
mainly within the military – that did not care for him and believed his mannerisms 
indicated significant leadership flaws. Regardless of this and Jones’ relatively distant 
report with the president, he maintained an effective relationship with Obama. That being 
said, few if any people shared the confidence and access to President Obama that 
McDonough and Mark Lippert – two veterans of the campaign. As such, President 
Obama’s immediate advisors and the NSC maintained the two most significant levels of 
foreign policy influence early in 2009.376 
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Take One: The Riedel Review and “Mini-Surge” 
 Within weeks of his inauguration President Barack Obama took action to change 
the course of the Afghanistan War. Sometime in late January or early February he 
contacted Bruce Riedel, a renowned and respected – albeit it retired – CIA analyst at the 
Brookings Institution.377 Riedel was an expert on the region and had advised Obama 
through his presidential campaign.378 The president asked him to lead a 60-day review of 
the nation’s policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan.379 By 2 February Riedel 
responded to the request and told NSA Jones he would accept the job. However, because 
the principals meeting at which he’d present the report was a short time away, in actuality 
Riedel had only two to three weeks to prepare the summary report.  
Riedel was not alone in his efforts, meanwhile. Lt Gen Douglas Lute (ret.), Senior 
Advisor and Coordinator for Afghanistan-Pakistan; Richard Holbrooke, Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; General David Petraeus, CENTCOM 
commander; Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and their 
respective staffs assisted on the report.380 Together, these individuals executed what was, 
in fact, a review first initiated under President Bush during the previous summer; it had 
not been completed. However, this report was unique in that it included the first, full 
review of foreign policy regarding Pakistan in decades. Meanwhile, President Obama had 
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asked for three separate war assessments prior to being elected.381 Each of these – from 
Lute, Mullen, and Petraeus – gave differing pictures of the war. This experience 
increased the president’s inclination to undertake the Riedel review. 
Riedel was a strong proponent of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and 
conveyed this in his book, The Search for al Qaeda. According to multiple descriptions 
of his review, the report he presented to President Obama was a re-hashing of that book’s 
thesis rather than an in-depth analysis of the current facts on the ground.382 NSA Jones, 
Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen reviewed an early draft of Riedel’s report on 
Wednesday 11 March. In it, the author proposed a broadened campaign in Afghanistan 
and a simultaneous shift of focus to Pakistan.383 He wrote, “The goal is to disrupt, 
dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies, their support structures 
and their safe havens in Pakistan and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” 
His ambitious and expensive recommendations included the option to fully resource 
COIN strategy with civilian and military surges.  
The next day NSA Jones met with the rest of the NSC principals to present 
Riedel’s latest draft.384 During this meeting Vice President Biden argued what would 
become his well-known position in regards to Afghanistan: “historical” invaders proved 
success was futile, the focus should be on Al Qaeda in Pakistan, and a form of enhanced 
counterterror (CT) that he dubbed “CT plus” could suffice. Secretary Clinton argued that 
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sustained COIN would be best while Secretary Gates agreed with Riedel, though with not 
as much tangible fervor as the secretary of state.385 
Jones’ recommendation was a qualified and tempered one; this was in light of the 
simultaneous troop deployment decisions being enacted by the president. That is, in early 
February Admiral Mullen presented a request for an increase of troops in Afghanistan; 
the primary reasoning being that more support was needed for the upcoming presidential 
election.386 General Petraeus, as CENTCOM commander, was campaigning for 30,000 
more troops and a “protect the population strategy” that had significant COIN 
undertones. When the requests were submitted to the president, however, Deputy NSA 
Thomas Donilon challenged the figures and asked questions about their make-up. Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USMC General James Cartwright, doubled back to 
reassess the numbers and answer the NSC’s questions. Soon Donilon was aggressively 
challenging the requests and belittling the military officers with whom he was in 
contact.387 This escalated when Admiral Mullen made a trip to the White House to tell 
the deputy NSA to calm down and stop encroaching on the military’s area of expertise: 
numbers.  
On Friday 13 February President Obama met with the NSC and NSA Jones to 
review the four options presented to them. These included waiting for Riedel to complete 
his review, send seventeen thousand troops immediately, send the same number in two 
deployments, or send twenty seven thousand troops, thus fulfilling a request from the 
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ground commander, General David McKiernan.388 Riedel was present at the meeting and 
told the president that if additional troops were not sent to Afghanistan the presidential 
election would most likely need to be delayed.389 Such a capitulation to security 
degradation would greatly hinder allied efforts there. 
The following Monday President Obama ordered the immediate deployment of 
seventeen thousand troops to Afghanistan. The public announcement was made the next 
day, Tuesday 17 February, after a significant attack on allied forces there.390 The forces 
would include a Marine expeditionary brigade and Army Stryker brigade, per 
McKiernan’s request and Gate’s recommendation.391 
The troop review and deployment all occurred while Riedel was in the process of 
writing his report. The simultaneous events made it difficult for Riedel to give an 
assessment that would remain accurate for a sustained period of time. It also presented 
challenges for the president’s advisors. Fluctuations made it difficult to offer 
recommendations. During the 13 March principals meeting Jones hedged his 
recommendation and gave three options, since seventeen thousand more soldiers would 
be on their way to Afghanistan in the near future. NSA Jones suggested CT “lite,” which 
included no more troops; an additional four thousand trainers for the Afghan army, per 
McKiernan, Petraeus, and Gates; or a ramp up to full COIN with another one hundred 
thousand troops.392  
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Five days later, on 17 March, the NSC principals met again with the goal of 
deciding on a recommendation for the president. They decided that sending an additional 
four thousand trainers to Afghanistan – per the ground commander’s, CENTCOM 
commander’s, and secretary of defense’s recommendation – would be the best course of 
action.393 One day later, Riedel flew to California with President Obama aboard Air 
Force One so that the president could ask him questions as he read his report.394 Thus, a 
review was being processed after a force increase had just recently been approved and 
additional recommendations were being consolidated by a separate group of civilian 
advisors. The moment was one of the most dissonant and chaotic moments of what 
would become a year of Obama’s Afghanistan strategic review. 
Troop Approval, Commander Change, and a Devolving Summer 
 On 20 March President Obama was present at a NSC meeting during which the 
principals reviewed Riedel’s report. The document was forty-four pages long and – due 
to time constraints – lacked “wide consultation, field visits, or rigorous analysis.”395 By 
meeting’s end Obama approved the additional four thousand trainers. He also stated that 
he’d review General McKiernan’s additional troop request “after the election” in 
August.396 In the president’s mind Afghanistan policy was set for approximately five 
months.  
 Over the next two months, however, Admiral Mullen became increasingly 
concerned that General David McKiernan was not the right man for the job. The 
Afghanistan commander’s career was mainly focused around armored combat 
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experience. As such, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was concerned that 
McKiernan lacked the appropriate knowledge and skill sets required for Afghanistan’s 
tactical environment.397 Gates shared Mullen’s concerns; McKiernan’s fumbled 
performances in early spring videoconferences did not allay any of their fears.398 
Eventually the chairman and secretary brought their concerns to President Obama and 
convinced him that a change needed to be made. The president gave the okay to remove 
General McKiernan. 
 In early May 2009 Admiral Mullen traveled to Afghanistan and asked the 
commander in Afghanistan to resign from his post. It was an exceptionally rare move. 
The equivalent action had not occurred since Truman’s firing of MacArthur during the 
Korean conflict. However, McKiernan responded with bluster, saying that he would have 
to be fired. The challenge was met with superior authority and on 11 May Secretary 
Gates announced that General McKiernan was removed as commander of U.S. and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan; Gates named General David McChrystal the new combat 
commander.399   
 The decision to remove a combat commander in the middle of a war sent 
reverberations throughout the military. Not only had Obama and his administration acted 
boldly to change the military’s dynamics in theater, they had also taken clear ownership 
of the current structures and trajectory of the fight. However, the decision also served to 
embolden the remaining generals. That is, since the firing was so rare, exceptional, and 
impactful upon civil-military dynamics, it was highly unlikely that more top-level 
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command changes would occur again soon. Many top-tier military leaders felt as though 
they were now safe from retribution and could be more assertive with civilian policy 
makers.400 If this sentiment was pervasive, it certainly would explain the civil-military 
relationship in the coming months. 
 Immediately after McChrystal’s assignment the general began making public 
statements about the war. A significant portion of these – including his initial ones – were 
by necessity; as the combat commander he was compelled to testify at his confirmation 
hearing, handle press coverage, and maintain a relatively public role. Other public 
interactions were by choice and were often fraught with civil-military consequences. 
 On 2 June General McChrystal testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee for his confirmation hearing. He conveyed skepticism about the status quo in 
Afghanistan and used language that suggested a need for escalation.401 NSA Jones 
perceived the general’s testimony as a military attempt to increase troop numbers. He 
contacted Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, reminding them that they had just 
finished the Riedel review and were still implementing the winter troop increase. Gates 
said that more conversations were needed and that the possibility for amplified efforts 
was on the horizon.402 It was unwelcome news to the president and his NSC staff. 
 Four days later, while traveling with the president to Normandy in 
commemoration of D-Day, Jones called Gates and suggested a way to silence 
McChrystal, thus punting any strategic review for the near term. The national security 
advisor suggested that they order the general to complete a commander’s assessment of 
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the war in Afghanistan.403 The task would take sixty days and require McChrystal to 
focus on determining the tactical as well as strategic realities of the war rather than 
campaign for immediate changes. Furthermore, the effort would create more order within 
the decision making process – something that the president and his immediate advisors 
greatly coveted. On 8 June, Geoff Morrell – the Pentagon’s press secretary – announced 
that General McChrystal was beginning a two-month, “ground-eye view” assessment that 
would ultimately mold “what changes in the strategy should be made.”404  
The intentions of the assessment order did not translate into explicit directions. 
The report’s purview was never made clear and the decisions on how to direct 
McChrystal were made by Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.405 Consequently, this 
allowed the general significant leeway and shifted the report from a civilian instigated 
braking process to a military defined strategic paper. 
Over the course of the summer, members of the NSC worked to translate 
Obama’s troop decision and the Riedel review into explicit orders. There was a fair 
amount of politicking and power play that occurred, too, as Obama’s advisors attempted 
to flank less familiar (and military-linked) NSC staffers, such as Senior Advisor and 
Coordinator on Afghanistan-Pakistan Lt Gen Douglas Lute (ret.).406  As Lute and others 
were drafting the Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) and other orders based on 
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Obama’s winter decisions, Gates suggested language that would significantly broaden the 
war goals. The secretary of defense suggested that Riedel’s goal – “disrupt” the Taliban – 
should be changed to “defeat.” Lute and others were very concerned that this would 
inexorably deepen and lengthen the campaign in Afghanistan. This and other debates 
continued throughout the summer as McChrystal continued his report and numerous 
players placed varying importance on the language involved. A strategic review 
continued to simmer. 
While posturing continued on both sides of the civil-military relationship, 
casualty counts in Afghanistan mounted. By July the KIA figures were approaching one 
hundred a month; this was quadruple what they were in April.407 Troop levels were still 
increasing and most players on the civilian side believed it was too early to reassess. 
Strategic approaches were tweaked, however. For example, a new body was created at 
CENTCOM: the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence. This helped promote the 
conceptualization of the two countries as a single, larger strategic environment.408 There 
were also efforts to blunt the military’s influence on national security discussions. 
Obama’s advisors believed that the combat commanders held too much influence during 
Bush’s tenure and that weekly videoconferences with generals in the field conveyed too 
much deference.409 There were deliberate efforts to decrease that military tier’s access to 
policymaking and the civilian decision makers. The White House continued to bolster 
civilian subjective control by way of structural changes to the civil-military relationship. 
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McChrystal’s Report and a New Strategy Review Begins 
 On 30 August McChrystal’s report was submitted to Secretary Gates.410 Over the 
course of writing his commander’s assessment, McChrystal came to believe that a great 
many operations in Afghanistan were distractions from what was required to win. He 
wanted to focus on Khandahar and other urban centers, but many military and civilian 
efforts were scattered throughout the large country. General McChrystal found that only 
a fraction of the seventeen thousand new troops were being used for security, despite the 
original letter and spirit of the orders.411 The general’s consternation manifested itself in 
his report’s recommendations. McChrystal and his small support staff forecasted a dire 
situation if drastic changes were not taken.  
 Because the combat commander and officers around him wrote the report – rather 
than outsourcing it to a think tank originally intended as the author – McChrystal had 
tremendous influence on its contents.412 He wrote that American troops were too “pre-
occupied” with their own security and “operated in a manner that distances us – 
physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to protect.”413 Victory, in a 
more traditional sense, would require upwards of eighty thousand more troops, another 
decade of open commitment, and another trillion dollars.  
 The general’s conclusions were drastic. They shocked many civilian advisors. 
Obama’s appointed combat commander was suggesting a massive escalation in a war that 
his advisors had no intention of perpetuating. In less than a week, General Petraeus 
contacted Michael Gerson of the Washington Post and helped source an impassioned 
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rebuttal to David Ignatius’ earlier op-ed eschewing escalation.414 Gerson – a former Bush 
speechwriter and stalwart of neo-conservative foreign policy – subsequently argued for a 
fully supported COIN strategy in Afghanistan. The end run by Petraeus – going outside 
the inner circle and emboldening a former Bush staffer – enraged President Obama and 
made his Chief of Staff – Rahm Emanuel – livid.415  
 The military did not limit its outside contact to the press. In fact, there were 
multiple top tier military officers who communicated with GOP legislators throughout 
the strategy review. For example, General Petraeus held “regular conversations” with 
Senator Lindsey Graham throughout the fall.416 The Republican senator from South 
Carolina was an Air Force Reserve colonel. The two men had a cordial relationship and 
the CENTCOM commander respected the senator. According to sources the men spoke 
about the strategy review, specifically, and Graham often counseled Petraeus on how the 
White House would attempt to engage the military. He mentioned that Obama would try 
to decrease the country’s presence in Afghanistan and “water it down.”417  
 While it appears a plurality of their conversations were positively reinforcing, 
Petraeus did tell the senator when he thought that Graham was miscommunicating 
McChrystal’s positions and being too bellicose with his public remarks.418 Likewise, 
Admiral Mullen visited with Senator Graham in the fall and described the civil-military 
dynamics of the review. He told the senator that the relationship was healthy, the 
discussions were good, and that there was no reason to fret over the decision making. As 
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such, it appears as though the military’s contacts with the Republican senator were 
beneficial to both parties as well as both sides of the civil-military relationship.  
Meanwhile, President Obama desired an exclusive, confidential, meticulous 
process inside the walls of the White House. These conversations went against those 
preferences. However, it appears as though the conversations did not benefit one side 
more than the other. Furthermore, it must be noted that one of the president’s closest 
advisors spoke to Senator Graham about the review, as well. Obama’s chief of staff, 
Rahm Emanuel, spoke to the Republican senator about the president’s leanings as the 
decision came closer.419 Whether this was to temper the GOP’s critiques or mute the 
military’s influence is unclear.  
 Shortly after Gerson’s op-ed, the White House asked that the Pentagon press 
secretary be the point person for all future military communications. Obama’s advisors 
also made moves to quiet General Petraeus directly.420 However, the military’s 
maneuvers, lack of progress in theater, McChrystal’s report, and public ambivalence 
about the state of Afghanistan had their effects on the policy process. Within days, the 
Obama administration prepared to initiate a new strategic review of the war. The players 
scrambled to consolidate and present their positions. Obama asked specific individuals to 
act as pillars for certain arguments.421 Others – including NSA Jones – thought the 
exercise was premature and complained “we’re about to change the strategy before 
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evaluating the product of the first decision.”422 NSA Jones also emphasized that 
procedure was the key to the review. He stressed, “every time you go outside the box – 
the National Security Council process – we lose.”423 This would be a mantra that Obama 
and the civilians would embrace throughout. 
The First Meeting and Start of Leaks 
 On Sunday 13 September sixteen advisors met in the Situation Room at the White 
House for the first strategy review meeting. What would be a highly methodical and 
publicly fought process began in secret; the meeting wasn’t initially made public.424 All 
NSC principals were in attendance except for CIA director Leon Panetta; General 
Petraeus was not invited, either.425 President Obama read McChrystal’s full 66-page 
report before the meeting and noted that it offered no easy options going forward.  
After an extended intelligence briefing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, President 
Obama made a number of clear points. He emphasized his desire for “a consensus about 
the essential facts on the ground.”426 From there he initiated discussion on a series of 
fundamental questions about the war. His hope was to identify any assumptions that were 
going unchallenged. Admiral Mullen was tasked to present a briefing on McChrystal’s 
report and the status of Afghanistan both tactically and strategically. President Obama 
then opened the table for what amounted to opening statements from the principals. Most 
of the attendees spent time presenting their opinions about the strategy review. 
Broadly speaking the principal players were firm in their positions and had 
consolidated their arguments. President Obama campaigned at length about the war’s 
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necessity; he said that he would refocus the campaign and assure strategic victory. 
However, he and his closest advisors were inclined to find their way towards the exits as 
soon as possible. In their eyes the war in Afghanistan was a drain on blood and treasure. 
It also acted as a political distraction to a variety of domestic priorities. NSA Jones, 
meanwhile, found Obama’s close advisors to be abrasive, relatively unchallenged by 
Obama, and too influential. Jones was particularly skeptical of Rahm Emanuel, David 
Axelrod, Robert Gibbs, Denis McDonough, and Mark Lippert; the national security 
advisor had dubbed them “the water bugs,” the “politburo,” and the “mafia.”427 This 
tension would present itself during various points of the NSC’s strategy review. 
Vice President Biden was extremely skeptical of the military leadership’s 
inclination to escalate. He was also quite pessimistic of what could be accomplished. 
Biden was quite experienced in foreign policy. As such, he and his national security team 
created an argument for amplified counter-terror operations that they called “CT-plus.”428 
The vice president also thought that the United States’ strategic focus should remain on 
Al Qaeda and, by extension, Pakistan.  
Secretary Gates had, by this point, come to agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
chairman’s and the combat commander’s assessment of Afghanistan. As a relatively 
quiet yet remarkably experienced and influential cabinet member, he compelled the 
group to consider McChrystal’s recommendation.429 Secretary Clinton, meanwhile, was 
in the middle of a pivot that would eventually put her in alliance with the secretary of 
defense. She would come to heartily support versions of a surge that employed COIN and 
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were – for the most part – what Gates was also promoting.430 General Petraeus, 
meanwhile, was fully supportive of McChrystal’s report, troop request, and the continued 
implementation of COIN theory.431 
General Lute, who was in attendance, briefed Petraeus the next day on the 
meeting. They both believed that Admiral Mullen was fully supportive of McChrystal’s 
recommendations and that Secretary Gates was shifting solidly to their positions, as 
well.432 That same day, meanwhile, Senators Graham, Lieberman, and McCain published 
an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal where they strongly supported escalation and 
“decisive force” in Afghanistan. It was a jab at Obama’s current course and an 
endorsement – however direct or incidental – of the military’s position. What’s more, 
McChrystal contacted them prior to the publishing and told them he preferred seven to 
eight additional brigades. It was a clear power play by elements of the Pentagon.433  
A week later there was uproar at the White House when the Washington Post 
published a leaked copy of McChrystal’s report. The civilians were certain that the 
military leaked the document, since its dire language and explicit recommendations for 
escalation were right in line with their positions.434 Obama and his civilian advisors 
threatened to fire whoever leaked the document, if the perpetrator was identified.435 It 
was a stark moment in which, as Obama would later admit in an interview, the president 
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realized how intense the policy fight would be. He also recognized how important it was 
that he and the NSC keep everyone on the same page throughout the strategic review. 
Formal Troop Request, Continued Posturing, and Public Maneuvers Come to a Head 
 On 25 September Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus flew secretly to Germany 
to receive General McChrystal’s formal request for troops.436 During their meeting the 
top tier officers had a four-hour discussion about the war, the contents of McChrystal’s 
report, and his troop request. The document was in paper form only and there were less 
than twenty copies in existence. Upon Mullen and Petraeus’s return to the United States 
the CENTCOM commander presented copies to Secretary Gates; the military would 
review the request before the president and his staffers got to view it. McChrystal’s 
request included three options: eighty thousand troops and a fully resourced COIN 
campaign, forty thousand troops in a COIN-style surge focusing on south and eastern 
Taliban strongholds, or ten to fifteen thousand troops to train Afghan forces and protect 
US bases. 
 On 29 September NSA Jones held a “rehearsal” principals meeting without 
President Obama. In what would become a routine prior to the main review sessions, the 
national security advisor asked all contributors to present their material. The goal was to 
hash out an itinerary, smooth over any confusion or contention, and to save the most 
necessary exchanges for the president.437 During the discussion it was clear that a 
concrete definition of objectives did not exist. Meanwhile, the press was already 
reporting on McChrystal’s troop request and the principals were going off of media 
reports just as much as they were relying on the documents in front of them. 
                                               
436 Baker, Peter. "How Obama Came to Plan for 'Surge' in Afghanistan." pg. 4. 
437 Woodward, Bob. Obama’s Wars. pg. 185. 
186 
 
 The next afternoon, on Wednesday 30 September, President Obama presided over 
the second strategic review session. The president emphasized – as he did earlier – that 
complete withdrawal was not on the table.438 However, he also stressed the need to define 
the national security benefit of being in Afghanistan. His challenges to the riding 
assumptions of the war concerned Petraeus and other military officers. Obama also 
pivoted the conversation so that they considered the homeland and the war’s impact on 
security within the nation’s borders. This conversation allowed Biden and other civilians’ 
opinions to shine. That is, since the fighting had significantly impacted Al Qaeda’s 
strength and strike capabilities, there was less reason to escalate in theater.  
Through the first one and three quarter hours of the meeting Secretary Gates did 
not speak. When the president asked for his opinion, the secretary recommended 
broadening the focus beyond the homeland.439 He suggested that the strategic 
environment, the nation’s allies, and – ultimately – the United States’ well-being would 
be damaged if such a narrow focus was taken. He also said that Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
were too closely linked to separate them in the discussion. Between this and Petraeus’s 
push back against Biden’s minimalist position, the military was firmly campaigning for a 
ramp up in operations. The CENTCOM commander was openly concerned that the focus 
on Al Qaeda, Pakistan, drones, and counter terror would detract from the necessary path 
to victory. 
At meetings end the president asked Gates to supply him with a copy of 
McChrystal’s troop request.440 It can be assumed that it was at this point that Obama first 
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read the combat commander’s official request for forty thousand more troops. The next 
day – 1 October – McChrystal spoke during an event at London’s International Institute 
for Strategic Studies.441 During the question and answer period he responded to a 
question about the viability of a scaled back campaign. When asked if such a tempered 
operation would succeed, the general responded flatly: “The short answer is: No.”442  
McChrystal’s words immediately enraged and panicked civilians in the White 
House. The answer ambushed the president in the middle of a strategy review and boxed 
in his options. Obama’s appointed general was curtly dismissing a significant range of 
options on Afghanistan. He was also doing so publicly. There is evidence, meanwhile, 
that the gaff was unintentional. McChrystal immediately apologized, acknowledged that 
he made a serious error, and volunteered to withdraw from public eye for the time being. 
Petraeus passed word of these sentiments to Gates, who passed them on to Obama.443 
The president was already on his way to Denmark when news broke of 
McChrystal’s statements. He decided to meet with his combat commander immediately. 
McChrystal was called to Copenhagen and met with President Obama for twenty-five 
minutes. The meeting took place aboard Air Force One while it waited on a tarmac.444 
From multiple accounts the meeting was formal. General McChrystal made sure to state 
that while he stood by his report and request, he would do whatever was ordered of him 
by the commander in chief.  
The immediate tension between civilians and soldiers appeared to subside 
quickly. However, President Obama shared his great consternation with close civilian 
                                               
441 Alter, Jonathan. The Promise. pg. 378. 
442 Woodward, Bob. Obama’s Wars. pg. 194. 
443 Ibid. pg. 194. 
444 Alter, Jonathan. The Promise. pg. 378. 
188 
 
advisors, including Emanuel and Axelrod. He saved his most passionate complaints for 
Donilon.445 The president also made sure that there would be follow through after the 
high frequency of leaks, bullish military actions, and overt attempts to compel civilian 
policy makers. Within days of the Air Force One meeting Obama called Secretary Gates 
and Admiral Mullen to the Oval Office. There, the president dressed down the secretary 
of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Showing a level of emotion that the stoic 
president rarely unleashed, Obama reprimanded the two men for the military’s leaks, 
politicking, and posturing. He said he was “exceedingly unhappy” with how the Pentagon 
was acting and said it was “disrespectful of the process” and “damaging” to every person 
in uniform.446  
The meeting was a cold one. It also represented one of the tensest moments in 
civil-military relations during the Obama presidency. Admiral Mullen was personally 
affected by the events as well as Obama’s critique of their impacts on the balance of 
power. As a career military officer who greatly respected civilian oversight, he was 
offended by the charges and was adamant that such actions would cease. On 5 October 
Secretary Gates gave a speech at the Association of the US Army. In it he emphasized 
the importance of military advice that is given “candidly but privately.”447 The theme of 
healthy civil-military relationship was woven through the speech.  
It is clear that the president’s reaction to McChrystal’s comments was swift, 
comprehensive, and highly influential. The frequency of news articles quoting military 
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and civilian sources alike decreased in the following weeks.448 Secretary Gates became 
more engaged in monitoring the Pentagon’s public profile. Furthermore, Admiral Mullen 
and vice chairman General Cartwright stopped shopping McChrystal’s request; they also 
asked General Petraeus to keep CENTCOM quiet.449  
The Review Muddles On 
Throughout this period of significant civil-military tension the Afghanistan 
strategy review meetings continued at the deputy and principal levels. During the first ten 
days of October there were hours of meetings held by NSA Jones. Although 
McChrystal’s report was well studied and his troop request was common knowledge, 
many of the meetings held by civilian policymakers were still focusing on the conflict’s 
riding assumptions.  
For example, Jones held one of his “rehearsal” meetings with the principals on 5 
October. During the discussions a debate ensued about whom to engage, who the real 
enemy was, and what the delineation was between Al Qaeda and the Taliban.450 These 
discussions concerned Petraeus and other military officers, since they challenged the 
fundamental bases of the war. The nature of the discussions also hindered the officers’ 
influence, in a way, since the concepts were more about nebulous policy points rather 
than tactical or strategic planning. 
It was at this time that evidence suggests Clinton’s pivot to Gates’ position was 
completed. One evening in early October the two secretaries had dinner after a public 
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event in Foggy Bottom.451 After that meeting their positions in and out of the review 
sessions were most similar. As the heads of both the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense came to agree and campaign together, they greatly amplified the 
push for McChrystal’s request. Conversely, the civilians who were against McChrystal’s 
plan had a very difficult time uniting under one banner. 
Some of Obama’s closest advisors were against a COIN-style surge. Rahm 
Emanuel, David Axelrod, and Denis McDonough were among these figures.452 
Furthermore, Ambassador Eikenberry, Vice President Biden, Richard Holbrooke, 
Ambassador Rice, and NSA Jones were either skeptical or outright against the military’s 
plan. However, significant differences of opinion – but more importantly, personal 
quarrels – hindered this group’s ability to consolidate and effectively influence the 
strategy review. Specifically, there was a great amount of tension between Vice President 
Biden and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke. Likewise, a resentment of 
Holbrooke permeated the NSC and hindered his influence.453 The tensions within the 
anti-McChrystal group leads one to question how much the division hindered the 
opposing position. 
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Alternate Options are Requested 
 On 7 October NSA Jones welcomed Clinton and Gates to his office. The national 
security advisor notified them that the president was displeased that the NSC had not yet 
defined the nation’s interests in Afghanistan.454 On the same day, Obama met with 
advisors for a three-hour discussion on Pakistan. The meeting included intelligence 
briefings, policy discussions, as well as principals and deputies recommendations.455  
 Two days later the fourth strategy review was held in the Situation Room of the 
White House. It was at this 9 October meeting that the NSC – as a whole – reviewed 
McChrystal’s troop requests for the first time.456 Only the highest deputies, advisors, and 
principals were present in the meeting; this was mainly due to the secrecy of the details. 
General Petraeus flew in from New York for the meeting while McChrystal, Ambassador 
Eikenberry, and Ambassador Patterson video-conferenced in from abroad.457 
McChrystal’s request basically outlined standard COIN theory and even followed some 
of its better-known equations, including troop to civilian ratios and stock timelines.458 
After the combat commander had a chance to present his thirty-minute presentation on 
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Afghanistan’s status and his recommendations, the discussions ensued. President Obama 
again requested everyone’s opinion and went around the room.   
  It was during this strategy review meeting that the most contested exchanges 
began. President Obama directly questioned various aspects of the troop request and what 
the military was stating. He was openly critical of McChrystal’s numbers, saying that 
there were not three choices in his request but, rather, a single option buttresses by two 
absurd ones. He also challenged the “ink blot” map of anticipated troop deployments. In 
the president’s opinion the plan had dismal troop coverage in the country and tried to 
satisfy COIN theory rather than creatively adapt to the threat environment.459 While he 
found the eventual plan satisfactory, he emphasized the need for significant revision and 
adaptation. 
Biden adamantly rebutted a call for COIN and tried to compel Eikenberry to give 
his far more pessimistic, tempered opinion. The vice president was passionately against 
escalation, consistently campaigning for his “CT-plus” idea; he was borderline 
belligerent during some exchanges. His challenges to the generals were more vociferous 
than the president’s. Meanwhile, Secretary Clinton expressed positions that were 
increasingly hawkish, in line with Gates’, and melding around McChrystal’s primary 
troop request. 
Throughout the meeting Secretary Gates expressed concern that they were 
focusing too much on terminology and not identifying actual resources, capabilities, and 
realistic goals.460 In short, they were not adequately engaging with and adapting to the 
Afghan theater. His opinion was that they were getting ahead of themselves and still 
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needed to firmly define what victory would be and to what extent it involved actually 
neutralizing the Taliban. Perhaps significantly, Petraeus indicated in his notes that he 
agreed with Gates; defeating the Taliban was both unrealistic and a poor goal to set.461 As 
such, the CENTCOM commander, secretary of defense, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
consolidated their positions around the combat commander’s recommendations. Their 
influence was amplifying.  
Retired General Douglas Lute, serving as a special adviser for the NSC, was 
inclined toward the vice president’s argument for amplified counterterrorism in 
Afghanistan. He was part of the minority opinion at this point and was exceptional 
because of his military background. Lute encouraged Biden to request a formal proposal 
of numbers and operational capability from the Pentagon. Vice Chairman Cartwright 
acknowledged the request and told him it would be provided, as it was their job to supply 
the civilian policy makers with relevant information.462  
Admiral Mullen, meanwhile, detested the “CT plus” option and refused to allow 
the plan to leave the Pentagon; he’s quoted as having said, “We’re not providing that.”463 
Cartwright immediately pushed back and, in so doing, tension developed rapidly within 
military circles. To date the top tier of military leadership was essentially united in its 
assessment and its recommendation; it was consistently falling in line with McChrystal’s 
opinions. However, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs was unwilling to abridge any 
information provided to the civilian policy makers. For this reason, a conflict began to 
brew. 
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NSA Jones was in agreement that the hybrid, “CT plus” option should be 
presented to the president, if for no other reason than to contextualize McChrystal’s 
request. When Cartwright received continued pressure from his superiors in the 
Pentagon, the vice chairman and national security advisor spoke for well over an hour to 
determine how to best decrease tension while also presenting all available options to the 
president.464  
Open Rancor in the Strategy Review Meeting 
 In the morning of Wednesday 14 October, President Obama met again with the 
National Security Council to discuss Afghanistan. The meeting occurred one day after a 
highly contentious “rehearsal” meeting during which arguments arose regarding how 
much civilians should augment any troop surge.465 The Wednesday meeting focused 
primarily on the Afghan government and how realistic it was to work towards a less 
corrupt regime. Towards the end of the meeting, however, President Obama directed 
questioning to General Petraeus. Earlier, the commander in chief had asked the 
CENTCOM commander for a briefing on possible similarities between Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Obama’s intention was to find opportunities towards reconciliation in the 
latter campaign.466 Secretary Gates approved the measure. 
 When Petraeus began distributing a memo to the principals, however, Admiral 
Mullen became visibly surprised and agitated. He asked the general what the memo 
contained; the chairman had not seen it prior to the meeting. Secretary Gates remained 
stoic throughout the entire exchange, even as Admiral Mullen passed a note to General 
Petraeus, who meditated on its contents for a few moments. The CENTCOM commander 
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then said to the group, “I’d like to withdraw this memo. Could everyone give it back to 
me?”467 When he finished collecting all the copies that were returned to him, Petraeus 
went on to give a verbal briefing on the issue. 
 The exchange flummoxed many in the room. In that moment an intra-military 
power struggle played out feet from the president’s eyes. The chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs compelled a general to defy the president’s direct request for information. The 
exchange was remarkably tense but President Obama did nothing to intercede. The 
meeting went on and at meeting’s end the president said, “At the next meeting, we need 
to move towards options and decisions.”468 After a month’s worth of briefings, 
conceptual discussions, leaks, power plays, and requests, the president compelled a shift 
from review to explicit planning. 
Decision-making Begins 
 That afternoon, on the same day as the fifth strategy review meeting with Obama, 
the Pentagon held a war game called Poignant Vision. The four-hour exercise was meant 
to test various scenarios and contingency plans associated with McChrystal’s report. 
There were wildly varying opinions on the relevance of the exercise. General Petraeus 
and Admiral Mullen thought it was not useful because COIN, by definition, is influenced 
by myriad social variables that can’t be anticipated in a war game. General Lute refused 
to participate on behalf of the NSC because he was certain that the military would tow its 
line regardless of what occurred.469 Some players who participated – including assets 
from the State Department and Director of National Intelligence’s office – found it to be 
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useful. However, despite interest from DNI Blair and others to continue the exercise, no 
follow up was planned and it became a singular moment.  
 With all the tension, leaks, and campaigning occurring vis-à-vis the military, 
President Obama asked his civilian advisers to meet with him on 26 October; he wanted 
to hear their “bottom-line recommendations” without uniformed officers in the room.470 
Four days earlier the NSC had published a “consensus memo” that suggested lower 
expectations and strategic goals in Afghanistan. By stating that diminishing – rather than 
destroying – the Taliban should be the end point, it echoed a point repeatedly made by 
Secretary Gates. It was assumed that the memo came the Department of State.471  
 Many of the president’s closest advisors were not present at the meeting; it was 
reserved for the highest levels of civilian leadership. As such, Axelrod, McDonough, 
Gibbs, and Lute were not present. During the meeting, President Obama pressed 
Secretaries Gates and Clinton for their full and honest opinions. He further asked them 
for recommendations on firm troop levels. Both cabinet level advisors indicated that they 
supported numbers around what McChrystal requested.472 Gates said he didn’t disagree 
with the president’s statements and sentiments; he went further to say that that some of 
McChrystal’s recommendations were not realistic or necessary. He also said that while 
he agreed with the general’s troop request, he believed that the fourth brigade should be 
held back – in the near term – for assessment.473The president told those in attendance 
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that he wanted to make his decision prior to a planned trip to Asia, two weeks away. He 
also intended to make a public announcement after he returned.474  
However, there was still plenty to decide and Obama was clearly dissatisfied with 
the options before him. Peter Orszag, director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), had projected that war costs – per McChrystal’s report and the general’s 
recommendation – would be far more than what the president was willing to approve.475 
What’s more, the combat commander’s report was devoid of international support and 
shared responsibilities. Conversely, President Obama intended to have allied forces 
augment the plan. He also wanted to decide roughly 12-18 months’ worth of strategy and 
then make another reassessment. Ultimately, the president said, “I want an exit 
strategy.”476 
The next day NSA Jones sent a formal tasking memo to Secretary Gates on behalf 
of President Obama. The document asked Gates to develop a plan for the president that 
would describe how to deploy troops faster than currently estimated.477 The request was 
meant to challenge the military’s current planning, compel a more aggressive time table, 
and force the Pentagon to give explicit details of its planning. It was a key moment of 
subjective civilian pushback that was executed through the NSC. Meanwhile, on Friday 
30 October the president welcomed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the White House for a 
meeting. Generals Petraeus and McChrystal were not part of the meeting; Obama wanted 
to hear from another group of top-tier military officers directly.  
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The Marine Corps commandant, General Conway, told the president that he was 
against COIN theory and that his men were killers, not diplomats. The head of the Army, 
General Casey, emphasized the need for a quick transition over to Afghan rule; it was an 
argument he was pushing since his days commanding in Iraq. Meanwhile, the heads of 
the Air Force and Navy were relatively quiet and even deferential, noting that regardless 
of strategy their branches would be minimally impacted.478 The conversation was an 
open and healthy one, by all accounts. Admiral Mullen listened on as Generals Conway 
and Casey spoke against his position. The meeting afforded the Joint Chiefs of Staff the 
opportunity to advise the president in a way that had legal precedent but was exceptional 
in a world of regional commands and assertive offices of the defense secretary. It was 
also the first time in the three case studies that the service chiefs were asked their 
opinions intentionally rather than as an afterthought. 
 On the same day, meanwhile, Secretary Gates’ office submitted a two-page, 
secret memo to Obama. Its contents included the military’s response to the 27 October 
request for an alternative plan to McChrystal’s request. The plan lowered the troop 
numbers by five to ten thousand simply because, logistically, those numbers would not 
be able to deploy in a year. The plan also indicated international troop support and 
outlined decreased strategic goals.479 There was finally another option on the table, even 
if it was simply a slight revision of McChrystal’s original request. 
Eikenberry’s Memo, Civilian Push Back, and Off to Asia 
 In the first week of November Ambassador Eikenberry sent a cable from 
Afghanistan; it was promptly leaked. The Friday 6 November memo contained his very 
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pessimistic assessment of operations in the country. General Lute encouraged the 
ambassador to write out his concerns regarding the status quo as well as McChrystal’s 
recommendations and transmit them to the administration.480 Eikenberry wrote that the 
plan’s costs were untenable, US forces were shouldering too much of the burden, that 
Afghan dependency as well as Kharzai’s corruption were toxic, and that COIN would 
likely fail in Afghanistan.481 It was a damning document. It was also one that was 
championed by various members of the NSC and the vice president’s office.482  
 Military leadership was incensed about the memo’s leak and felt betrayed. The 
Pentagon was not notified about the drafting or submission of the memo. What’s more, 
the direct challenge to COIN was an affront to many of the top generals, since they were 
developers or enactors of the theory. The blowback was immediate; Petraeus, Mullen, 
and McChrystal were angered and multiple sources indicate that the civil-military 
relationship was shaken.483 Many in the top tier of the military leadership assumed that 
the memo was leaked to the press as retribution for previous leaks from the Department 
of Defense. It was a low moment of accusation and counter accusation. 
 Three days later, on 9 November, there was another principals meeting. The 
discussions focused on reviewing and revising McChrystal’s plan. Specifically, there was 
a good deal of conversation about – and challenges to – the general’s recommendation of 
training 400,000 Afghan forces. General Petraeus firmly pushed that number of 
combined troops and police. However, the president and his advisors thought the number 
was unrealistic, unnecessary, and the product of COIN equations rather than applied 
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analysis of the tactical environment.484 There was pushback from the president, the vice 
president, and even the defense secretary; the latter, Gates, had already made clear that 
the numbers were too high. Tensions were high and both sides were entrenched in their 
opinions. President Obama made his position clear when he stated, curtly, “This 
presentation strains credulity.”485 He then made clear he would not approve a plan like 
this. 
 On 11 November the strategy review group held its fifth formal group session. 
From the start, President Obama expressed anger at the frequent leaks. What set him off 
was not the Eikenberry memo but another leak from the Pentagon. That day’s Wall Street 
Journal was reporting that – according to a “senior military official” – the force option 
two, Tab A plan had been presented to the president.486 The president was not pleased 
that the leaks were on the rise, again. 
As the meeting developed, Admiral Mullen presented various mission plans and 
goals for troop deployments. When concerns were expressed about mission creep the 
president made clear that the strategic goal would be to “disrupt” the insurgency.487 He 
then went on to explicitly define the word “disrupt” and what it would entail for military 
operations. Obama was making it clear that he would hold the military accountable and 
expected them to execute his orders, nothing more. The president used some of the vice 
president’s arguments to emphasize where he was at, personally. Secretary Gates agreed 
with the president on the topics of process and timeline, though he went on to say that it 
was vital that policymakers determine firm definitions and assessment points throughout 
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the campaign. Gates clearly wanted quantifiable data and accountability. As such, this 
executive and cabinet level triumvirate was making the policy decision very clear to the 
military. 
Vice President Biden continued to push back on the military’s plan by presenting 
various points that Eikenberry raised in his memo. Biden also presented the hybrid, 
twenty thousand-troop option that he requested and Vice Chairman Cartwright pushed 
through despite Mullen’s judgment.488 Even some of the NSC civilian staff thought it was 
irresponsible to present a new option that late in the review process. What’s more, 
General Petraeus was angry that a minority report plan such as the hybrid would be 
presented at all. The CENTCOM commander gave an extended response to Biden’s 
points, noting numerous reasons why the hybrid option was not tenable. When the 
president asked him directly if the hybrid option was “not really a viable option,” the 
general said that it was not. With that, Obama deferred to Petraeus’s professional 
judgment and ended the discussions. Still, the civil-military parries continued.  
President Obama challenged the deployment timeline that was being quoted by 
the Pentagon. He found it unacceptable that the military needed 18 months to deploy the 
requested troop surge.489 The president asked the CENTCOM commander why the 
deployments would take so long when the Iraq surge took far less time. The ensuing 
discussion was curt; some civilian advisers found the general’s responses to be 
condescending while others found the president’s questions to be combative. It was a 
moment of highly subjective civil-military interrogative discussion.  
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When Petraeus described the differences from Iraq or why Afghanistan would 
take longer, Obama responded with his express expectations and challenges to military 
logistical support. The president wanted it done faster and his way. Obama laid out the 
budgetary costs and his unwillingness to approve such an open-ended, long timeline. 
Eventually, General Petraeus saw the writing on the wall and said that the military could 
deploy the requested troops under a six-month timetable.490  
Petraeus’s accommodation was a significant one. It assumed that the military 
could deploy a large amount of forces very rapidly to a region with little support 
infrastructure. The CENTCOM commander told the president that the military could do 
something for which a plan didn’t exist. Immediately after the meeting Petraeus called 
his command’s logistics team. He told them that he had “just written a check” and needed 
them “to help [him] cash it.”491 He ordered them to immediately draw up plans so that 
every aspect of a rapid deployment was anticipated. What was conceded to the president 
– a much faster deployment than the military was planning– needed to occur as promised. 
 After the meeting President Obama departed for his ten-day trip to Asia. The 
president reached out to Secretary Gates on the way overseas and reiterated his desires 
and the need to hold the military planners to them. Gates understood and 
acknowledged.492 President Obama also expressed continued frustration with the 
military, the lack of options, and their stalwart approach to civilian questioning. The 
president told his advisers that he was more than willing to use time – thus delaying his 
decision – in order to maintain control of the civil-military relationship. He was already 
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past his preferred deadline for a decision, as he was flying to Asia without arriving at a 
decision. 
Return and Rapid Decision-making 
 There was little review activity while President Obama toured Asia. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff released a revised chart regarding the trajectory of the war; this was done 
at the NSC’s request.493 There were also various discussions taking place within civilian 
and military circles. That being the case, few civil-military discussions took place. Upon 
the president’s return, however, the strategy continued in earnest. The following week 
became the highest velocity moment of the review. In the late evening of 23 November 
President Obama asked for an NSC meeting in the Situation Room; it was the group’s 
ninth strategy review session.494   
 At the start of the meeting the president promised a final decision within days. He 
then responded to a Gates memo created at the president’s request; it outlined six 
strategic goals for Afghanistan. President Obama outlined that which he did and did not 
agree. He made clear that he wanted tamped down goals vis-à-vis the Taliban and 
insurgents. He also said that they would not seek to build the 400,000 troops Afghan 
force that McChrystal outlined. The president then welcomed responses. Biden wrote a 
response document and, while he expressed his skepticism of the dominant positions, his 
comments were less argumentative than in previous meetings. Secretary Clinton, 
meanwhile, gave an extended speech supporting the surge, the troops numbers, the 
timeline, and the strategy that the president sought to enact.495  
                                               
493 Ibid. pg. 281-282. 
494 Alter, Jonathan. The Promise. pg. 388. 
495 Woodward, Bob. Obama’s Wars. pg. 290-292. 
204 
 
 The meeting was a rallying cry for Obama’s “Max Leverage” plan that called for 
slightly fewer troops and more delineated, bounded operational goals. Most significantly, 
it contained a timeline for withdrawal and began the pullout by July 2011.496 Gates 
recommended that the plan be approved quickly, thus allowing three brigades to be sent 
to Afghanistan immediately. Mullen – via videoconference from Geneva, Switzerland – 
also endorsed the plan, stressing the need for forces as soon as possible. He reiterated – in 
response to a comment from the president – that the military would not be asking for 
more troops. It would be the end of the discussion.  
Finally, General Petraeus stated that CENTCOM would support the president’s 
decision. Although Petraeus expressed skepticism about NATO forces’ fighting 
effectiveness, he was on board.497 Various levels of the top military leadership expressed 
support for the Max Leverage option. Support for the revised version of McChrystal’s 
original troop request mounted on both sides of the civil-military relationship. Although 
there were many qualified statements from the military – including concerns raised about 
force flexibility and leverage against Kharzai’s government – the plan appeared to be 
coalescing. 
Over the next week the decision-making process accelerated tremendously. The 
civilian policymakers did final outreach to confirm that all aspects of the plan would be 
supported by the military.498 On Wednesday 25 November President Obama met with 
various members of the NSC and his closest advisers. NSA Jones, Donilon, and 
McDonough were among those present. In the meeting the president told them that he 
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was “inclined to go with the 30,000” although his decision wasn’t final.499 However, he 
said that he expected all players – from the cabinet level to the military leadership, alike 
– to support the decision wholeheartedly. Donilon raised a number of issues that had yet 
to be resolved. These included an additional troop request originating from the Pentagon, 
in regards to 4,500 additional “enablers” and logistical support. The president responded 
angrily and said that he was done talking about more troops. His numbers would be final 
and that was that. It was a tense moment in what the president expected to be a merely 
formality of a meeting.  
Later that day, during his normally scheduled meeting with Secretary Gates in the 
Oval Office, President Obama let him know that the decision was made and it would be 
thirty thousand troops.500 NSA Jones and Vice Chairman Cartwright were also in 
attendance. When Gates mentioned the “enablers” request on his desk the president was 
extraordinarily curt as he shot down the option. It would be thirty thousand or nothing.  
On the day after Thanksgiving – Friday 27 November – the president held an 
NSC meeting in the Oval Office. As Obama’s national security team entered, the 
president expressed consternation at the fact that they were still deciding on things 
related to the strategy review.501 The Pentagon was still asking about the extra troops. 
What’s more, the military was now concerned that they wouldn’t be able to deploy the 
troops as fast as Petraeus had stated. Obama was livid at the pushback he was receiving 
from the Pentagon, especially when they had expressed support for the plan and also 
volunteered the deployment capabilities.502   
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Over the course of this meeting – which lasted until 9:15 at night – Obama’s 
national security advisor reached out to Admiral Mullen and other military officials 
multiple times to clarify their positions. The day was an extraordinarily tense one as the 
White House pushed back at the military’s new stances. The civilians refused the 
military’s attempt to assign particular units to the surge, since many of them were not yet 
deployable and would slow the surge.503 The president acknowledged that he was 
involving himself in some of the more minute details of the strategy, but he also felt as 
though he needed to, considering the military’s repeated challenges. 
After over eight hours of finagling Obama had his team wrote out an 
extraordinarily descript “terms sheet.” In it, the president laid out explicit detail of his 
orders, the new strategy, its limits, its timetable, and what would be permitted going 
forward. The document ultimately was six single-spaced pages in length.504 The sheet 
was meant to outline the limits of the president’s decision and the strategy going forward. 
Obama intended for all relevant players to sign it, as though it was a contract to which 
they would abide. 
Final Say as Orders are Given 
 On Saturday 28 November the president met with the core of his National 
Security Council, yet again. Secretaries Clinton and Gates as well as NSA Jones were not 
in attendance due to the Thanksgiving holiday; some of the president’s key political 
advisers were there, however. In the meeting Obama said that he had given his orders 
though, oddly, he also told his staff “the door is not closed.”505 The president then asked 
                                               
503 For example, NSA Jones told Admiral Mullen that the 101st Airborne Division could not be used in the 
surge since it would not be deployment ready until September 2010. Ibid. pg. 312. 
504 Ibid. pg. 315. 
505 Ibid. pg. 319. 
207 
 
for his advisors’ opinions on the strategy decision. Many of them were sharply critical of 
the decision, feeling as though the president was buckling to a plan that was against his 
positions. Donilon openly asked the president why he decided the way he did.506 
Regardless, it appears Obama was unwavering and went forward with the plan. 
 While President Obama allowed for his staff’s rehashing of the decision after 
Friday’s NSC marathon, he did not allow Vice President Biden to make one last 
argument. When the president phoned Biden and told him he wanted a meeting on 
Sunday, the vice president asked to meet with Obama before said event. The president 
said it wasn’t necessary.507 Obama was done hearing options. It was time to enact the 
plan. 
 At 5pm on Sunday 29 November the president distributed his six-page orders 
sheet to Biden, Gates, Mullen, Cartwright, and Petraeus.508 NSA Jones and Rahm 
Emanuel were also in attendance. President Obama allowed everyone to read the 
document and then described his expectations going forward. He made it clear that the 
mission was altered and narrower. He also made clear how he defined key concepts and 
what theories to avoid when enacting the new strategy. He repeated to General Petraeus, 
“Do not occupy what you cannot transfer” multiple times. President Obama demanded 
assurances from the military leadership that the 18-month timeline could be enacted. He 
also went around the room in order to receive direct agreement from the officers. All 
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those present agreed with his plan and assured their full support. He ended the meeting 
by explicitly stating, “and that’s my order.”509 
For months Obama had battled an obstinate military leadership. He had responded 
to end runs, ambiguity, and reticence by manipulating the decision timeline, openly 
confronting the military’s positions, and demanding revisions. Ultimately the civil-
military relationship pivoted back towards a more subjective, albeit more contested and 
openly argumentative, state.  The civilians were in control even when the military 
boisterously used its professional influence. However, it’s important to note – as General 
Petraeus did in his 29 November notes – that the military was receiving just about 
everything that it had requested.510  
Analysis 
The 2009 AfPak strategy review contained the most contentious debates and 
overtly tense civil-military relationship of the three case studies. The most avenues of 
communication were used, the NSC was most active, and the most players participated. 
Under President Obama’s engaged leadership the national security process was highly 
delineated, procedures were coveted, open debate was encouraged, and tension was not 
avoided. Simultaneously, loyalty and cooperation was expected from all players. 
The civil-military relationship was in flux throughout this third case study. The 
primary reason for the momentum shift was the White House and National Security 
Council’s systemic effort to repossess and consolidate control over national security 
discussions. The military recognized the change and did not acquiesce quietly. The 
Pentagon attempted to maintain its influence through various actions, including end-runs. 
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The military edited the options it presented to civilians, openly defended its domain, and 
leaked information to both the press as well as officials outside of the principal-level 
leadership.  
Throughout the strategy review President Obama dictated the tempo of decision-
making. He used his authority such that the timbre and tempo of the review modulated to 
his benefit. The president placed himself at the center of the decision making process and 
made sure the NSC process reflected his leadership preferences. His NSC and national 
security advisor used their re-anointed power to moderate the process. NSA Jones had his 
own opinion about the process and the options on the president’s desk. Nevertheless, he 
acted as custodian, rather than adviser, throughout the process. All of this led to a civil-
military relationship that was a theoretically purer form of subjective civil-military 
control than those preceding it. It also produced an NSC leadership model that was far 
more formalized and custodial.  
While the previous case studies reveal a great deal of subjective civilian 
influence, there had been a significant amount of deference given to the military. Civilian 
policy makers made it a habit of co-opting military voices that agreed with their 
positions. This maneuver legitimized their arguments and allowed them to enact their will 
when engaging with military professionals who had tremendous professional credibility, 
influence, and power. 
Conversely, in this case study the president used his rank – as commander in chief 
– and the calendar in order to bend the military professionals’ influence. Ultimately, 
Obama decided on a plan that was closer to the military’s recommendations than his own 
starting point. However, Obama’s emphasis on process and his determined effort to 
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enforce subjective military control led to a decision on his terms. His process method and 
the structural changes therein were as significant as the decisions that were made.  
From the beginning of the case, President Obama established efforts to 
reinvigorate an NSC that was less engaged under the previous administration. 
Presidential Directive 1 established a structural change that would elevate the NSC, put it 
at the epicenter of national security discussions, and imbue the quote of Deputy National 
Security Advisor Denis McDonough, “regular order is your friend.” This would prove to 
be significant when the formal strategy review of late summer/early fall commenced. The 
initial review, however, was abbreviated and outsourced in many ways.  
The inefficacy of the Riedel review and the deteriorating state of Afghanistan 
made a larger review inevitable. When that time came, the civil-military relationship was 
tense. Specifically, the White House staff and NSC were consistently challenging their 
military counterparts. Deputy NSA Donilon was particularly vociferous with his critiques 
of the military’s output. This created tension and ill-will; it also indicated the deep 
skepticism each side had for the other. This did not mean that civil-military relations 
were overly caustic or ineffectual. Significant collaboration occurred regularly. The best 
example is Admiral Mullen’s and Secretary Gates’ efforts to replace the combat 
commander, General McKiernan. Without cooperation this rare moment would not have 
happened. 
The replacement of General McKiernan with General McChrystal did have its 
tense moments, however. The former told his superiors he refused to resign; they were 
forced to fire him. Replacing a combat commander for the first time since the Korean 
War apparently emboldened the remaining officer corps. Since lightning was unlikely to 
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strike twice, the top military leaders felt as though they were more secure in their 
positions.  
General McChrystal’s opinions and ineloquent public persona immediately 
presented issues for civilian policymakers. President Obama outkicked his coverage 
when, enacting Secretary Gates’ suggestion, he ordered the general to write a 
commander’s report about the situation in Afghanistan. The task was intended to punt 
any policy discussion and keep McChrystal out of the public sphere for a time. In 
actuality, the civilians failed to frame the purview of the report. This allowed the combat 
commander to define the contents and breadth of the exercise. What the general authored 
was wide ranging, unsettling, and urgent. It ultimately pushed the national security 
apparatus towards a comprehensive strategy review.  
The effects of McChrystal’s report and his force request were significant. 
Ironically, the White House and President Obama’s staff were attempting to ebb the tide 
of such influence. Many of the president’s closest advisers believed that combat 
commanders were given too much access and influence during the previous 
administration. The frequency of video-conferences had decreased and the circle of 
officers with direct access to the NSC was limited. Regardless, McChrystal’s efforts 
proved catalytic within the civil-military relationship. 
President Obama, NSA Jones, and the NSC staff adamantly enforced a delineated, 
highly procedural review process. Jones urged, “Every time you go outside the box – the 
National Security Council process – we lose.” That quote epitomized President Obama’s 
goal with the strategic review; he demanded deliberate and confidential methods. 
However, once the formal strategy review began the amount of end-runs increased. 
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General Petraeus contacted Republican-connected editorialists and GOP Senator Lindsey 
Graham. Admiral Mullen and Rahm Emanuel also contacted the latter legislator in efforts 
to frame the process that was underway.  
Obama and his custodians monitored the leaks and publicly chastened all 
participants when information made its way to the press. However, the president 
appeared more concerned about leaks coming from the military. He and his staff 
perceived those leaks as challenges to civilian authority. The president’s advisers were 
very concerned that the Pentagon would box in the White House. This caused a good deal 
of tension and exacerbated the relationship between various civilian policymakers and the 
generals. 
President Obama’s staff sought to quiet the military’s voices many times. It also 
tried to decrease the number of voices coming from the Pentagon; there were efforts to 
channel all releases through the OSD or Pentagon’s press office. President Obama 
expressed increasing willingness to more aggressively engage the military. His appraisal 
of the civil-military relationship changed over the course of the case study.  
In early October the commander-in-chief firmly asserted himself when General 
McChrystal’s public statements in London proved caustic to the civil-military 
relationship. After meeting with the combat commander he called his defense secretary 
and chairman of the Joint Chiefs into the Oval Office. That meeting was a watershed 
moment. President Obama reprimanded his top civilian and military leaders, telling them 
that the Pentagon’s leaks and posturing were damaging the process as well as relations as 
a whole. After that meeting numerous public statements by the principal-level leadership 
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made it clear that the message had been received. Additionally, leaks dropped 
significantly as the military pulled back on its publicity. 
Over the next six to eight weeks dozens of deputy and principal-level meetings 
were held. Focus turned inward as discussions continued about the assumptions, goals, 
and plans related to Afghanistan. The military’s position was stable – if not recalcitrant – 
throughout this period. It continued to present McChrystal’s initial options despite 
indications from the president that they were not sufficient. The Joint Chiefs, regional 
command, combat commanders, and OSD shared the same position. Conversely, 
positions changed and posturing occurred on the civilian side. 
Secretary Gates was quite influential and respected throughout the process. 
President Obama went out of his way to elicit his positions. The defense secretary tended 
to support the military’s position but was also pragmatic in his assertion of what could or 
should be ordered. On a number of occasions he sought to divert the strategy review back 
when discussions were tangential. He proved to be a moderating and highly experienced 
voice in the process. Secretary Gates also mediated positions on both sides of the civil-
military relationship; he tended to translate and transpose positions so as to enable 
agreement. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, pivoted to Secretary Gates’ 
position over the course of the fall. She eventually adopted his approach after initially 
expressing skepticism over it. Her initial argument put her closer to Vice President 
Biden’s camp; he towed an unpopular and controversial line that garnered contempt from 
the Pentagon. When Secretary Clinton endorsed the strategy change espoused by 
Secretary Gates she amplified her voice and standing within the policy discussions. 
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Inversely, Biden, Holbrooke, key Obama advisers, and others were firmly against 
escalation. However, for a variety of reasons, they were unable to consolidate their 
argument into a persuasive response to the Pentagon. The strategy discussion engaged 
their opinions but there is no evidence they ever posed a challenge. 
McChrystal’s report continued to be the foundation of the strategy review, despite 
the president’s preferences, his wish for more options, or the amount of civilian 
skepticism. This does not mean, however, that the Pentagon’s positions were not 
interrogated or challenged. President Obama aggressively challenged the combat 
commander’s requests, even saying that what was being presented “strained credulity.” 
The president’s most insistent questioning was directed at CENTCOM commander 
General Petraeus. Tension was palpable throughout and source material shows that 
various military officials viewed aspects of the review with contempt. 
One of the tensest and most objective civil-military interactions occurred when 
President Obama asked General Petraeus to present a report to the NSC. The chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff – unaware of the request – suppressed the president’s request 
during a NSC meeting. It was a significant moment; civilians who witnessed it were 
aghast. Admiral Mullen had previously attempted to suppress options coming from the 
Pentagon after President Obama requested them. General Cartwright overrode the 
admiral’s preference and included them anyways. However, the chairman succeeded in 
censoring the military’s position at this and other moments. 
In order to force an expansion of the military’s options President Obama 
requested – via his national security advisor – that the OSD draw up an augmented plan 
with an accelerated deployment timetable. The president’s dissatisfaction with 
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McChrystal’s timeline was minimized by the new option that Secretary Gates submitted. 
It soon became the preferred plan of the president. It also became a leverage point for 
civilian control over the military’s positions. 
General Petraeus and other military professionals insisted that the aggressive 
timeline was not feasible. Despite deferring to the general’s professional judgment in the 
past – most notably when Petraeus insisted Biden’s hybrid option was not viable – 
President Obama pushed back aggressively on this point. The CENTCOM commander 
eventually acquiesced though he initially conceded a point that was not developed by the 
military. He and his staff scrambled to make tenable what he had already promised the 
commander-in-chief. It was another significant moment – this time, of subjective civil-
military relations – during a consistently arduous review process. 
The final week of the strategy review gained momentum quickly. A tremendous 
amount of topics had been covered during the nine strategy review sessions. A substantial 
volume of reports and plans had been reviewed. The military had succeeded in presenting 
McChrystal’s middle option as the most viable course of action. However, President 
Obama and his staff slowed the process and engaged in aggressive questioning in order to 
analyze and alter what was being presented. During the final week – Thanksgiving 2009 
– President Obama held numerous meetings with his civilian advisers, many military 
officials, and various other national security assets. He diligently wrote out a terms sheet 
that explicitly listed all aspects of his coming orders: goals, purview, timetable, and 
actionable items. 
President Obama asserted himself most aggressively when it came to the final 
decision. By his own admission the terms sheet was far more in depth than was necessary 
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or even ideal. However, the president’s explicit orders did not stop the military from 
asking for additional troops, time, or flexibility. This was after the president stated that 
his decision was final. He held his line and threatened to rescind his order if the Pentagon 
did not accept what he ordered. When President Obama delivered the orders during the 
final NSC meeting, he emphasized the letter and the spirit of what he was approving. He 
repeatedly stated the orders, their goals, and the limits to the campaign. 
The civil-military relationship in this case was the most overtly contentious of the 
three. Both sides engaged in the most end runs, engagement with the press, and outreach 
to officials outside of the national security apparatus. A power struggle occurred 
throughout the strategy review as the White House and NSC sought to reassert itself 
against the military. The combat commanders, CENTCOM, and chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs were unified throughout a vast majority of the process. The civilians, meanwhile, 
held multiple positions; the power balance within the policymakers’ circle was fluid. 
It would be incorrect to perceive the power struggle as a sign of dysfunctional 
civil-military relations, however. In this author’s opinion the increased tensions was born 
out of the shift in influence back to the National Security Council. For many years the 
military possessed heightened authority and significant autonomy during the execution of 
operations. While civil-military relations was subjective in the prior two cases, the 
civilians intentionally augmented their positions with military voices in the pursuit of 
equivalency. In this case study, however, the civilian policymakers maintained subjective 
control by asserting control over the process, procedure, and timeline of the decision-
making process.  
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Calendar manipulation was used in the first case. In the former case, calendar 
manipulation was used to hasten the planning process. However, in this case the decision-
making timeline was manipulated in order to inhibit the military’s bargaining position. In 
this case study the president elongated the review process in order to distance himself 
from politically volatile moments. This stunted the resonance of the military’s 
maneuvers. As mentioned above, the ultimate decision was closer to the military’s 
starting position (read: McChrystal’s report and request) than most of the civilian 
positions. However, the ultimate decision included subtle yet significant changes to the 
military’s changes. The troop number cap, timetable, and explicitly limited mission were 
all aspects that were imparted upon the military against its wishes. 
Furthermore, this author found the relationship to be moderately subjective and 
more theoretically pure because of the civilian’s actions throughout the process; they 
defended themselves from objective pushes and then maintained the process through 
NSC procedures. National Security Advisor Jones was integral in enforcing Presidential 
Directive 1, the resurgence of the NSC’s authority, and the procedural dynamics of the 
Afghan strategy review. Throughout the case he was the custodian of the process. His 
deputies and NSC staff were at times recalcitrant. However, he and his system sought to 
enforce a set of transparent, established review procedures. Many examples show his and 
the NSC’s success in shepherding the process, communicating the will of the president, 
and choreographing all levels of leadership that were involved. Perhaps most importantly, 
NSA Jones did not staff the president or let his opinions known throughout the process. 
He was the gatekeeper, first and foremost.  
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Chapter Six 
Analysis 
 
 In this thesis we have studied civil-military relations at the civilian-principal/top 
military leadership level during three historical moments of strategic planning. In all 
three cases there were many variables and numerous agents. Presidential leadership and 
process organization were the two most significant variables at play. With each case we 
have analyzed the concept of subjective civil-military relations and tried to determine its 
characteristics. Now, we have the opportunity to analyze how all these cases are informed 
by and respond to the political science literature, in order to examine the unique trends 
and typologies that arise from this project.  
 The foundation of this thesis and its governing theories has been explored earlier 
in this work. In framing the inquiry it is important it examine the scenarios – or 
theoretical problems – that are at hand. In order to do so, the author explores the 
characteristics of subjective civil-military relations when a number of specific conditions 
are present. If all the conditions exist, the cases relate to the thesis and the analysis 
therein. 
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First, a strategic problem must exist within national security.511 Second, there 
must be willingness by civilian policy makers to examine the problem, engage in 
planning/review, and implement their decisions. Third, there must be a consensus that 
military assets and operations will constitute the primary tools for achieving the ultimate 
goals.512 Fourth, a plurality of principal level communication must occur primarily with, 
through, or in spite of the NSC.  
All four of these conditions exist in this thesis’s three case studies. As such, the 
cases are best inclined to illuminate the types of subjective civil-military relations at key 
moments during the past twelve years of national security operations. The scenarios are 
all similar; there were strategic questions that required examination and military planning 
in order to resolve them. The author sought these similar scenarios in order to increase 
the controls of this thesis. Without such similarities it is possible that correlations could 
be explained by alternate causality. Nevertheless, there are innumerable variables that 
influence civil-military relations. Despite significant similarities, these cases are no 
different. As such, the process tracing done herein is intended to identify the likelihood 
that the variables influenced the thesis’s concepts and focuses.  
As explained earlier, this thesis focuses on the concept of subjective civil-military 
relations at the civilian-principal and top-tier military leadership levels. Particular focus is 
paid to the influence of presidential leadership and decision-making process organization 
                                               
511 For the first case, the problem has two parts. First, should the United States invade Iraq? Second, how 
should a war plan be organized, developed, and executed? For the second case, the problem is whether a 
strategic review must take place in regards to operations in Iraq then, secondly, what solution should be 
adopted? For the third case, the problem is whether a strategic review should occur in regards to operations 
in Afghanistan then, secondly, what solution should be adopted? 
512 Because the primary options and ultimate solutions of all three cases were predominately military-based, 
the author finds it necessary to list this as a scenario. It is possible – even likely – that the typology of civil-
military relations would be significantly different if such strategic questions were approached from a more 
balanced, or even diplomacy heavy – approach.  
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in civil-military relations within the United States’ national security apparatus. The NSC 
and national security advisor’s proximity to power most influence decision-making 
process organization. The typologies to be examined have been defined and explored in 
the literature review chapter. This is the primary focus, though the author recognizes the 
influence of other concepts including bureaucratic process and innovation.  
Within the cases – individually and collectively – we are looking at patterns 
characteristic of the concepts and typologies advanced in this thesis. For example, the 
logic of this thesis focuses on variables present during the process of decision-making. 
This thesis focuses on the phenomenon of subjective civilian control. It is clear that there 
are varying forms of subjective civil-military relations shaped by different values of key 
variables. The process tracing and evidence presented here illuminate several 
mechanisms and variables pointing to a different type of subjective civilian control. 
This being the case, the dependent variable (DV) is the type of subjective civilian 
control that is present within a particular case’s civil-military relationship. The DV 
corresponds with Huntington’s typologies of subjective versus objective civil-military 
relations. The theory developed in this thesis is meant to complement the literature that 
precedes it. This author intends to fill a gap in existing conceptual frameworks regarding 
particular types of subjective control. 
The dependent variable is influenced by a large number of independent variables 
(IV). These are discussed throughout the thesis. Of all the independent variables, two are 
most present, influential, and predictable. Presidential leadership and decision-making 
process organization are clearly present in every case. They also have direct correlations 
with dependent variable outcomes. Other independent variables include the location in 
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which the debate is centered, the nature of the debate, the transparency of the debate, and 
the civilian agents’ level of authenticity within the civil-military dynamic. All of these 
IVs are described in chapter two. 
The National Security Council and national security advisor are highly influential 
agents in modern US national security decision-making. They have been particularly 
relevant since Nixon’s Administration and became structurally reinforced following the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of the late 1980s. Because of the NSC’s mission and its relevance 
regarding many independent variables (including the center of debate, nature of debate, 
and transparency of debate IVs), this author pays particular focus on how its character 
and actions influences the DV. This effort reinforces and builds upon existing literature. 
Numerous authors have studied the NSC’s role in decision-making and subsequently 
developed typologies that assist this thesis. Crabb and Mulcahy’s work is of particular 
relevance. This thesis complements and builds upon their theories, like Huntington’s. 
Intervening variables (IntV) include the organizational structures of bureaucracies 
used in the relationship, the style of communications between the sides (ie. method, 
frequency, etc.), tempo of the decision-making process, and others. Conditional variables 
(CV) include policy makers’ willingness to make policy decisions, the political 
capital/opportunity to enact policies, and the military’s capability to enact the decided 
upon tactics/strategies. The conditional variables were described more fully above.  
Three case studies are examined. These span two presidential administrations, 
two wars, two beginnings of combat, and two tactical/strategic shifts of ongoing combat 
operations. The case studies include war-planning for the Iraq invasion in the spring of 
2003; the strategic review and development of counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) as 
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well as what became known as the “Surge” in Iraq, 2006; and the strategic review and 
new war plan in Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak), 2009. The timeline spans approximately 
eight years, from September 2001 through December 2009.   
Conceptual Analysis  
 The three case studies offer useful insights about subjective civil-military 
relationships. There are many variables that affect the type of subjective control enjoyed 
by civilians. How the process is undertaken influences the characteristics of control. 
What remained constant through all cases was the president’s steady control of final 
decision-making. In every case the president enacted the decision that he arrived at 
without threat to his authority. Additionally, the style of national security debate was 
what the president desired. This was consistent through all cases, even when end runs and 
push back threatened the president’s ideal process path. It is clear that executive authority 
and subjective civilian control was firm through all cases. How the president and civilian 
agents succeeded in maintaining subjective control was different in each case, 
meanwhile. This latter point affords this author an opportunity to identify trends, develop 
a typology, and create a theory relating to delineated forms of subjective control. The 
conceptual framework presented in chapter two can now be applied to the cases herein.  
Throughout all of the three cases presidential leadership varied. Organization of 
the decision-making process was also clearly distinguishable, even when the actual 
events were secretive or the evidence available was incomplete. These two variables have 
clear characteristics and defined spectrums. They also relate to the other IVs covered in 
this thesis (see below). 
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Variable Spectrums         
   Characteristics     
  Decision-Making Process (DmPO) Orderly vs. Ad-hoc   
  Presidential Leadership (PL) Engaged vs. “Delegatory”   
  Center of Debate (DC) NSC vs. Other   
  Nature of Debate (DN) Inclusive vs. Exclusive   
  Transparency of Debate (DT) Open vs. Secretive   
  Character of Civilians (CC) Authentic-role vs. Co-optation   
            
Figure 6.1 – Variable Spectrums and Characteristics 
When the IVs are identified across the three case studies we begin to see trends.  
Cases DmPO PL DC DN DT CC 
Case I(a) Ad-hoc “Delegatory” Other Exclusive Secretive Co-Optation 
Case I(b) Ad-hoc Engaged Other Exclusive Open Co-Optation 
Case II Orderly “Delegatory” NSC Exclusive Secretive Co-Optation 
Case III Orderly Engaged NSC Inclusive Open Authentic-role 
Figure 6.2 – IV Identification 
 Over the course of the three case studies subjective civilian control became 
increasingly orderly and inclusive. The National Security Council was increasingly 
engaged, became the debate center, and tended to open up the debate process. We also 
know from earlier analysis that the NSC and national security advisor became less policy 
focused and more implementation focused with each successive case. All of these trends 
signify a shift to one end of all the variable spectrums.  
 It is worth taking some time to illuminate particular trends within the independent 
variables’ relationships. Most significantly, engaged presidential leadership corresponded 
with open debates. When the president was personally involved in the national security 
debate it resulted in a dialogue that was more publically transparent. Conversely, when 
the president delegated his leadership to another civilian agent the result was a secretive 
process.  
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A direct relationship also exists between engaged presidential leadership and 
inclusive debate processes. This does not exist over the course of all case studies. The 
latter half of Case I – titled Case I(b) – involved high engagement by President Bush and 
high debate transparency but exclusive characteristics. The author argues that while high 
engagement and open debate process existed during the latter half of Iraq war planning, 
power dynamics from the first half of the war planning – Case I(a) – were so entrenched 
that exclusive participation was maintained despite openness. Secretary Rumsfeld’s ad-
hoc debate process organization had consolidated power centers and culled civilian 
agents to such a degree that high transparency/presidential engagement did not shift the 
former variable. As such, Case I(b) is an outlier when considering the relationship 
between presidential engagement, debate transparency, and debate nature.  
Another trend exists between decision-making process organization and the 
debate center. When process organization was high/orderly, the NSC became the center 
of the policy debate. When low process organization led to ad-hoc protocols, the center of 
the debate existed outside of the NSC. As such, the National Security Council was the 
center of the policy debate during Cases II and III. Case I’s debate center was firmly in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Cases I(a) and III demonstrate how the variable spectrums relate to each other. 
They also substantiate our typology of subjective civil-military control. In both cases the 
extremes of all IVs are present. Case I involves the low/low combination of presidential 
leadership and decision-making process organization. It also contains the remaining 
variables’ far end characteristics (other [DC], exclusive [DN], secretive [DT], and co-
optation [CC]). Case III involves the high/high combination of presidential leadership 
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and decision-making process organization. It also contains the remaining variables’ 
complementary, far end characteristics (NSC [DC], inclusive [DN], open [DT], and 
authentic-role [CC]).  
Case II – and in some respects, the latter half of Case I (Case I(b)) – show the 
incremental shift from Case I’s low/low to Case III’s high/high characteristics. This 
movement is paired with the trends identified above in order to infer causal relationships 
among the variables. In particular, Case II helps us plot out the subjective types’ relation 
to each other and Huntington’s larger theory. Let us focus briefly on the latter point. If we 
overlay our typology upon Huntington’s theory we are able to determine the level of 
subjectivity in each case. Additionally, let us give particular focus to role authenticity. 
When we relate the authenticity/authoritative advantage to Huntington’s spectrum of 
subjective/objective control and then plot each case’s relative subjectivity, we are able to 
view the trajectory of subjective control and assess agents’ authoritative advantages over 
time.  The result is below: 
Figure 6.3 – Change over Time Trajectory for Civil-Military Relations  
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Finally, after determining the IVs, their characteristics in each case study, and how the 
variables relate to each other we can determine the type of subjective civil-military 
control that existed in each of the three case studies.  
         Decision-making Process Organization 
   low high 
   Ad-hoc Orderly 
       
  “Delegatory” Alternative Out-Sourced 
Presidential  low  Case I(a) Case II 
Leadership       
  Engaged Spontaneous Optimal 
  high Case I(b) Case III 
 
Figure 6.4 – The Cases and Typology of Subjective Civil-Military Control 
As stated earlier, Case I(a) and Case III possessed the low/low and high/high 
primary variable combinations, respectively. Meanwhile, changes in the level of 
presidential engagement – abutted by a calcified process organization – led to a low/high 
combination in Case I(b). Case II had high process organization – complemented by a 
newfound NSC focus on process implementations – and relatively low presidential 
leadership. This led to an out-sourced typology as NSA Hadley led a secretive strategic 
review using many military voices outside of the established, active-duty chain of 
command. It is Case III, meanwhile, that provides the most traditional, theoretically pure 
form of subjective civil-military control. This optimal scenario included high presidential 
leadership, high process organization, inclusive as well as open debate, and authentic 
agents across the civil-military relationship engaging in lively debate via an invigorated 
National Security Council. 
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Existing Literature and Case Study Trends 
 Several theories from civil-military relations and defense policy literatures are 
implicated in this thesis’ case studies. There are several trends that weave through all of 
them. Nevertheless, gaps as well as unsettled debates exist in the field. We now present a 
number of observations and conclusions – regarding the current literature – arising from 
this research. 
Consensus-Maintenance is Not the Goal 
(Cohen, Daalder, Destler, George, Priest) 
 Decision-making requires a critical amount of consensus. However, if 
maintaining comfortable levels of consensus is the primary goal, civil-military relations 
can suffer. This is just as risky a venture in the national security realm, as a whole. By 
virtue of complex systems and governmental bureaucracy, there are multiple priorities 
and perspectives that are held by all players. Ideally, representatives of the different 
institutions are talented and engaged enough to strongly promote their stances. Inevitably, 
there is going to be disagreement. This should not be avoided. The goal, then, is not 
consensus but manipulating the dissonance so as to draw out any commonalities. 
Ultimately, the best decision should satisfy the top priorities and also complement the 
highest possible percentage of positions involved. Harmony can be achieved if the 
tension is perpetuated and analyzed. 
 In the first case study consensus was a priority. President Bush’s leadership style 
was inclined to pursue particular policy decisions with high levels of consensus. 
However, this was achieved by limiting influence to those who were inclined to agree. If 
players disagreed or consistently challenged a position, they tended to be flanked or 
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ignored. For this and other reasons the Iraq war planning process became highly 
compartmentalized. It involved a fraction of the total national security apparatus. This 
was done for many reasons, though it is no coincidence that the involved players shared 
ideological, strategic, and tactical opinions. When disagreements did arise, the civilian 
policy makers used deadlines, assertive inquiries, and cherry-picking in order to receive 
the answers that were preferred. As such, even in moments of disagreement the civilian 
policy makers’ preference received consensus via tenacity.  
In the second case study, the expectation of consensus was so well entrenched that 
the necessary tension of review was delayed for prolonged periods of time. Many players 
in various realms of national security began their own secret and hermetic reviews. 
Collaboration was non-existent because of this. Even when the review did finally begin, 
the minority opinion was developed secretly and implemented rapidly so as to avoid 
overt disagreement. Again, the minority opinion of a surge was known to be politically 
unpopular and, more significantly, against the military commanders’ recommendation.  
Meanwhile, Frederick Thayer posited that officials “may not be forthright” in 
their critiques of they believe “the president has decided the issue in advance.”513 The 
first case study was no exception; multiple players suppressed numerous arguments when 
they suspected President Bush’s opinion was already made up. At that point their 
contribution served no purpose and could actually limit their influence going forward. 
In order to pursue the minority-held surge option in the second case study, the 
NSC and the president eventually cherry-picked a new combat command staff. This 
group of generals approved of the plan, prepared its implementation, and was inserted 
                                               
513 Thayer, Frederick C. "Presidential Policy Processes and New Administration: A Search for Revised 
Paradigms." Public Administration Review Sept/Oct (1971): 552-561. Web. 8 Sept 2012.pg. 556. 
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into the command structure when it was time to shepherd it through. The result was a 
significant change in strategy, a substantial policy review that occurred largely outside 
the normal civil-military structures, and a top-tier military leadership that was largely 
flanked and avoided. 
In the third case study tensions were deliberately raised, acknowledged, and 
perpetuated. Consensus was not a priority. In fact, President Obama’s leadership style 
required participation from all players as well as the discussion of all viable options. The 
president and NSC sought to distill a decision out of a sustained campaign of highly 
critical and contentious debate. Many perspectives were raised. When an advocate didn’t 
exist for a position, an individual was asked to fulfill that role. Eventually a decision that 
caused derision and tension was decided upon. The level of consensus was enough to 
move forward but it was never the top priority. In fact, at points, it appears as though 
consensus was actively avoided.  
Multiple Advocacy is Essential 
(George) 
 Multiple advocacy is essential in promoting healthy civil-military relations and 
sufficiently inclusive discussions within the national security apparatus. Bureaucratic 
process inevitably leads to politicking. Each player is going to be invested in his position, 
framing and arguing his points as such. Meanwhile, the national security community 
works best when all its players are engaged in policy discussions. Because of the 
inevitable dissonance these facts will develop, it’s imperative that multiple advocacy be 
used to counter the normal tendencies of agency and bureaucracy. 
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 The National Security Council structure offers an excellent forum through which 
multiple advocacy can take place. The NSC’s integrative setup allows myriad players to 
present their positions and petition the decision makers. The national security advisor can 
be tasked to the custodial role, per George’s theory. The characteristics of this figure’s 
position are vital to the success of multiple advocacy. If the national security advisor 
staffs the president too aggressively – thus taking on an advocate/policy-making role – it 
may inhibit his ability to choreograph the NSC’s functions while maintaining legitimacy.  
The civil-military relationship – and the national security realm, more broadly – 
must also have players that have evenly distributed resources. If certain players lack the 
intelligence, staffing, resources, or influence that are held by their cohorts, it’s likely that 
the quality of the relationship will become distorted. If this occurs, it is easy for relevant 
positions to be lost. Specific players can gain non-proportional control.  
Multiple advocacy also requires strong leadership by the decision maker. The 
president must participate in the process, engaging all positions and parsing the nuances 
of what is presented with skepticism. If the president does not assert his leadership in the 
process, the NSC must take the mantle and ensure the proper power dynamics. If neither 
occurs, a power vacuum develops and presents opportunities for inequitable dynamics. 
Multiple advocacy further stresses the importance of the calendar. Leaders must have – 
and use – the full time required to reach an informed decision. The key is using the NSC 
so as to compel these characteristics in the civil-military relationship.  
 Alexander George’s work on multiple advocacy was bolstered by the three case 
studies here. In the first case, multiple advocacy was absent. Under a compressed 
timeline, delegated leadership, secrecy, and compartmentalized engagement a fraction of 
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the civilian leadership (the OSD) maintained nearly exclusive control over the decision-
making process. Co-optation of the CINC also allowed a fraction of the military 
leadership to influence a vast majority of their participation. The decision-making process 
during Iraq war planning ran counter to many of Alexander George’s recommendations. 
Most strikingly, George emphasized the need for the decision-maker to access all 
viewpoints and options. He wrote, “Differences of view are identified and defended” in 
the NSC, “rather than muted or buried.”514 However, this was not the case for a majority 
of the first case. 
 George described nine malfunctions of a policy-making system. Each typology 
was to be avoided. Unfortunately, a number of them were present in the first case study. 
George warned of when advisers debate different stances “but their disagreements don’t 
cover the full range of relevant hypotheses and alternative options.”515 He also warned of 
“when there is no advocate for an unpopular policy option.”516 Process tracing has 
revealed that both of these malfunction typologies were present in the first case study. 
The president’s involvement and leadership style, complemented by an atrophic NSC, 
allowed a plurality of policy option discussions to occur before the president was 
involved. This minimized the number of options for the president and limited his 
flexibility. As such, strategic review of a war plan morphed into an actionable military 
policy without explicit discussions from all players about the consequences. 
 Other malfunction typologies were present in the first case study. Various 
advisers argued over and arrived at policy preferences before presenting them to the 
president. This process is common and necessary within bureaucracies. However, when 
                                               
514 George, Alexander L. "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy." pg. 754. 
515 Ibid. pg. 772. 
516 Ibid. pg. 773. 
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the argument arrives at a unanimous decision that is presented without the decider’s 
knowledge of context, it’s negative. This perverted the decision-making process by 
abridging the viable options and the president’s knowledge of the process. The 
malfunction was amplified by an additional attribute: the president’s failure to “ascertain 
how firm the consensus was, how it was achieved, and whether it is justified.”517 
President Bush’s deferential leadership style – particularly with Secretary Rumsfeld and 
the military leadership – perpetuated a tendency for generalized questioning during the 
most senior-level meetings. When the president met with the Joint Chiefs, for example, 
he asked for simple yes or no answers, acknowledged general critiques, and was satisfied. 
 Another one of George’s malfunction typologies that was pervasive throughout 
the first case study was, “When the president, faced with an important problem to decide, 
is dependent upon a single channel of information.”518 Throughout the entire case study 
the information that was accessed by principal-level leadership was of singular – and 
controversial – sources. This also created tensions within the civil-military relationship as 
various players – most of them, flanked or outright avoided – were concerned about the 
validity of the planning process. 
In the second case, secrecy again stunted the potential of multiple advocacy. More 
players and positions participated in comparison to the first case study. The NSC was 
more engaged, as were a higher number of players across the civil-military spectrum. 
However, the national security advisor and related staff held hybrid custodian/policy-
making roles. This inhibited the ideal breadth of options and participants. Additionally 
                                               
517 Ibid. pg. 780. 
518 Ibid. pg. 777. 
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the official, public strategy review began very late and lasted a relatively short period of 
time. This truncated the window in which successful multiple advocacy could occur. 
Because of this, the malfunction typology most directly related to the second case 
study is, “When the key assumptions and premises of a plan have been evaluated only by 
the advocates of that option.”519 The standard-bearers of the enacted policy were within 
the National Security Council. The national security advisor staffed President Bush in a 
policy-making capacity while also managing the NSC. This combination led to an 
environment in which Hadley and his staff simultaneously lobbied for a plan that was 
also reviewed under their custodianship.  
This malfunction increased the likelihood that the surge option would be adopted. 
However, there is no indication that was the reason it was ordered. It’s also relevant to 
note that the review process was more inclusive, deliberative, and contentious than the 
first case study. Regardless, multiple advocacy was not achieved because of this more 
glaring malfunction. It had further influence upon the civil-military relationship; the 
chain of command was subverted and the leadership was reorganized because of it. This 
perpetuated a subjective civil-military relationship through which a civilian-held policy 
was developed by co-opted military figures (in this case retired active duty as well as 
officers outside the top-tier leadership) and implemented despite the objections of 
numerous principal-level military officers.  
The final case study reveals the best attempt at multiple advocacy of the three. On 
behalf of an engaged president, the NSC mediated a highly procedural strategic review 
that expected participation of all players as well as the representation of many positions. 
In the spirit of multiple advocacy, President Obama explicitly asked Vice President Biden 
                                               
519 Ibid. pg. 778. 
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to campaign for a position for which there was no other advocate. This action 
complemented the Socratic method that President Obama used in numerous meetings. 
There were many deputy level meetings during which different positions were 
debated and decisions were arrived at prior to the president’s involvement. This behavior 
was consistent with one of George’s malfunction typologies. However, because of the 
president’s level of involvement, it did not seem to compromise the strategy review. 
President Obama’s participation was frequent enough to prevent decision bias; he was 
sufficiently aware of a necessary level of information. Likewise, there were moments 
when the military leadership sought to censor the range of options presented to civilian 
policy makers. However, because of the actions of individual military officers this did not 
occur. 
The civilian policy-makers aggressively debated the military’s positions. The 
assertive, interrogative nature of the strategy review increased overt tension within the 
civil-military relationship. It also increased the frequency of leaks and politicking within 
the national security apparatus. President Obama and his NSC – through the leadership of 
the national security advisor – altered the strategy review’s lexicon. They changed the 
lens through which the case was examined. These moves were direct challenges to the 
military-centric framing of the prior decade. By augmenting the latter with the former, 
the “mixed system” of multiple advocacy came closer to fruition.520  
In this case, the president accepted and embraced a fact authored by Alexander 
George: “Conflict over policy and advocacy are inevitable within a complex 
                                               
520 George wrote, “Multiple advocacy requires management to create the basis for structured, balanced 
debate among policy advocates drawn from different parts of the organization… Multiple advocacy, 
therefore, is a ‘mixed system’ that combines elements of a centralized management model with certain 
features of pluralistic and participatory systems.” Ibid. pg. 751. 
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organization.”521 In order to navigate the tensions, President Obama manipulated the 
calendar so as to parse out the options on his terms before making a final decision. He 
refused to let deadlines, politicking, or external pressures dictate the civil-military 
relationship or the national security decision-making process.  
The most substantial failure of multiple advocacy was his inability to ensure all 
sides possessed equivalency in resources. The State Department, National Security 
Council, and other atrophied players were emboldened prior as well as through the case 
study. However, equity was not attained. The most influence still rested firmly with the 
Pentagon, even though the president and NSC effectively shifted the authority back to the 
other side of the Potomac. The net change, meanwhile, did allow for a purer form of 
subjective civil-military relations, even if the latter body still dominated the available 
resources. 
NSC/National Security Advisor Must Stay Engaged 
(Crabb, Lord) 
 The case studies reveal the importance of maintaining a legitimate, influential, 
and engaged National Security Council. This is especially true if the president isn’t 
consistently engaged in the decision-making process. The NSC must be networked with 
all avenues of the national security apparatus. It must also be seen as legitimate in the 
eyes of all players. Carnes Lord wrote that a strong NSC is one of the best defenses 
against a strong White House staff. The same can be said about preventing an overly 
politicized – or ideological – civil-military relationship.  
In the first case, a weak NSC failed to assert itself in the policy discussion. It also 
failed to reign in the OSD’s expansion of power. It even failed to funnel civil-military 
                                               
521 Ibid. pg. 759. 
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communications into arenas that could be easily monitored or complemented by all 
relevant players. The NSC’s atrophic performance corresponded to the co-opted and 
subjective styles of the civil-military relationship. It had limited participation within the 
planning process. Without a custodian choreographing the strategic planning it became 
increasingly easy for highly influential players to increase their monopoly of the events.  
In the second case study the NSC was more involved and the national security 
advisor was more influential. This corresponds with broader civilian participation, greater 
equivalency in contribution, and a more balanced civil-military relationship. This helped 
counteract a president who was not proactive in starting a strategic review. And while the 
OSD as well as the Pentagon had decreased influence by this point, the NSC’s 
involvement helped to further moderate the substantial power center in the Pentagon. 
Another significant aspect of the civil-military/national security dynamic was how 
close NSA Hadley was to President Bush. Joseph Bock noted that national security 
advisors can possess high levels of influence based on their proximity, alone.522 This was 
particularly true in the second case study. Stephen Hadley’s relationship with and 
exposure to President Bush allowed him to possess great influence in the strategy review. 
This had the effect of increasing the success rate of a minority position that held little 
sway in the current, active-duty military leadership. 
In the third case the NSC was heavily engaged. It was the locus of the strategy 
review and the national security advisor was custodian over the process. Despite various 
tensions and leaks in the process, the NSC succeeded in enacting a substantially multi-
advocate environment. The president’s level of involvement and efforts to define the 
                                               
522 He wrote, “His close proximity to and daily contact with the president allows him to be more in tune 
with the president’s political concerns, not to mention the concerns of the political advisers.” Bock, Joseph 
G. The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987. pg. 180. 
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power dynamics helped complement the NSC’s influence, as well. What’s more, national 
security advisor’s purely custodial role helped moderate a complex, contentious, political, 
fluid process. NSA Jones’ legitimacy, loyalty, and consistency helped bolster the NSC’s 
mission. 
There is No Primer; Personalities Beget All 
(Bock, George) 
 This thesis and its case studies confirm that civil-military relations and the NSC 
are influenced immensely by personalities. Structural arguments are vital to 
understanding the concepts herein; they dominate the thesis, in fact. However, 
interpersonal dynamics are so significant that no model can be applied universally. 
Alexander George wrote prolifically about the influence of personalities and group 
behavior. His observations resonate with these three case studies. 
 In the first case study is was found that NSA Rice attempted to transplant 
Scowcroft’s NSC structure into President George W. Bush’s administration. Personalities 
and leadership styles inhibited success in this venture. Instead, Condoleezza Rice would 
have benefited from transposing the former NSC structure. That is, attempting to 
replicate relationships and power dynamics is different from carbon copying roles. The 
latter assumes uniformity across countless individuals’ temperaments, opinions, 
relationships, and decisions. These assumptions are faulty – even arrogant – when one 
deals with the human animal. 
 In the second case study the national security and civil-military relationships more 
accurately reflected the personalities involved. NSA Hadley had greater influence upon 
the decision-making process because he understood the president’s preferences – both in 
238 
 
leadership and policy. The NSC was more successful in choreographing the relationships 
because it engaged the relevant players in ways that complemented personalities and 
power dynamics. Secretary Rumsfeld and the OSD was challenged more, the State 
Department was courted more, and the military was pressed more aggressively. When 
this was complemented by a bold and military-endorsed plan – albeit retired military – 
the NSC/civilian leadership was successful in enacting a strategy review that was counter 
the military’s stance and effective in more equitable communications. 
 The third case study involved a civil-military relationship and national security 
apparatus that incorporated the most players. Furthermore, President Obama and his NSC 
engaged in high levels of involvement. The civilian policy makers interrogated all 
positions – especially those of the military’s CENTCOM CINC and combat leadership – 
most aggressively. They also enacted a process flow and procedural scaffold that best 
reflected the civilian leadership’s desires while also restricting the tendencies they wished 
to avoid. These maneuvers led to an agency/structure hybrid approach that 
simultaneously amplified some individuals and contained other personalities; all of this 
occurred within a highly codified environment. The National Security Council was the 
structure throughout which the entire strategy review occurred. This, complemented by 
the president’s highly engaged approach, allowed the top civilian to act as magistrate, per 
Alexander George’s recommendation. In so doing, subjective civil-military relations 
occurred without the need for civilians to co-opt military legitimacy or roles. 
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Typologies of National Security Advisors 
                Implementation Responsibility 
     
   Low High 
   Department-Centered Formalized  
  Low Administrator Coordinator 
Policymaking   Cases I Case III 
Responsibility   Collegial Palace Guard 
  High Counselor Agent 
     Case II 
Figure 6.5 – Typologies of National Security Advisors (Crabb and Mulcahy) 
 Cecil Crabb and Kevin Mulcahy were adamant that the national security advisor’s 
role was determined mostly by the president’s leadership style and preferences. 
Furthermore, the advisor’s success was reliant upon how well he adapted to the 
president’s wishes.523 As such, the magistrate/decision maker was doubly important. He 
influenced the NSC’s head both culturally as well as through agency. This argument 
complements the focus and developed typology of this thesis. The emphasis on 
interpersonal dynamics laid the foundation of their national security advisor’s roles 
typologies. Admittedly, they are simplistic and required generalizations. However, these 
typologies are effective in categorizing the national security advisors’ roles. As such, this 
thesis applies them to these cases. 
Case I 
 In the first case study the National Security Council and national security advisor 
maintained the lowest levels of implementation responsibility. They were the least 
involved in the civil-military relationship and were the least influential upon the decision 
making process. Because of the president’s inclination towards delegation and the low 
                                               
523 Crabb, Cecil V. & Kevin Mulcahy. American National Security: A Presidential Perspective. Pacific 
Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991. pg. 176. 
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influence maintained by the NSC, the defense secretary and his office were able to 
capitalize on the power vacuum. The impetus for Iraq war planning was centered in the 
OSD and the locus of power throughout the process firmly rested in Secretary Rumsfeld.  
 There is little evidence that NSA Condoleezza Rice asserted herself or the NSC 
during the case study. Regardless of effort or intent, neither she nor the council held 
significant influence. What’s more, the NSC was not the forum through which a majority 
of the process flowed. It was flanked by the consistent actions of Secretary Rumsfeld and 
the OSD. The disregard for the NSC either perpetuated or arose from the defense 
secretary’s control of the war planning process. President Bush made it clear that he 
wanted his defense secretary to begin the planning process. From that moment through 
the final attack order, Secretary Rumsfeld accepted and expanded the authority given to 
him. 
 Causality is difficult to determine in this case study. It would be unwise to assume 
whether Secretary Rumsfeld’s influence inflated because of the NSC’s atrophic state or if 
NSA Rice’s purview was stifled because of the defense secretary’s actions. There is 
evidence that various principal-level civilians sought to undercut the NSC and Rice from 
the beginning of the administration. However, a direct correlation escapes us.  
 Despite this being the case, it is clear that the NSC and National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice had low levels of responsibility, both in relation to the history of the 
National Security Council and in relation to other civilian policy makers. Meanwhile, 
NSA Rice publicly acknowledged that her role was to staff the president. This being the 
case, her policymaking responsibilities were mid-to-high. These variables place the 
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national security advisor’s role in the first case study somewhere between administrator 
and counselor on Crabb’s and Mulcahy’s typology scale.524  
This author finds that characterization to be accurate. As administrator (low 
implementation, low policy-making), one finds that departments outside of the White 
House and NSC accumulate influence. They also tend to take the lead on strategic issues 
as well as decision-making. Secretary Rumsfeld and his OSD certainly succeeded to this 
end. Meanwhile, the counselor typology (low implementation, high policy-making) 
fosters a collegial style leadership. The NSC and national security advisor shirk 
administrative functions in order to focus on policy-driven roles.  
Additionally, ad hoc decision-making groups tend to develop in the absence of the 
NSC’s leadership. The consensus-friendly, respectful style of collegial leadership 
matches President Bush’s desire to maintain an even keel within the national security 
leadership. In order to maintain this atmosphere, however, it became necessary to 
dissociate certain players from the decision-making process and delegate the most 
conflict-ridden processes to other departments (in this case, Secretary Rumsfeld and the 
OSD). Inevitably, an ad hoc group of primary civilian players came to the fore. 
Case II 
 In the second case study process tracing reveals significantly different dynamics 
within the civil-military and national security realms. Consensus was still a priority set by 
the president’s leadership style. However, dissatisfaction with the status quo led nearly all 
players to question the merits of the current strategic decision. Meanwhile, the defense 
secretary no longer possessed the level of influence or access that he once did. A leveling 
of sorts occurred within the national security power dynamics. President Bush privately 
                                               
524 Crabb, Cecil V. & Kevin Mulcahy. American National Security: A Presidential Perspective. pg. 189. 
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acknowledged the need to review his orders; he eventually requested that a confidential 
strategy review begin within the National Security Council. 
 President Bush tasked his national security advisor and the NSC with the review. 
He did so for a number of reasons. Among these were the high levels of trust and access 
enjoyed by National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley. Additionally, a confidential 
review within the NSC – a body particularly close to the White House and the president’s 
staff – was most inclined to succeed secretly as well as to Bush’s preferences. Thus began 
the formal strategy review process that would bring about a surge in Iraq. 
 NSA Hadley approached the strategy review with strong personal bias towards a 
COIN-related strategy shift. He and many of his staffers believed a change was required 
and that counterinsurgency afforded them an opportunity. Hadley also perceived his role 
as a policy adviser and staffer of the president. This was not mutually exclusive from his 
role as the NSC’s custodian, however. The national security advisor maintained a high 
level of influence in both realms and he acted accordingly. According to Crabb and 
Mulcahy, NSA Hadley maintained high levels of responsibility in both policy-making 
and implementation. This placed him squarely within the agent typology. 
 This author agrees with this characterization of both President Bush’s 
management style and NSA Hadley’s role in the second case study. The national security 
advisor was given the lead on the strategy review. He maintained the mantle of that 
decision all the way through to implementation. Secretary Rumsfeld’s role in the strategy 
review was negligible. This was because of his decreased influence through Fall 2006, 
followed by his resignation after the mid-term elections. The OSD held limited sway 
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because it also sided with the combat commanders’ assessments, thus going against the 
president’s own policy inclinations. 
 More players from a larger range of bureaucratic bodies participated in this case 
study. However, the NSC was the locus of power throughout the formal strategy review 
process. This was particularly true after retired general Jack Keane inserted himself in to 
the process. His position was augmented into the NSC’s process and its policy posture. 
This helped enhance the policy argument that was being pushed by the NSC, especially 
because of its unpopularity with the military as well as other civilian policymakers.  
 In sum, the national security advisor’s role was similar to what Crabb and 
Mulcahy called palace guard behavior. When this is the case, administrative as well as 
policy responsibilities are contained within the White House’s purview; this includes the 
NSC. National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley was assertive in his role. He managed 
the creation of the policy options and took steps to enhance the surge/COIN option as a 
legitimate choice. He complemented his position with the experience and articulate 
nature of allies with whom he agreed. In so doing, he choreographed the development of 
a minority held position until it was a legitimate enough policy option for the president to 
select.  
Case III 
 In the third case study we saw a presidential management style and national 
security role that was most distinct from the other two cases. Process tracing showed that 
President Obama was highly engaging in the strategy review. Prior to the beginning of 
that event, he had made numerous decisions that clearly expanded and delineated the 
NSC’s role in his administration. The expanded National Security Council was under the 
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leadership of a national security advisor who was expected to manage a substantial swath 
of civil-military and foreign policy terrain. NSA Jones was expected to be a custodian 
over the national security bureaucracies. As such, he had high levels of implementation 
responsibilities. Conversely, he did not staff the president and didn’t so much as divulge 
his policy preferences. 
 These characteristics place the third case study firmly within the coordinator 
typology, according to Crabb and Mulcahy. The author agrees with this conclusion and 
finds it to be the most accurate description of the three case studies. The coordinator 
typology is closest to Alexander George’s description of the national security advisor’s 
role. That is, the position is tasked with being the custodian of the national security 
process and conduit through which the magistrate can make his decision. All available 
evidence seems to indicate that NSA Jones, his deputies, and the NSC as a whole worked 
towards that end. 
 According to Crabb and Mulcahy the coordinator typology is inclined towards a 
formalized leadership pattern. The latter is an accurate depiction of the procedures 
pursued in the third case study. The highly structured, codified procedures of President 
Obama’s NSC reflected his desire to have a high level of control and knowledge of the 
decision-making processes. As such, the National Security Council became the locus of 
all deliberation and decisions. This required a strong NSC and a national security advisor 
who’s pervasive and primary task was coordination. Data exchange and transparency 
were paramount. This was especially true when a high number or bureaucratic players 
were expected to participate. Being able to choreograph the personalities, politicking, 
proposals, and deadlines was of utmost important to NSA Jones. 
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 The level of communication and deliberation that was encouraged in the third 
case study helped stimulate the civil-military relationship. At various points of the 
strategy review tension increased significantly. Morale swung like a pendulum as 
civilians challenged the military, officers pushed back within as well as outside of the 
formal channels, and the president continually enforced his control over the decision 
making process. However, the discourse helped invigorate the civil-military relationship, 
challenge myriad suppositions, and forge a power dynamic that was based on the 
traditional, delineated characteristics of both sides. Civilians led subjectively by way of 
their civilian powers. Military leaders objectively influenced the decisions by way of 
their professional experience and knowledge. As such, the relationship benefited from the 
“candor, honesty, and clarity” that comes from fundamentally exploring “assumptions 
and [digging] into differences.”525  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
525 Tom Ricks emphasized the need for this civil-military discourse in his most recent book about civil-
military relationships and generals in the past decade. It is titled The Generals. He also emphasized that 
good discourse does not mean “everyone getting along.” Ricks also said, “I came away from the book 
thinking that the quality of civil-military discourse is one of the few leading indicators you have of how 
well a war will go.” Ackerman, Spencer. "Your Favorite Army General Actually Sucks." The Danger 
Room. Wired Magazine. 31 Oct 2012. Web. 11 Nov 2012. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
 Civil-military relations will continue to be a vitally important topic as long as the 
modern, democratic nation-state exists. The concept continues to evolve, devolve, 
mutate, and expand through the years. There is no vacuum within civil-military relations. 
Civilian policymakers and military professionals influence the relationship while being in 
the midst of it. The inevitability, fluidity, and momentum of this concept make it ripe for 
research and frequent analysis. Political scientists should not be timid. They should 
attempt to continually analyze and learn from recent cases, thus helping to hone and 
apply their theories. 
 The framing of this thesis was born out of these trends. The twenty-first century is 
dense with activity within United States civil-military relations. Multiple cases reveal 
transformative moments of posturing, divisiveness, and cooperation. The military 
campaigns that followed September 11th are boons for research regarding not only this 
concept but also foreign policy and national security decision-making. However, 
researchers must approach the available information with heightened skepticism. The 
volume of available sources is low; a vast majority of the most credible and definitive 
information is still classified. Meanwhile, available sources are often tainted with bias or 
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the voices of invested individuals. Regardless, political scientists have the opportunity to 
analyze these relations at a moment of great velocity and undetermined trajectory.  
 This thesis focused on three strategic decision-making moments in US civil-
military relations during the past decade. The project uncovered three different types of 
subjective civil-military relations. It analyzed the new typologies and related them to 
established literature. The thesis goal was to better understand how civilian policymakers 
and military professionals interact during key moments in policy decision-making. The 
author readily admits that there are limits to the work but further argues that it contributes 
to existing literature in significant ways. By contextualizing the findings, this author 
seeks to enhance political science’s understanding of this vital concept. 
Conclusions 
 This thesis arrived at a number of conclusions regarding civil-military relations, 
the variables affecting it, how different forms of subjective control are enacted, and how 
those forms relate to each other. The characteristics of subjective civil-military control 
are most greatly influenced by presidential leadership and process organization. Other 
independent variables include the center of the debate, nature of the debate, transparency 
of debate, and character of civilian action. 
In all three cases the style and tempo of decision-making was dictated by the 
president. His preferred leadership style was definitive, even when push back and end 
runs increased. When the president was engaged in decision-making then it was likely 
that process organization was orderly. Orderly process organization tended to lead to 
more inclusive, open, authentic civil-military relations. Additionally, when process 
organization is high, the National Security Council tended to be the locus of debate. 
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 Presidential leadership and decision-making process organization are the most 
delineated and influential variables in all three case studies. The other variables, listed 
above, impact the type of civil-military relationships, as well. This thesis found 
correlations between the variables and paired them by their extremes. Chapter six 
includes the full conceptual analysis. However, a clear relationship exists between 
engaged presidential leadership and open, inclusive debates. Conversely, if the president 
delegates his leadership then secretive, exclusive processes tend to follow.  
 Based on the variable characteristics in each case and their relations through time, 
this thesis found that subjective civil-military relations became increasingly moderate, 
authentic, and theoretically pure from 2003 through 2009. The national security advisor 
became decreasingly involved in policy formation and increasingly engaged in process 
organization. The latter point corresponded with the NSC’s increasing influence and 
importance to strategy discussions.  
 Using process tracing and analysis of the case studies, this thesis developed a new 
typology that explains the characteristics of subjective civilian control based on the two 
most influential independent variables discussed above. The concepts are complex, 
causality is often undetermined, and myriad variables can influence or mutate anticipated 
trends. However, the correlations that were uncovered here can help enlighten and 
expand the current literature.  
Limits to the Work 
 There are clear challenges to the certainty and breadth of this work’s findings. 
This thesis focuses on very recent history. The volume of sources is incomplete, 
fragmented, and often contains highly subjective voices. The author must admit that the 
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findings could be challenged or dismissed as more sources become available. 
Additionally, this work focused on a small number of top-tier, principal level leaders. The 
work lends itself to great man theory in that it assumes indefatigable power at the top 
tiers of governments. There are a great many institutions and agents that contribute to 
civil-military, foreign policy, and national security issues. It’s possible that other levels - 
which were not focused on here – shaped the relationship. 
 Meanwhile, the beginning of chapter six outlined the scenarios that had to be in 
place in order to merit case study analysis. The list was very specific. As such, this thesis 
and its theories may not apply to other civil-military interactions at the grand strategic or 
purely tactical levels. Furthermore, the focus on United States political and military 
apparatuses means that it should only be applied to the structures and institutions of this 
country. 
Contribution to the Literature 
 The typologies developed in this thesis enrich the literature’s understanding of 
subjective civilian control. Political science literature lacks comprehensive examination 
of the different types of subjective control. The degree of civilian control is often 
overlooked; the civil-military relationship is often perceived as a binary relationship that 
switches between objective and subjective. However, degrees of subjectivity are 
important in understanding how civilians control the civil-military relationship. 
 This thesis also contributes to the literature’s conceptualization of process. There 
have been many works that describe civil-military relationships throughout history. 
However, few works focus on how the dynamics were established. The process related to 
perpetuating a civil-military relationship is often overlooked, as well. This thesis sought 
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to fill that void and deepen political science’s understanding of the relationship. By 
examining agents’ and structures’ actions in the cases, the author uncovered the methods 
that develop particular types of subjective control. By focusing on cases during a period 
of significant innovation and strategic shifts, the thesis drew conclusions from more fluid 
moments in the civil-military relationship. All of this helped create a picture of the 
concept amidst the volatility of change. 
 Finally, the thesis contributes to existing literature by examining how relevant 
theories complemented the data. The works of Huntington, Cohen, Daalder, Destler, 
George, Priest, Crabb, Mulcahy, Lord, and Best were studied. Process tracing, conceptual 
analysis, and typology development supported George’s multiple advocacy theory and 
provided data affirming his malfunction typologies. Crabb and Mulcahy’s national 
security advisor leadership typologies fit the case studies with striking precision. Feaver’s 
agency theory was enhanced by the frequency of challenges, end runs, and ultimate 
civilian enforcement present in the three cases. Bock and George’s emphasis on 
personality dynamics resonated greatly with the first case study. Crabb and Lord’s call 
for engaged NSC/national security advisor leadership was heeded with increasing fervor 
throughout the thesis.  
Priest’s theory of increasing objectivity was seemingly refuted when all three 
cases revealed subjective civilian control. However, her observations about objective 
military influence and the transformation of professional power complement this author’s 
observations vis-à-vis authentic roles. Civilian co-optation of military professionals – 
especially CINCs and officers below the Joint Chiefs – indicates inequity amongst 
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civilians and military officers. There are various solutions to this quandary facing civilian 
policymakers, as each case study proved. 
These findings and contributions are intended to enrich political science literature. 
Every episode within civil-military relations is a microcosm that can be studied. For 
better or worse, this century has been dense with case study candidates. At the risk of 
uncovering trends too hastily, this thesis sought to discover civil-military characteristics 
at this volatile moment in history. With any luck it has afforded us greater understanding 
of this field’s past and the nature of our present actions. 
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